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Introduction
One of the most important dilemmas of the modern world 
is the striving for universalization in the sphere of morality, the 
pursuit of unity in the sphere of law, the desire to achieve a com-
mon understanding of justice for all people on the one hand, 
and an existential longing experienced by separate groups and 
individuals, states, and communities to establish and preserve 
their own uniqueness on the other. The stumbling block is pre-
cisely the answer to the question of a uniform understanding 
of the world and human behaviour. Superficial preservation of 
diversity obviously does not help to solve this difficult dilem-
ma of modernity.
It is possible to move towards humanism through mutual 
recognition; the struggle leading to slavery and domination is 
tragic. Masters are only recognized by their slaves. There can 
only be one reasonable solution to the struggle for recognition–
mutual recognition among equals. Is it possible in a society 
where people are united only by a common goal or a common 
idea? Even a common goal, which brings people together, may 
ultimately result in tyranny – with tragic consequences.
Is there an alternative? Is liberalism based on the equality of 
civil rights an adequate alternative? In this case, it is necessary 
to consider the issue of different cultural contexts. Depending 
on a cultural context, equal rights can be interpreted differently. 
Hence, the question is whether the idea of equal rights, inter-
preted in a particular cultural context and depending on this 
context, is the only possible interpretation.
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The current crisis of epistemological and ethical founda-
tions is caused by the fact that the era of metanarratives in 
continental philosophy has come to an end. The crisis is as-
sociated with the attempts by analytical philosophy to find re-
liable bases of knowledge using its own methodology. These 
attempts ultimately end with a crisis and require analysis in 
context. Contextualism, in its turn, cannot provide a complete 
and comprehensive answer to the question of the foundations 
of knowledge and ethics. However, it can be an effective instru-
ment in clarifying the above problems, along with the herme-
neutic tradition of continental philosophy and the develop-
ments of phenomenological ontology.
The contextual approach is appropriate, provided that the 
contextualism of cultural specificities is essentially an adequate 
response to contemporary challenges. If cultural contextualism 
is adequate, it would seem that the accusation, made by various 
societies, of global unification is well-grounded. However, cul-
tural contextualism – just like any other – may not be an ade-
quate solution to epistemological and ethical problems, while 
the restoration of a single ontological picture of the world may 
be really important. The immediate problem of knowledge pro-
duction amid the calamities of the twentieth century, the im-
portance of understanding ethical guidelines in the light of the 
epistemological crisis of modernity, and the high scientific value 
of interpreting a complex of epistemological and ethical issues in 
today’s realities have determined the choice of the research topic.
Purpose and objectives of the study. The purpose of 
the study is to conduct an epistemological and contextual 
discourse analysis of the problems of knowledge production 
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in the post-catastrophe era, namely: the identification of the 
essential characteristics indicating the ontological genesis of 
the existing crisis of epistemological and ethical foundations; 
consideration of the main distinctive features of knowledge 
interpretation in epistemology and contextualism as a pos-
sible knowledge production instrument; study of the pos-
sibility of restoring an integral picture of the world based on 
phenomenological ontologies; study of possibilities in the 
language domain from a hermeneutical point of view in the 
light of the resolution of epistemological contradictions.
As for the method, the study covers a transition from exis-
tential to social phenomenology. It contains a critique of epis-
temological and contextual fundamentalism, induction and 
reflexive quest, interpretation of ethical and aesthetic founda-
tions as part of the movement and critique mentioned.
To identify epistemological and ethical foundations, the 
study focuses on the concepts developed by Continental phi-
losophers (Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, Paul Ricœur, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-François 
Lyotard, Jürgen Habermas, Donald Verene), analytical philos-
ophers (Edmund Gettier, Michael Williams, Oswald Hafling, 
Gilbert Harman, Alvin Goldman, David Clarke, Kate Lehrer, 
Peter Klein, David Lewis, Stewart Cohen, Edward Keyserlingk, 
Barry Hoffmaster, Earl Winkler, Richard Shusterman), and 
representatives of German analytical philosophy (Gerhard 
Ernst and Erich Ammereller).
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Chapter 1. Knowledge: 
scepticism and epistemology
Kant’s search for synthetic a priori propositions applicable 
specifically to ethics, Hegel’s idealistic reinterpretation of the 
master-slave dialectic, the Marxist emancipation of the prole-
tariat were, in the author’s opinion, prerequisites for a number 
of large-scale disasters of the twentieth century: from a series 
of Russian revolutions in 1905–1917, the fascist reaction to 
revolutionary liberation movements to modern scepticism, 
claims for a new world order, on the one hand, and the crisis of 
discourses of human rights and international law, on the other 
hand. Marxism and critical theory were a reaction to Hegel’s 
philosophy and to the philosophical views of the Enlighten-
ment. The left-wing Hegelian critics were more radical and be-
lieved that Hegel’s dialectic was far from complete. Karl Marx 
took their side. Marx believed in the complete abolition of pri-
vate property and the capitalist production system as a whole 
in order to overcome the class structure of the state and the 
individualism of the civil society.
Marx believed that only the working class, or the prole-
tariat, was up to the task in the interests of all mankind. Lib-
eration of the proletariat was not the only idea – emancipa-
tion of the proletariat implied universal human emancipation 
(Marx, 1974, p. 41). Marx identified four types of alienation 
that occur to the workers labouring under a capitalist system: 
their alienation from their product, from the act of produc-
tion, from their work as an act of creativity and, finally, from 
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other workers as a result of antagonistic class relations. How-
ever, Marx’s theory of alienation is largely based on Hegelian 
criticism. Marx combined a version of Feuerbach’s material-
ism with the historical dialectical progression of the forms of 
knowledge developed by Hegel. As a result, Kant’s universal 
and eternal categories were reinterpreted in terms of history 
and sociology. An understanding of reality reflects the social 
forms prevailing at the moment; ideas are not the essence of 
being, but historical social being determines ideas. This is 
not an abstract person or the disembodied subject of the En-
lightenment. It is also not the historically unfolding spirit of 
Hegel, which is the essence of man, but the ensemble of all 
social relations. The meaning of history is not an idealistic di-
alectic of absolute spirit, but a series of modes of production. 
The very history of Marxism appears in the twentieth century 
as a tragedy: from hopes under Marx’s banner to deep disap-
pointments and new enslavement, from emancipation to the 
revival of class societies and new grinding tyranny, followed 
by the attempts at theoretical rethinking and critical analysis 
in the period after World War II.
Let us briefly describe the spiritual atmosphere of this post-
catastrophic state as part of the discourse of Continental phi-
losophy. Philosophers from the Frankfurt Institute for Social 
Research attempted to rethink creatively and preserve the sig-
nificant legacy of Marxist theory. They proposed the renewal of 
Marxism by returning to Hegel. Then the focus shifted to the 
earlier works of Marx, resulting in a return to dialectical, philo-
sophical, non-dogmatic Marxism and consequently to the re-
vival of the philosophical discourse itself, which is essentially 
impossible in dogmatic Marxism or Marxist fundamentalism.
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According to dogmatic Marxism, science and revolutionary 
practice are able to replace philosophical discourse completely. 
The theorist of the Frankfurt School, Jürgen Habermas, has a dif-
ferent point of view. Philosophy still plays a crucial role in the 
interpretation of both social relations and the individual’s ex-
istence. The theorists of the Frankfurt School do not consider 
Marx an anti-philosopher, while Kant’s abstract rationalism and 
that of the Enlightenment are subjected to criticism. At the same 
time, they agree with Marx’s materialistic criticism of the Hege-
lian idealist dialectic. According to them, the self-development 
of the Absolute Idea is not a determining factor in the historical 
process. Even the proletariat’s role in the emancipation of man-
kind is questioned, especially if one takes into account the sup-
port of fascist and Nazi regimes by ordinary workers.
The most important contribution of the critical theorists 
consists in the criticism of Marx’s concepts with regard to po-
litical economy. The theorists of the Frankfurt School believe 
that science cannot explain the human subject’s behaviour, and 
Marx’s refusal of the concept of ‘utopia’ was erroneous in ex-
plaining alternative points of view on morality, which is vital 
in the process of emancipation of social groups. Utopia is an 
important example of negative thinking. Utopian revelation is 
similar to a mytheme and may be an important factor in ex-
plaining social relations. Myth and enlightenment must be 
dialectically interrelated. Reducing the human exclusively to 
instrumental and scientific reason can be a prerequisite for the 
loss of the human itself.
Postmodernism. Postmodernism is a series of sceptical and 
anti-essentialist concepts, whose context is quite wide – from ar-
chitecture, art, and literature to psychoanalysis and philosophy 
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in general. Jean-François Lyotard questioned the possibility of 
the emergence of metanarratives of history in the second half 
of the twentieth century. He treated all claims to universal truth 
and objective morality with scepticism and rejected the claims 
of the Enlightenment to the omnipotence of reason.
Postmodernity is ‘the state of culture after transformation, 
which dictated the rules of the game in science, literature and 
art at the end of the nineteenth century’ (Lyotard J.-F., 1998, 
p. 9). The metanarrative mechanism of knowledge legitima-
tion (Lyotard J.-F., 1998, p. 10) is becoming obsolete, and is 
accompanied by a crisis of philosophy and higher education 
institutions. Scientific knowledge is turning into a produc-
tion force, taking the form of a commodity, becoming one of 
the stakes in great power rivalry (Lyotard J.-F., 1998, p. 20). 
Both Hegel’s and Marx’s philosophical concepts are denied. 
Suspicions are aroused, in particular, by phenomenology 
and existentialism, whose attempts to restore the subject are 
criticized. And the Subject himself/herself becomes the main 
embodiment of evil.
One of the contexts of postmodern movements is philo-
sophical. In these philosophical discourses, the spirit of the En-
lightenment is criticized; all claims to universality are denied. 
Both positive science and the attempt to instrumentalize the 
human, objectivation, and reduced rationality are renounced. 
The connection with the Enlightenment project remains virtu-
ally in the denial mode. ‘The question of the legitimacy of sci-
ence has been indissociably linked to that of the legitimation 
of the legislator since the time of Plato. From this point of view, 
the right to decide what is true is not independent of the right 
to decide what is just’ (Lyotard J.-F., 1998, p. 27).
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The following context for the formation of postmodern 
movements is the context of the history of Western Europe in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Two changes are cru-
cial for understanding the concepts of identity and the philo-
sophical concepts of recognition in the modern world. The first 
change is the collapse of social hierarchies that served as the 
basis for honour narratives and inequality narratives, that is, 
honour used to be a matter of privilege. The concept of honour 
in hierarchical societies was gradually replaced by the modern 
concept of human dignity, inherent in all people, in every in-
dividual, by nature. The concept of human dignity is based on 
the inner voice of truth, the voice of authenticity, in contrast 
to the concepts of hierarchical societies, where a sign serves 
as a basis external to man: social origin, hierarchy, order from 
above, hypostasized ideas, or dogmatic ideology.
On the one hand, one of the main ideas of modernity is that 
each of us can have our own individual authentic way of being. 
Diversity in the modern era becomes a moral postulate. The 
driving force behind history, which undermines the social hier-
archy, is the emergence of ideas of authenticity and human dig-
nity inherent in people by nature, expressed and manifested in 
human rights. According to Marxism, the driving force of his-
tory is the development of the productive forces that result in 
the intensification of the class struggle, most highly expressed 
in the social revolution. In this connection, human rights are 
the final and supreme manifestation of the human spirit, which 
reveals the true concept of human dignity, or is it a temporary 
consensus between the oppressors and the oppressed, be-
tween the right and the left, between the forces of reaction and 
revolution – and is humanity still in the same space of struggle 
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and absolute freedom, that Sartre’s plain of life, with no justifi-
cation whatsoever?
In his Categorical Imperative, Kant emphasized the impor-
tance of the autonomy of the will. ‘Autonomy of the will is the 
property of the will by which it is a law to itself independently of 
any property of the objects of volition.’ Therefore, the principle 
of autonomy is reduced to the following: ‘Act only according 
to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it 
should become a universal law’ (Kant I., 1994, V. 8, p. 219). Kant 
postulates that under no circumstances should a person use an-
other person merely as a means to an end: people must – under 
all circumstances – be treated as ends in themselves. ‘Man, and 
in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not 
merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will’ (Kant I., 
1994, V. 8, p. 204). But what – and exactly how – should one do 
in a particular situation? If the universal postulate does not give 
a definite answer, is the postulate necessary at all and is it pos-
sible to give a broad interpretation without ‘opening a Pandora’s 
box’ (Kant I., 2001, p. 125)? According to Immanuel Kant, we 
are rational agents guided by two main principles – universal 
and human. This potential should be respected in every human 
being. There is a demand for equal treatment of all people; we 
must also recognize and even cultivate the features promoting 
the policy of equal dignity.
Further, the establishment of totalitarian regimes in the 
twentieth century, world wars, nuclear confrontation, loss of 
hope for a peaceful and rational resolution of social conflicts, 
military offences and crimes of genocide, ongoing problems of 
discrimination undermine the entire landscape of culture and 
knowledge, and cast doubts on the very possibility of a ratio-
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nal explanation of existence and evolutionary social changes. 
In this respect, the fate of Marxism, which in the twentieth 
century evolved from theory to practice, the tragedy of failed 
hopes, the Stalinist reaction that followed instantly, the revival 
of class societies and terror – all these undermine the faith in a 
rational and humanist subject.
The state of philosophical thought, as well as the historical 
legacy of recent large-scale calamities, leave an indelible im-
print on literature and art in general and constitute one of the 
postmodern terrains. The key features of postmodern art are 
self-reference and epistemological scepticism. Styles are mixed, 
the narrative of absolute space and time becomes a thing of the 
past, and the elementary concept of causality and genesis dis-
appears along with it. They are replaced by uncertainty, fluidity, 
and the metaphysics of the moment. Faith in liberalism and so-
cialism is lost, concepts of reason and liberation are discredited, 
everything is questioned.
Nevertheless, not everyone welcomes such a state in phi-
losophy and art. Jürgen Habermas sees in this concept attempts 
by neoconservative circles to restore power (or  at least influ-
ence) by permanently abandoning the unfinished project of the 
Enlightenment. Well aware of the problems caused by the En-
lightenment, Habermas, however, does not support those who 
question human rationality. As a concept, a rational pragmatic 
and ethical discourse is proposed, which will make it possible to 
avoid both subject absolutization and mind instrumentalization, 
as well as fulfil the expectations of the Enlightenment.
Creating intersubjective paradigms of mutual understand-
ing and recognition might be a solution. According to Haber-
mas, truth is the result of an ideal free discourse, that is, this 
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concept is procedural in nature. ‘The paradigm of cognition of 
subjects should be replaced by a paradigm of mutual under-
standing between subjects capable of reasoning and acting’ 
(Habermas J., 2003, p. 306).
The dogmas of historical materialism are criticized: progress 
in working conditions and social relations does not necessarily 
lead to progress in mutual understanding. ‘Hegel and Marx never 
managed to achieve a paradigm shift, Heidegger and Derrida tried 
to get rid of metaphysical subjectivity, but the philosophical tradi-
tion was too dominated by them’ (Habermas J., 2003, p. 306).
The task of communicative rationality – the concept of 
Habermas – is the correction of the concept of ‘reason’, which 
dominated during the Age of the Enlightenment and still re-
mains its legacy. Formal is replaced by procedural discursive. At 
the same time – and it is important to note this – according to 
Habermas, hermeneutic knowledge does not reveal the ideo-
logical roots of knowledge. As a reconstruction of the meaning 
of expressions, hermeneutics does not always reasonably take 
into account the reason for this or that context, where an ex-
pression is used.
Hence, according to Habermas, hermeneutics cannot be ef-
fective in criticizing ideology. Ideology as a system of beliefs 
and values is an apology for the interests of a particular group. 
Habermas believes that any act of communication is an attempt 
to find a rational response. Totally free rational discourse is the 
only way to get a rational response.
This is not the only point of view on the path of knowledge 
proposed in a post-Hegelian era in the aftermath of the large-
scale disasters of the twentieth century. Sartre, for instance, 
considers formal deduction and procedural discourse to be tools 
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of knowledge, while pure knowledge can only be intuitive: 
‘There is only intuitive knowledge. Deduction and discursive 
argument, incorrectly called examples of knowing, are only in-
struments which lead to intuition’ (Sartre J.-P., 2003, р. 172).
Emmanuel Levinas contrasted the uncertainty and open-
ness of intuition, as well as the discursive, free, and symmetrical 
nature of ethical discussions in the aftermath of World War II 
with the asymmetry of relations with the Other, where asymme-
try is understood as a duty to the Other: serving the Other and 
responsibility to the Other are personalized, it is necessary to 
see the face of the Other. In this context, the Other is not un-
derstood universally or as the same general being: ‘Otherness 
is a non-reciprocal attitude… Due to his difference, the Other 
is not just an alter ego, he is something that I am not… He is 
what he is by virtue of his being’ (Levinas E., 1998, p. 90).
The relationships between the Self and the Other are in 
asymmetry; the Other chooses to build a relationship. At the 
same time, the question is: What is the common denominator 
for all people? This common denominator can be found only 
by understanding your responsibility to the Other. ‘Responsi-
bility precedes freedom’ (Levinas E., 1998, p. 207).
The Other is not another Self for me, the Other exists for 
himself, the Other is the Self only for himself, the Other does 
not possess the characteristics that the Self attributes or may 
attribute to him. The positivity of the Other does not open in 
accordance with the possibilities that open up to me (the Self). 
In this regard, thinking about the Other is not reduced and not 
reducible to instrumental thinking.
In the light of responsibility to the Other, the concept of the 
social is reinterpreted: ‘… through discourse, the Same and the 
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Other maintain themselves in relationship; [for this reason] 
the Other cannot be qualified as the Identical One and remains 
the Absolute in a relationship. This is the end of the solipsis-
tic dialectic of consciousness, always suspecting that it is held 
captive by the Identical. An ethical attitude that implies verbal 
conversion is not a kind of consciousness emanating from the 
Self. It questions the Self. And the reason for this challenge is 
otherness’ (Levinas E., 1998, p. 200).
The social is not an aggregate of individual units; it is not 
constituted by a purely personal self-consciousness. In soci-
ety, we respect the Other not because of abstract humanism or 
by virtue of abstract universal requirements. Respect for hu-
man dignity arises from empirical or historical data depend-
ing on the specific situation. Additionally, society is no lon-
ger a universal subject in the Hegelian sense, that is, neither 
does it historically become a whole, nor does it differentiate 
itself (Hegel). A universal individual is a self-conscious Spi-
rit (Hegel  G. W. F., 2000, p. 20). The whole is the self-mov-
ing interpenetration of the individuality and the universal 
(Hegel G. W. F., 2000, p. 210).
Representatives of the liberal and communitarian branch-
es of philosophical thought build their concepts of relation-
ship with the Other around mutual recognition and equality, 
while conscience, responsibility, and the Other stand aside. 
The Other acts as a partner, the relationship is symmetri-
cal. Phenomenology inspired Levinas. Intentional analysis 
opened the horizons forgotten by science. But Levinas fo-
cused more on ‘practical philosophy’, the beginning of all be-
ginnings. For Levinas, metaphysics is not ontology or episte-
mology, but ethics.
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Heidegger’s fundamental ontology comprises criticism of 
the alienated mass being, which he calls Das Man, originat-
ing in technification, mass industrialization, and deperson-
alization. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is built from a 
certain perspective – from Dasein. This is still philosophy of 
the Subject, and, therefore, there is a suppressive core in it. 
Yet again, everything originates from the Self, though asking 
about its own being. According to Heidegger, the Other ap-
pears in Mit-Sein modus – being with others – where there 
are no asymmetrical relations of responsibility. Heidegger fo-
cuses on the responsibility for the truth of Being, though it 
should be underscored that he is quite clear about the issues 
of responsibility and conscience: ‘The voice does call back, 
but it calls back beyond the past deed onto thrown being-
guilty, which is “earlier” than any indebtedness [Verschul-
dung]’ (Heidegger M., 2010, р. 279). Thus, the call of being 
is retrospective; it can be traced back to the abandonment of 
being-guilty, which precedes any guilt.
Sartre asserts that responsibility lies in individual action; 
according to Sartre’s existentialism, man, while acting, cannot 
pass beyond his own subjectivity. It is the deeper meaning of 
existentialism (Sartre  J.-P., 1996, р. 68). Again, it should be 
noted that for Sartre, cognition precedes action, and cogni-
tion is exclusively intuitive, while deduction and discourse are 
the instruments of cognition, that is, instruments of intuition. 
Surely, Sartre accepts discourse, deduction, and intuition. At 
the same time, he provides detailed descriptions of particular 
relations with the Other, the Other’s view and conscience in 
terms of ‘bad faith’. Action in itself is not the starting point for 
existentialism. The differences, in my opinion, lie in the key 
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points that each of these authors highlights while considering 
this or that sphere.
For Levinas, this is a sphere of concrete relationship with the 
Other, where the Other acts as a Face. The content of this re-
lationship is responsibility, conscience, duty towards the Other, 
which, in actual fact, reconciles his views with those of Sartre. In 
our opinion, no strict asymmetry is found in the works of Sartre 
and Heidegger in relation to the Face of the Other (Heidegger 
uses the concept of guilt: in this context, the sameness rethinks 
itself as guilty, as thrown into guilt (Heidegger M., 2010, p. 279), 
while Sartre’s human totality is both transcendental and imma-
nent, and the relationship with the Other is expressed in modes 
of shame, where the ‘Self ’ is subordinate to the other, being-
in-the-world for the Other [Kafkaesque process], as well as in 
modes of love). For Levinas, responsibility towards the Other is 
the foundation of his whole philosophy, where the metaphysical, 
the moral, and the social are synonymous.
So, what is sociality here? This is one of the central ques-
tions. As a proponent of humanism, Levinas set out to provide 
an answer to the question of whether humanism of the twen-
tieth century was in effect humane. Levinas comes to a nega-
tive conclusion. Making humanism really humane was one of 
the main ideas and recurrent themes of Levinas’s philosophy. 
According to Levinas, humanitas of homo humanus is not blind 
freedom at the centre of things, which is understood as autono-
my from everything and everyone. Real humanism, according 
to Levinas, is primarily about the rights of the Other. Respon-
sibility precedes freedom.
For Levinas, the concept of transcendence is manifested in 
the Face of the Other, which looks at me. The Other is not con-
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stituted. We encounter the Other. Sartre draws a similar conclu-
sion. According to him, my attitude towards the Other is the 
relation of Being to Being: ‘If we are to refute solipsism, then 
my relation to the Other is first and fundamentally a relation 
of being to being, not of knowledge to knowledge’ (Sartre J.-P., 
2003, р. 244). Levinas agrees with Sartre that the Other is en-
countered. This is not institutionalization, coming from the Self. 
To understand oneself as finite, the Self must possess the idea of 
the Infinite. If the finite has no alternative, then there will be no 
difference between good and evil. The relationship between the 
Self and the Other is not a cause-and-effect relationship, the re-
lationship between the Self and the Other is the Speech, the Word.
In Dimitrova’s interpretation of Levinas’s concept (Dimi-
trova M., 2016, p. 20), we serve the Other, but this service is 
not slavery – it is responsibility. The Self turns into sameness 
only through answering questions, to the call of the Other. 
And depersonalization, in turn, can be overcome, if the Self is 
permitted to support the Other in his/her otherness, without 
being hostile towards the otherness of the Other. First, we en-
ter into a personal relationship, which, in turn, forms the basis 
for any other relationship with the Other.
Paul Ricoeur takes into account the significant role that 
language plays in passing judgment. ‘We are dealing with a com-
bination of argumentation and interpretation, where the for-
mer term designates the logical aspect of the process – deduc-
tion or induction; the latter term emphasizes inventiveness, 
originality, creativity’ (Ricœur P., 2005, p. 255). ‘To judge is 
to cut the Gordian knot in order to put an end to uncertainty’ 
(Ricœur P., 2005, p. 147). ‘To judge in the end is to have an 
opinion’ (Ricœur P., 2005, p. 148).
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For Ricœur, the acts of fair-minded people are a choice – 
against violence in favour of discourse (Ricœur P., 2005, p. 151), 
acts of justice, and, therefore, rational and efficient acts can be 
purely institutional, otherwise they risk becoming revenge. Nu-
merous institutions of justice should be established, for example: 
1) legislative institutions for adopting general rules; 2) judicial 
institutions; 3) a specific method of taking legal action (repre-
sented by a specific person in authority – a judge); 4) the legal 
system as a whole; 5) everything must be subject to debate; 
6) a decision/a sentence are elements of justified acts; and final-
ly; 7) there must be a possibility for rehabilitation or forgiveness. 
All of the above should collectively ensure the right to speak out 
in certain circumstances (Ricœur P., 2005, p. 157).
Hence, for Ricoeur, the consolidated social Third one acts as 
an independent judge. And this is the power that rises above indi-
viduals and has a monopoly on violence, but not on revenge. Here 
we find courts, judges and laws that restrict judges. Ricoeur em-
phasizes that these judges are neither angels, nor gods. These are 
people who judge other people. In this category of the Third Party, 
Ricoeur includes all people related to the exercise of judgment.
Ricoeur insists that it is necessary to legitimize, justify, and 
protect formalism: due to the codification of cases, similar 
cases can be treated in a similar way. Formalism also regulates 
the legal process of exchanging arguments. Another impor-
tant aspect is procedurality. However, Ricoeur’s concept is not 
reduced to formalism and procedurality: ‘Applying rules to a 
case or finding rules for a case in both cases is the production 
of meaning’ (Ricœur P., 2005, p. 256).
In Levinas’s theory, there is a movement from the culprit to 
the law. In Ricoeur’s theory, an act and a sanction are defined. 
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In this case, the law is above the parties to the conflict, the nec-
essary component of justice is the distance between the act and 
the sanction: ‘A fair distance between crime and punishment is 
the essence of justice’ (Ricœur P., 2005, p. 156).
According to Lyotard, speaking of justice, we mean regula-
tions. However, one should take into account that it is not the 
imperative that says ‘You must’, but a person who states it clearly. 
Lyotard believes that culture reproduces itself through the narra-
tive: in this case, we are dealing with ‘narrative knowledge’: ‘In 
the first place, scientific knowledge does not represent the total-
ity of knowledge; it has always existed in addition to, and in com-
petition and conflict with, another kind of knowledge, which 
I will call narrative in the interests of simplicity…’ (Lyotard J.-F., 
1998, р. 44). ‘Contemporary hermeneutic discourse is based on 
the same assumption, which ultimately gives it some cognitive 
value and thus conveys the idea of a legitimate history and, in 
particular, the history of knowledge’ (Lyotard J.-F., 1998, р. 65).
The question is how the narrative is related to prescriptions. 
In a tribe, there are no autonomous individuals; before speak-
ing, people are spoken to; before having a chance to articulate 
a prescription, they get one. The narrative repeats itself, but it is 
never the same, because we see different variations of the same 
theme. Most importantly, at the beginning of a long chain 
of narratives, there is a precognitive agent. The narrative is a 
mechanism for transmitting and activating a prescription. In 
this respect, speaking is an act of duty, one cannot ignore the 
fact that one is being spoken to. In paganism, people, individu-
als, are not authors. They struggle with their fate, play with it.
On the one hand, the concept of a ‘moral code’ is deemed 
contradictory, the fact is that morality is extra-historical and 
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it is very difficult to find a Universal moral code. On the other 
hand, human bondage begins with a face-to-face encounter. 
The meaning of injustice coincides with the meaning of being 
socially unrecognized at the level of institutionalized rights and 
freedoms, leading us to the conclusion that all individuals and 
cultures must be treated equally. Equal treatment of individu-
als and cultures after World War II constituted in the second 
half of the twentieth century the essence of such a phenom-
enon as multiculturalism.
However, considering the current state of multiculturalism, one 
should note an acute struggle for the survival of various cultural 
contexts. It is a collective goal that will almost inevitably require 
varying interpretations of the law, depending on the circum-
stances. Hence, we have unity, the collective goal, the desire to 
survive, and various cultural contexts. Such is the dilemma of 
the modern era, where different cultural contexts face the con-
flict with universal human rights for example.
There exist other forms of liberalism, where such relation-
ships are considered from a different perspective. Alternative 
forms of liberalism call for the protection of certain rights with-
out any options. There should be no doubt about cultural dif-
ferences that determine the use of habeas corpus. To attain their 
goal, these alternative forms are used to compare completely 
different historical situations. In this paradigm, the integrity of 
cultures is extremely important. The question is whether cul-
tural survival can be recognized as a legitimate goal. Can we as-
sume that different cultures have the same value? For example, 
we can take the equality of men and women in universal hu-
man rights and some restrictions put on women in some cul-
tures, for instance in Islamic societies.
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The main challenge of multiculturalism, in my opinion, is 
the need for the recognition of a new culture while preserving 
the autochthonous canon. This averaging factor for both new 
and autochthonous elements resembles an attempt to fit the 
pattern. As part of this pattern, the culture suffers as well. But 
the issue remains unresolved. There is ethnocentricity. There 
should be something in between a non-authentic and averag-
ing need for recognition of equal value on the one hand, and 
strict ethnocentric standards on the other.
It seems to be a moral issue: if we consider the merging of cul-
tural horizons as Good, then it will be reasonable to continue reg-
ular and equal cultural studies with the possibility of merging 
horizons. M. Walzer supports the idea (Walzer M., 1994, p. 99) 
and argues against the so-called elevated moral absolutism. The 
essence of this first type of liberalism is the rights of individuals 
and, consequently, a completely neutral state, namely, a state 
without cultural and religious projects or, in fact, any kind of 
collective goals beyond the personal freedom and mental secu-
rity, well-being, and safety of its citizens.
Liberalism of the first type is the official doctrine of immi-
grant societies such as the United States or Canada, since the 
United States is not ultimately a nation state, but a nation of 
nationalities – a social association of social associations. Liber-
alism of this kind presupposes that there is neither a privileged 
majority, nor excluded minorities. In the case of the liberalism 
of the second type, the state seeks to ensure the survival and 
prosperity of a certain nation, culture and religion or a group 
of nations, cultures and religions, while protecting the basic 
rights of citizens. However, multiculturalism is another form of 
liberalism, ensuring that responsibility for the cultural survival 
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of minority groups is assumed. In fact, multiculturalism results 
in a movement towards liberalism of the first type, which can 
be observed at the moment: the Anglo-Saxons of the New 
World is a social association of social associations, a country 
of immigrants, where each association lives at its own risk and 
peril (1-A, p. 6–12).
Hence, in today’s diverse cultural contexts, there are differ-
ent approaches to knowledge production: formal, procedural, 
discursive, hermeneutic, and intuitive. The same is true about 
various interpretations of the attitude of man and Self towards 
guilt, justice, and the Other. The era of metanarratives is over, 
the subject is dissolved in discursive practices. However, in the 
author’s opinion, under certain circumstances, discursive prac-
tice may give rise to endless sceptical arguments and, accord-
ingly, provoke and generate nihilism, followed by the complete 
elimination of knowledge as such.
Let us consider in more detail the issue of knowledge pro-
duction using sceptical reasoning in the discourse of analytic 
philosophy. Analytic philosophy is a branch of the post-Kan-
tian philosophy of the Anglo-Saxon world. It took a different 
approach as compared to continental philosophy. Does the an-
alytical approach solve existential and epistemological issues, 
is it an adequate response to classical scepticism, what are the 
features of this approach in knowledge production at the cur-
rent stage? Let us consider the Gettier problem here.
According to the classical definition given by Pla-
to, knowledge is equivalent to justified true belief ( JTB) 
(Plato, 1856, p. 12). However, Edmund Gettier argued that 
knowledge could be something other than justified true be-
lief (Gettier E. L., 2011, р. 192–194). This question has been 
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discussed for more than half a century after the publication of 
Gettier’s short three-page essay ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowl-
edge?’ in 1963. The problem associated with Gettier’s counter-
examples, as well as with sceptical issues, is central to episte-
mology. Gettier gives three counterexamples to demonstrate 
that knowledge is something other than justified true belief.
Most philosophers agree that there is no knowledge without 
justification, but it is justification that plays a key role in sceptical 
reasoning. Sceptics do not deny that we have true belief; sceptics 
deny that our beliefs (faith) can be justified. We can conclude 
from here that we do not possess knowledge, when its justifica-
tion is required (3-A, p. 79). It is advisable to provide a num-
ber of examples reflecting the historical stages in the study of 
the Gettier problem, as well as the problems associated with the 
definition of knowledge and possible solutions to it.
Let us start with the original counterexample provided by 
Gettier in his essay in 1963 (Gettier E. L., 2011, р. 192). Smith 
and Jones came for a job interview. Smith has good reason to 
believe that Jones will get the job. Smith also knows that Jones 
has 10 coins in his pocket. Based on the above, Smith concludes 
that the man who has 10 coins in his pocket will get the job. In-
deed, the man who has 10 coins in his pocket is hired, but not 
Jones. Smith himself gets the job and does have 10 coins in his 
pocket, although he is unaware of the fact.
Smith had a real and justified belief, but we cannot call it 
knowledge. It can be argued that Smith’s false justification is 
almost obvious. Smith’s conclusion, which made him believe 
that the man with 10 coins will get the job, is incorrect. Why 
did Smith think that way? Because he believed that Jones would 
get the job. However, this is not the case. Thus, his belief cannot 
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serve as a convincing basis. Causal relationships are represent-
ed in the form of ‘X because of Y’. Both parts – X and Y – must 
be true and must not have a false cause and effect relationship 
for the phrase ‘X because of Y’ to be true. In this case, Y is false, 
therefore the phrase ‘X because of Y’ is also false (Amereller E., 
2005, p. 58). Thus, Gilbert Harman in 1973 (‘Thought’) (Har-
man  G., 1973, p. 10) and Kate Lehrer in 1964 (‘Knowledge, 
Truth and Evidence’) (Lehrer K., Paxon T., 1969, p. 168–175) 
suggested that justification should not be based on false prem-
ises. However, this does not solve the problem. Let us consider 
the ‘fake barns’ scenario described by Alvin Goldman (Gold-
man A., 1976, p. 772).
Henry is driving in the countryside and sees a barn through 
the window of his car. He concludes that he drove past a barn. 
But Henry does not know that the neighbourhood generally 
consists of many fake barns. If Henry knew about fake barns, he 
would not have thought that he had seen a real one. But Henry 
did see a real barn, the only real barn in this place. Henry has 
a justified true belief; moreover, his reasoning is not based on 
a false premise. However, one cannot agree with the fact that 
in this situation Henry possesses knowledge, despite the cor-
rect causal connection, serving as the basis for his true belief. 
Henry’s justification may be eliminated, if additional informa-
tion is obtained, namely that the area is full of fake barns. As a 
result, Peter Klein added another condition to the definition of 
knowledge (Klein P., 1971, p. 471).
S knows that P, assuming no information can be added to 
the justified true belief S about P. However, Henry’s justifica-
tion is not the case. It can be eliminated by submitting addi-
tional information. Therefore, Henry does not possess knowl-
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edge. Nevertheless, the above definition is quite important, but 
it is erroneous, as it excludes various situations, where subjects 
really possess knowledge, and, consequently, it excludes nu-
merous cases, not allowing one to assert confidently that this 
definition contains both necessary and sufficient conditions to 
define knowledge. The definition suggested by Klein is redun-
dant, unlike the previous definitions, which were insufficient. 
Let us consider the Grabit example introduced by Keith Lehrer 
and Thomas Paxon (Lehrer K., Paxon T., 1969, р. 168).
The librarian sees Tom Grabit steal a book from the library. 
His belief that Tom stole the book is true and justified. But the 
librarian does not know that Tom’s father is mentally disabled 
and is currently in hospital. Tom’s father, while in hospital, tells 
other people, that Tom has a twin brother who does not exist 
in reality. Tom’s father does not want people to think that his 
son Tom is a thief. The librarian, however, is unaware of his 
mental disorder. He only knows that Tom stole the book. If 
someone tells the librarian about the fantasies of Tom’s father 
without mentioning the mental disorder and the hospital, the 
librarian’s faith can be shaken. Even though there really was a 
theft. The justification of the librarian is not resistant to addi-
tional information. Such justification is easy to eliminate. There-
fore, the condition regarding any additional information is too 
strong. The justification should be resistant not to any, but only 
to the relevant additional information. Let us consider the fol-
lowing definitions (Ernst G., 2013, pp. 69–83).
S knows that P, if S has a true belief in P, and S is justified 
in believing that P, when his justification cannot be refuted by 
relevant new evidence. Or: S knows that P, if S has a true be-
lief in P, which is personally or factually justified. Or: S knows 
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that P, if S has a true belief in P, which is duly justified. The 
Gettier counterexamples, in case of analysis of the concept of 
‘knowledge’, on an intuitive level, lead the judging subject to 
certain perspectives the judge, where it is necessary to under-
stand such terms as ‘properly justified’, ‘relevant additional 
information’, and ‘actually justified’ (Ernst G., 2013, pp. 69–
83). This is due to the nature of epistemic causal relationships. 
For someone unaware of a mentally ill father and his fantasies, 
the justified belief is that Tom stole the book. And for some-
one who knows only the father’s part of the story, this is an 
unconvincing argument. The same applies to the example of 
fake barns. For someone who knows nothing about fake barns, 
as well as for someone who does know about them, but also 
knows that there is a real barn in this particular place, the fact 
that someone has driven past the barn is a sufficient justifica-
tion. But for someone who only knows about fake barns, the 
fact that this barn looks like a real one is not a justified belief.
Gettier’s counterexamples create certain perspectives 
for the judging subjects to find justification and estimate the 
knowledge of other subjects. Owing to the relativity of per-
spectives, there is no certainty as to how to treat such counter-
examples. In this context, the judging subjects tend to forget 
that their own perspective is relative (3-А, р. 79). A natural 
question arises: What is the solution to the Gettier problem? 
Sceptical questions are also related to the relationship between 
knowledge and justification. Two approaches may be applied 
to solve the Gettier problem – a revisionist approach and a de-
scriptivist approach. Revisionists generally argue as follows: 
having considered Gettier’s counterexamples, we can see that 
ordinary language creates contradictions. Therefore, it seems 
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inappropriate to use this language in order to consider the con-
cepts of ‘true belief ’ and ‘justified belief ’ in philosophy and for 
its purposes. Philosophy should use another language, while 
ordinary language is suitable for everyday contexts. Descriptiv-
ists, however, argue that such a separation is merely a change 
of subject, which does not solve the original problem. In their 
opinion, one should stick to the normal use of language. One 
encounters philosophical problems wherein everyday expres-
sions are removed from their usual context and used in a strictly 
philosophical context. The language used in Gettier’s examples 
is ordinary. A competent speaker is nevertheless able to use the 
language competently in appropriate contexts. The question 
here is, who is this competent speaker? Hence, if the language 
is not meaningless, there is no Gettier problem.
Additionally, it is necessary to analyse the fact that in Getti-
er’s examples there is a lack of reference for a subject who pass-
es judgment on the use of language. For this purpose, analysis 
of the common use of the word ‘knowledge’ is required. Ad-
ditionally, as we will see, the word ‘knowledge’ may be used in 
two completely different situations (Ernst G, 2013, pp. 69–83).
On the one hand, we may already possess knowledge and 
judge from the point of view of the knower, and on the other 
hand, we may not be aware of something and so look for the 
necessary information. In such situations, we are interested in 
different things and set different goals. Depending on the situa-
tion, different types of knowledge analysis may be applied – an 
analysis that is not based on perspective, an objective analysis 
of knowledge, in case we already possess it. If we lack the nec-
essary knowledge, other types of knowledge analysis will take 
some perspective into account (Ernst G., 2013, pp. 69–83).
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Stuart Cohen (Cohen S., 2011, pp. 706–721), David Lewis 
(Lewis  D., 2011, pp. 691–706), and Michael Williams (Wil-
liams M., 1996, p. 64) are proponents of contextualism, claim-
ing that knowledge depends on the context, and the truth of 
the expression ‘S knows P’ also depends on the context, where 
the validity of standards for asserting that a subject possesses 
knowledge may be different.
According to Cohen, contextualism has been proposed as a 
way to resolve stubborn epistemological paradoxes. Where P is 
some common sense proposition about the external world (for 
instance, I see a zebra) and H is some sceptical hypothesis (for 
instance, I see a cleverly disguised mule), the paradox takes the 
following form:
1. I know P.
2. I do not know not-H.
3. I know P only if I know not-H (Cohen S., 2014, р. 69).
These propositions constitute a paradox because each is 
independently very plausible, yet jointly they are inconsistent. 
Because our intuitions about knowledge lead to paradox, scep-
ticism poses a threat.
What are the alternatives for a subject to reject? In what 
contexts and situations can this occur? Which alternatives 
should be validated in the pursuit of knowledge and true justi-
fied belief? There is no single answer to these questions. The 
essence of contextual theories of knowledge is that the signifi-
cance or insignificance of an alternative is determined based on 
the context. In this respect, there are two contextual factors – 
the context of the subject who chooses between alternatives 
and the context of the person to whom knowledge is attribut-
ed – the alleged knower, that is, the context of the subject that 
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should provide judgement. The level of standards set in judg-
ing knowledge or lack of knowledge can also be considered the 
basis for explaining contextualism.
Hence, there are two bases for contextual theories of knowl-
edge:
1. The alleged knower and the subject who judges, who 
claims that S knows P. They are in different contexts.
2. Different standards apply to knowledge in different con-
texts: a) conversational context; b) particularly demanding 
epistemological context; and c) sceptical context.
Many contextualists, including Cohen and Lewis, believe 
that one must be able to accept and understand different 
epistemological standards in order to overcome scepticism. 
According to Lewis, the problem arises because of the scep-
tic’s unrealistic demands, which are so high as to be meaning-
less. And its solution consists in the ability to ignore these 
meaningless alternatives offered by sceptics, if there are valid 
reasons to do so. What are the relevant alternatives? In this 
respect, Lewis suggests rules of Actuality, Belief, Resemblance, 
Reliability, Method, Conservatism, and Attention (Lewis  D., 
2011, pp. 691–706).
First, there is the Rule of Actuality. If a possibility is actual, 
it is never properly ignored. Thus, we get a factor that depends 
on the subject: ‘S knows that P’ is true. For instance, Lewis 
maintains: ‘Actuality is always a relevant alternative; nothing 
false may properly be presupposed. It follows that only what 
is true is known, wherefore we did not have to include truth in 
our definition of knowledge. The rule is “externalist”–the sub-
ject himself may not be able to tell what is properly ignored’ 
(Lewis D., 2011, р. 695).
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The second rule (the Rule of Belief) says: a possibility that is 
believed to obtain, or that ought to be believed to obtain, is not 
properly ignored. In other words, if there is a possibility that the 
subject believes he should obtain, it is never properly ignored, 
regardless of whether he is right or wrong to believe it. ‘A pos-
sibility that the subject believes to obtain is not properly ignored, 
whether or not he is right to so believe’ (Lewis D., 2011, р. 696).
Next, there is the Rule of Resemblance. A possibility which 
saliently resembles a possibility that is not properly ignored, is 
itself not properly ignored. The Rule of Resemblance is decisive. 
The third rule could solve the Gettier problem. In the Gettier 
problem, there is always an alternative, similar to actuality, which 
cannot be eliminated by the subject’s evidence (3-A, p. 79).
In the example of the fake barn, it is obvious that Henry can-
not get rid of doubts about the alternative that is not properly 
ignored. In other words, it may seem real, when he is passing 
through the area full of objects that look exactly like barns. In 
accordance with the Rule of Resemblance, these alternatives 
are not to be ignored. But here is the main problem regarding 
the Rule of Resemblance: neither the subject of the Gettier 
case – nor Henry – who is in the area full of fake barns, pos-
sesses knowledge. Thus, the Rule of Resemblance makes room 
for scepticism. The sceptical hypothesis resembles actuality, 
and, so, cannot be properly ignored, according to Lewis’s own 
concept of resemblance. This brings Lewis to a radical solu-
tion – to ignore all ad hoc arguments of sceptics. In fact, it is 
hardly a solution at all, since sceptics are simply ignored ad hoc, 
despite all arguments.
The Rule of Attention is another important rule of Lewis’s 
that is worth mentioning. A possibility that is not ignored (just 
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mentioned) is not properly ignored. As soon as a sceptic attracts 
our attention to his sceptical hypothesis, he cannot be ignored 
any more. But in an everyday context, when our attention is 
not drawn to some alternative hypothesis, that is, in the usual 
scenario, other conditions of the Rules of Actuality, Belief, and 
Resemblance are taken into account. Similarly, by attracting our 
attention to the sceptical hypothesis, the sceptic excludes the 
knowledge ‘S knows that P’. Thus, Lewis’s theory leads to the 
solution of the Gettier problem, but when it comes to sceptical 
arguments, it mystifies them (Lewis D., 2011, р. 80).
According to Cohen, Lewis’s theory can solve the Get-
tier problem, but the focus should be shifted from the alleged 
knower to the person attributing knowledge, that is, to the sub-
ject who judges – hence, the Rule of Resemblance may be re-
formulated. It means that not all alternatives resembling actual-
ity should be considered, but only those that are considered by 
the subject who judges, that is, those which resemble actuality 
only for the subject who judges. In this case, ad hoc alternatives 
of sceptics should not be ignored. Once again, we cannot solve 
the Gettier problem, as we need the factors depending on the 
subject who is inside the Gettier case instead of the factors of 
the subject who judges.
The theory of contextualism, therefore, is not flawless, and 
the problem of relevance remains unsolved. Different solutions 
to this problem are presented in the works of Gerhard Ernst 
(Ernst  G., 2013, р. 69–83), Oswald Hanfling (Hanfling  O., 
1995, p. 40–56), and David Clarke (Clarke D. S. Jr., 1990, 
р. 188–190). For this purpose, they suggest analysing the sub-
ject’s interest in various situational contexts, where knowledge 
is an object of interest. Here, the context has two components: 
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1) the interest of the unknowing, and 2) the interest of the 
knowing (Ernst G., 2013, р. 69–83).
If we lack knowledge, we are looking for a trustworthy per-
son, that is, an informant, who could provide us with reliable 
information. Hence, in a situation of lack of knowledge, we 
may characterize this information provider as follows: the sub-
ject S knows that P, when the JTB conditions are met, where 
justified true belief is understood in classical terms. In this way, 
S can dispel our doubts about non-P. The relevant doubts in 
this case are those created by the unknowing person, passing 
judgement on knowledge, attributing it.
So, what is the character of these doubts, created by the 
speculating subject in search of knowledge (by  the unknow-
ing person)? When important interests are affected, the level of 
doubt surely increases. The second factor is some other infor-
mation available to the unknowing person. If the subject is suf-
ficiently convinced, he provides judgement. It means that this 
unknowing person attributes knowledge to the subject S. He 
claims that S knows P.
In general, in philosophical contexts, in particular, in the 
context of the Gettier problem, people judge from one per-
spective or another. Contexts make the judging person choose 
a certain perspective, although he/she might not notice this. 
The first case: the perspective of the unknowing person who 
judges. He is in search of a good information provider and re-
lies on the perspective of passing judgment, provided that the 
informant removes his doubts. And the second case: the person 
who judges takes the place of the alleged knower. If we face the 
Gettier problem, we intuitively tend to take the position of the 
unknowing person. Despite the fact that these paradoxes indi-
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cate the possibility of error, we begin to have doubts, whether 
voluntarily or involuntarily, and need to get them cleared. In 
the Gettier cases, the actor cannot remove our doubts in all of 
the demonstrated situations (3-А, р. 81).
In the situation, where we are looking for a reliable informa-
tion provider: in the general context, being of sound mind and 
memory, we are able to choose a certain perspective. In a phil-
osophical context (or  in a complex historical situation), every-
thing depends on the particular case. What is the perspective of 
the Gettier case? We do not have a final solution, since we almost 
always have reasons for doubt. And we have a final solution, if we 
find it ourselves as subjects who judge, paying attention to some 
highlighted points that allow for some kind of doubt.
The Gettier problem can be described as a deep philosophi-
cal problem. The attacks of sceptics are aimed at justification. 
Such attacks can take knowledge away, make subjects defence-
less against deep scepticism, and doubtful even in familiar ev-
eryday contexts. In general, it can be argued that approaches to 
solving the Gettier problem, which are directed exclusively at 
philosophical contexts, have been found, but they are not suffi-
cient. The problem arises in a real, normal language, which can 
be considered as a variant of scepticism. It can be both destruc-
tive and enlightening for ordinary people.
In the ordinary language, scepticism can have serious con-
sequences, making many people uncertain and weak-willed. 
Hence, it can be argued that productive approaches to solving 
the problem are within the limits of a normal language. Ap-
proaches that are exclusively associated with philosophical 
contexts objectify the term ‘knowledge’ and do not take into 
account another aspect, where knowledge exists, although it 
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plays an important role in relation to the expression of will, 
that is, subjectivity is ignored (3-A, p. 82).
We believe that an approach based on ordinary language, 
the philosophy of everyday language may be more productive 
in finding a solution to the so-called Gettier problem. Even 
though two definitions of knowledge are used in its analysis 
(one – dependent on perspective and the other – objective, in-
dependent of perspective), it does not eliminate subjectivity 
from the philosophical context, which, in fact, is impossible to 
eliminate. The subjectivity of expressing one’s will and evaluat-
ing oneself as the alleged knower takes into account knowledge, 
depending either on perspective or on context. Both types 
have their own meaning.
Chapter 1. Knowledge: scepticism and epistemology 37
Chapter 2. Positivism and 
humanitarian discourse
The modern West’s self-awareness was formed after 1500 
CE as a result of several inter-woven processes like the Renais-
sance, New Humanism, the Age of Discovery, advances in the 
natural sciences, the Reformation, the rise of capitalism, and 
the emergence of the modern system of nation states. In the 
17th century, Francis Bacon and René Descartes started a philo-
sophical reframing of the new era and a dismantling of the ex-
isting worldview.
But is a paradigm of thinking aimed at external knowledge 
of the world exhaustive and adequate for a human? If we base 
our future solely on scientific knowledge, gained by experience, 
will we lose something very important in our lives? Will such 
a situation lead to catastrophe and dehumanization as a conse-
quence? What kind of knowledge can act as a solid foundation 
for modern culture, if modern culture needs a foundation in 
terms of values, human rights, goals for humanity?
My first step is to analyse the rise of Positivism by track-
ing the views of the first positivists. The representatives of early 
positivism – Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and John Stuart 
Mill – proposed a new look at the scientific paradigm: hence-
forth, according to the positivists, science should be based on 
empirical observation and experimentation instead of being 
speculative or metaphysical. There was a tendency to view the 
empirical fact as the basis of knowledge. Philosophy was as-
signed a methodological role in the process of cognition; that 
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is, the task of philosophy in this system was the systematization 
of knowledge, the description of the process of cognition, and 
the development of effective methods of cognition in the posi-
tive sciences. But is this paradigm a sufficient basis for a civili-
zation? What is the goal of knowledge? Can knowledge be an 
evil or senseless routine which does not answer the existential 
questions of humans?
Modernism made yet another attempt to identify being and 
cognition. The free action of cognition, which does not have 
any external goal, finds itself in self-reflection. The wisdom of 
the first philosophy was reduced to self-knowledge.
My next steps will be to analyse reactions on positivist and 
modernist paradigms and to track different attempts to hu-
manize the scientific and the positivist approaches. According 
to my point of view, these were made by philosophers like Wil-
helm Dilthey and Hans Georg Gadamer – both belonged to 
the hermeneutic tradition. The aim of Dilthey’s hermeneutics 
is the application of a rigorous method for understanding and 
interpreting Being. In general, a primary factor in understand-
ing human life is examining the historical course of thought 
and history.
Wilhelm Dilthey simultaneously combined history and 
the philosophy of life. However, an absolutization of will and 
subjectivity can lead to dangerous tendencies in the develop-
ment of irrationalism. Therefore, without ignoring the rational, 
Dilthey attempted to bring together a scientific objectivity and 
human subjectivity. In general, Dilthey believed that exposi-
tors would be able to overcome their historical subjectivism 
and find a universally acknowledged interpretation by remain-
ing subjective.
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Hans Georg Gadamer (Gadamer, 1998, 114–122) critically 
considered the mind based on the technique and calculation 
(calculation, instrumental reasoning) of the concept of the cul-
ture of modernity inherited from the Enlightenment. This con-
cept of culture found its embodiment in, first, the bourgeois 
and, later, industrial societies.
Edmund Husserl belonged to the phenomenology tradition of 
continental philosophy and saw the crisis of positivism as well as 
the modernist paradigm in Europe. In his Vienna Lecture (Hus-
serl, 1996, 7–15), Husserl accentuated the crisis of the European 
humankind or the crisis of the philosophical idea in Europe. Hus-
serl believed that the roots of this crisis were in misunderstood 
rationalism, although rationality itself was not evil in his view.
Husserl proposed distinguishing between philosophy as a 
historical fact at a certain time and philosophy as an ideal of a 
non-completed task: every philosophy is an attempt to under-
stand infinity and the truth.
The ideal scientist is motivated by nothing more than a de-
sire for knowledge. However, despite that, it is a foundation of 
our civilization – and science has become the foundation of 
our civilization, playing a significant role in the modern world, 
which is still full of conflicts, wars and misunderstanding. We 
must repeatedly ask ourselves if we have omitted anything. The 
hand of the scientist is half in the dark: could this knowledge, 
obtained in semi-darkness, become destructive? This problem 
is actually universal.
To analyse the genesis of the positivist and the humanitar-
ian hermeneutic ideas, to stress the main critical points of the 
modernist world view and find answers to the questions indi-
cated above one of the key points of this study.
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The representatives of the first positivism, namely Auguste 
Comte, Herbert Spencer, and John Stuart Mill, proposed a 
new vision of the scientific paradigm. According to positivists, 
science should be based on empirical observation and experi-
ment as opposed to speculative, i. e. metaphysical knowledge. 
Positivism was characterized by a shift towards empirical fact 
as a basis of knowledge. Philosophy was assigned a method-
ological role in the cognitive process with the following objec-
tives: knowledge systematization, description of the cognitive 
process, and development of effective methods of cognition in 
the positive sciences.
A positive scientist should never move beyond the estab-
lishment of laws, i. e. the identification of stable recurring re-
lationships in Nature. While criticism of metaphysics is one 
of the tasks of a positive scientist, any attempt to go beyond 
the sphere governed by the laws of cause and effect excludes 
the scientist from positive science, turning him or her into a 
speculative metaphysician. Criticism of metaphysics has a neg-
ative attitude towards intuition. At the same time, positivists 
recognize that although it is impossible to avoid hypotheses, 
one must be very careful in putting them forward. All scien-
tific hypotheses are subsequently subjected to critical analysis 
so that the corpus of science is only made up of facts and their 
associations.
Speaking of facts, they can either be singular or have a cer-
tain degree of generalization, including individual observations 
and general concepts that are based on a set of observations or 
a scientific law derived from these concepts. Moreover, facts 
can be abstract as in mathematics, or concrete and empirical 
such as in physics and medicine.
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According to Comte, true knowledge about society can only 
be provided by sociology: ‘All that can be rationally proposed 
in our day is to recognize the character of positivity in social as 
in all other science, and to ascertain the chief bases on which 
it is founded’ (Comte, 1998, p. 195). This science explores the 
laws of phenomena that refer to a person’s real social standing. 
In this context, sociology is a positive science. Thus, a positive 
scientist receives a set of facts and observations to be organized 
in some fashion. In contrast to the metaphysics of the past, the 
focus is not on the system, as for instance in Hegel’s philoso-
phy, but on the method. Originally, the word ‘method’ meant ‘a 
way’. It is intended to help coordinate the search for knowledge. 
The methodology of positivists lacks certain features of meta-
physical systems, including their complete and unconditional 
character, and the finality and absoluteness of Truth.
In this regard, according to positivists (Lenzer, 1998, p. 146), 
there is not much difference between a theory and a hypothesis. 
Both appear as guiding ideas, carrying equal weight as methods 
designed to systematize observations and factual material.
It should be noted that recognizing both theory and hypoth-
esis as necessary methodological steps makes it impossible to 
reduce positivism to mere empiricism. A hypothesis (a certain 
assumption, a belief) and even more so a theory (a  certain 
methodological system) go beyond mere empiricism. The fact 
is, the positivist’s anti-metaphysical attitude rejects absolute 
truth, but it does not (in general) reject truth as an ‘organizing 
form of experience’.
In Discours sur l’esprit positif, Comte outlines the development 
of the human spirit (Lenzer, 1998, p. 293, 328), evolving through 
three stages: the theological or fictitious stage, the metaphysical 
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or abstract stage, and finally, the positive or scientific stage. In 
Comte’s opinion, the theory of three stages is a law and does not 
need any further justification – it is enough to describe or explain 
them. The craving for absolute truth, and the quest for onto-
logical fundamentals are characteristic of the first stage, which is 
manifested in religion. At the second or metaphysical stage, there 
is a gradual depreciation of theology, therefore, in Comte’s view, 
philosophy appears as a simplistic religion. Finally, positivism 
appears at the third stage as a result of the critical rethinking of 
philosophy: the illusory, the otherworldly, and the concept of ab-
solute truth are rejected; while the main motto is ‘to see in order 
to foresee’, thus summarizing the idea of rational anticipation.
Comte comes to the conclusion that the laws of nature are 
unchangeable and represent stable relations in the world of 
phenomena (Lenzer, 1998, pp. 499–502). Comte describes 
the principles of social coexistence in three sections, they are: 
social statics, which describes the interaction of social institu-
tions here and now; social dynamics, which refers to the evo-
lution of social systems; and social policy as a programme of 
action (Comte, 1998, pp. 263–279).
According to Comte, the cornerstone of social progress is 
primarily the improvement of the human spirit, which can fur-
ther define ‘material’ progress (referring to improving external 
living conditions) as well. Further, Comte highlights ‘physical’ 
progress (referring to the physical improvement of humanity) 
and ‘intellectual’ progress (here Comte means that, as a result 
of intellectual improvement, ‘positive philosophy’ will become 
a mass ideology).
Again, the evolution seen here falls under the law of three 
stages as provided by Comte. The first stage is theological, di-
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vided into fetishism, polytheism, and monotheism. The sec-
ond stage is metaphysics, it is transitional and has a critical 
character while passing through the Era of Reformation, En-
lightenment, and Revolution. And finally, at the beginning of 
the 19th century, the last stage occurs, which is positivism. As 
a result of industrial development, the third stage spreads the 
ideas of altruism, and the positivist philosophy is viewed as a 
worldview paradigm.
According to Comte, ‘positive philosophy’ will become 
the religion of humanity (Lenzer, 1998, p. 381). This will be 
made possible by artists, scientists, and positive philosophers, 
who will gradually be transformed into the so-called ‘positive 
priests’. With the help of this force, the synthesis of feelings 
and reason, science, and faith will become real. Thus, the posi-
tive sociology of Comte is not a simple description of experi-
ence and facts, nor is it pure empiricism. As shown above, it is 
clear that ‘positive’ sociology has adopted many of the patterns 
from the old metaphysics and Comte’s law of three stages was 
influenced by Hegel’s and Turgot’s dialectics, wherein the ethi-
cal orientation of his sociology is a continuity of the previous 
metaphysical systems of continental philosophy, which stress-
es the improvement of the human spirit, as for example in the 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant.
John Stuart Mill was both a student and a friend of Auguste 
Comte. He is the author of such works as On Liberty (1859), 
Considerations on Representative Government (1861), Utilitarian-
ism (1863), and Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their 
Applications to Social Philosophy (1848). Three Essays on Religion 
(1874) which expresses his religiosity was published posthu-
mously. As for Mill’s ontological views, he states “‘We cannot 
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acquire any genuine knowledge a priori’. Mill holds that knowl-
edge can be obtained only by empirical observation, and by rea-
soning which takes place on the ground of such observations. 
This principle stands at the heart of his radical empiricism” (Stan-
ford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Mill J. S.). However, here it is 
necessary to consider the shift of positivism to experience, and 
experience is always associated with the human personality; hu-
man existence, no matter how fluid, is the same being and the 
only life; it is the ‘life existence’ that remains constant from birth 
to death throughout the process of living.
Science does not consist of sensory data alone, it needs 
both laws and hypotheses about these laws (here, hypotheses 
means theories). If random observations are not directed by 
theory, they will reveal nothing about whether the law is true 
or false. Inductive logic, therefore, acts as a confirmation and 
verification of the above principle, both in nature and in soci-
ety. There is no logical circle here.
‘We are, Mill claims, naturally inclined to reason inductively, 
and upon critical inspection, acts of induction strike us as ‘deserv-
ing of reliance’ (18, System, VII: 319). ‘We adopt induction “spon-
taneously” as a method of reasoning – and under free consider-
ation, it seems to us reasonable to do so’ (18, System, VII: 317).
Moreover, Mill, unlike Comte, draws attention to the fact of 
self-reflexion. Comte (1998, p. 195) denies that this could be 
a fact. And it should be noted that self-reflection of the spirit 
was a burning topic during the ‘metaphysical era’ and in the 
transition period of positivism, because it gave a person an ex-
perience that was more than the available experience of ‘here 
and now’. In this regard, the ‘meaning of existence’, according 
to Mill, is revealed in his thesis concerning spirit:
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‘If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we 
are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of 
feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are 
reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is 
something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities 
of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex 
hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a 
series’ (18, Examination, 194).
Here we can draw parallels with idealism from Hegel’s The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, where the process of self-realization 
turns to the phenomenology of spirit. The realization of exis-
tence opens the spiritual basis of the world, perhaps as an ‘em-
piric’ interpretation in the sense of Berkeley’s subjective ide-
alism. This is the main difference between Mill’s and Comte’s 
ideas, the latter believed that no positive knowledge is possible 
in relation to itself. According to Comte, positive knowledge 
only consists of physical and physiological processes and so-
ciological facts: they (entirely) determine our mental state and 
consciousness due to the state of society. This leads to the con-
clusion that the positive science of Comte, unlike Mill’s idea, 
can only be sociology, not psychology.
Mill does not agree with this point. According to Mill, there 
is an unbreakable divide between how nature and the soul 
(mental) are explained. The phenomena in these spheres are 
different and irreducible to each other. Thus, psychology be-
comes both an independent subject and a basic discipline. The 
knowledge of science is generalization, it is not knowledge of 
the deep essence of existence.
‘We spontaneously take certain initial inductive moves to be 
justified. Induction’s self-examination then leads to an increasing 
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confidence that induction is a warranted way of reasoning about 
the world, and to a general sharpening of that method of rea-
soning. Induction could have been self-undermining – its suc-
cess as a form of reasoning about the world, established on its 
own terms, is not trivial’ (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 
Mill J. S.). Thus, general knowledge is not the source, but the re-
sult of induction. Mill does not reject deduction either, he denies 
its metaphysical basis. He believes deduction is useful and helps 
to get faster results in the technical sciences.
Herbert Spencer is recognized in connection with the third 
classic of positivism. Spencer decisively breaks away from 
metaphysics. Moreover, he divides the world of ‘real’ positive 
existence, like Kant, into two layers: the cognizable layer of phe-
nomena (involving science) and the unknowable layer (similar 
to Kant’s thing-in-itself). Spencer asserts that the knowledge 
of phenomena requires empirical demonstration. As a result 
of this view, he held that the nature of reality in itself is not 
known and therefore, there is something that is fundamentally 
‘unknowable’ (this includes the complete knowledge of space, 
time, force, motion, and substance) (Internet Encyclopaedia 
of Philosophy, a peer reviewed academic resource. Spencer H.).
In addition, Spencer does not believe that religion will 
lose its position with the development of science. According 
to Spencer, science and religion must be reconciled as well. ‘…
knowledge cannot monopolize consciousness and… thus for 
our mind there is a constant opportunity to do what lies be-
yond knowledge. Therefore, there must always be a place for 
some Religion. For religion in all its forms differed from ev-
erything else as its subject was that something that lies beyond 
experience’ (Spencer, 1911).
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According to Spencer, both science and religion contain 
a postulate of faith. Science recognizes objectivity (reality 
of thing-in-itself) beyond the world of phenomena, but reli-
gion postulates the primacy of the ideal. ‘But while we cannot 
know whether religious beliefs are true, neither can we know 
that (fundamental) religious beliefs are false’ (Internet Ency-
clopaedia of Philosophy, a peer reviewed academic resource. 
Spencer  H.). Thus, even the spirit of positivism, no matter 
how down to earth it may be, remembers its former greatness, 
which means that the spirit of positivism does not think only 
about external physical facts, the philosophy of positivism is 
also engaged with problems of sociology, psychology and oth-
er humanitarian issues.
Both Dilthey and Husserl consider the positivism paradigm 
to be restricted in its world view, because it neglects the human 
spirit and many humanitarian issues. According to Husserl, 
philosophers and scientists have a one-sided understanding, 
but there is no truth that can be absolutized; the philosopher 
must be devoted to understanding the full context of philoso-
phy and the totality of the infinity horizon. However, whenever 
necessary the philosopher must go through naivety and pro-
vide a space for criticism by irrationalism.
The most appropriate name for this naivety is objectivism, 
including various forms of naturalism and naturalization of 
spirit, which is expressed exclusively in a causal, deterministic 
understanding of will and spirit, and the human. At the same 
time, the comprehension of the nature of finiteness as an ob-
jectivity in itself, opens the way to an idealization that permits 
us to understand infinity. For example, contemplation in ge-
ometry and calculation of numbers in arithmetic.
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The discovery of physical infinity also affects the spirit – the 
spiritual turns out to be spread on the surface of physical ob-
jects. Materialism and determinism are mentioned for the first 
time at the beginning of philosophy – Democritus. However, 
originating from Socrates (and thanks to him), the human at-
tains his place as a personality in society, though, according to 
Plato and Aristotle the human stays in the objective world as 
he has aims, norms, ego, etc.
Reason as understood in the modern age demonstrated 
its great power in the comprehension of nature, but this naïve 
subjectivism of the New Age is the main challenge. The main 
task is to show how temporary success in one sphere could re-
sult in extensive crisis in all other spheres.
It is remarkable that the idea of distinguishing between sci-
entific and humanitarian discourse had been introduced by 
Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) long before the modern de-
bate about the hermeneutic philosophy approach began. ‘The 
challenge, however, is to develop this science in such a way 
as to understand the facts of the human world without either 
reducing them to mere contingency or explaining their order 
by way of speculative principles of the sort generated by tradi-
tional metaphysics. They must be rendered intelligible, that is, 
without reducing them, as did the Cartesians, to the status of 
ephemera. Vico satisfies this demand by distinguishing at the 
outset of The New Science between il vero and il certo, “the true” 
and “the certain.” The former is the object of knowledge (sci-
enza) since it is universal and eternal, whereas the latter, related 
as it is to human consciousness (coscienza), is particular and 
individuated. This produces two pairs of terms-il vero/scienza 
and il certo/coscienza-which constitute, in turn, the explanan-
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da of philosophy and philology (“history” broadly conceived), 
respectively. As Vico says, “philosophy contemplates reason, 
whence comes knowledge of the true; philology observes that 
of which human choice is author, whence comes conscious-
ness of the certain” (Element X, § 138, p. 63).’ (Stanford Ency-
clopedia of Philosophy, Giambattista Vico).
Subsequently, Vico’s views influenced the work of Wilhelm 
Dilthey and Karl Marx. Both philosophers refused to see a human 
being as a pure object constructed by science. Wilhelm Dilthey 
developed further the hermeneutical approach and Karl Marx 
paid a great deal of attention to human practice in economic re-
lations and to a critique of political economy. Wilhelm Dilthey’s 
hermeneutics aims at the application of a rigorous method to 
achieve understanding and interpretation in the humanities. In 
general, the history of understanding, interpretation of meaning, 
and subjectivity are emphasized as being of great importance 
as opposed to the natural sciences in many fields of continental 
philosophy. The historical flow of ideas and history as a whole 
are the main factors in understanding human life.
The primary sources of genuine understanding are: subjec-
tive experience, history, and the accumulated experience of 
mankind. Wilhelm Dilthey combines historism with the phi-
losophy of life, simultaneously paying due attention to the nat-
ural sciences. History is the key to understanding human life; 
people and society are understood exclusively from a historical 
perspective; therefore, the application of positivist methods of 
science to understand human beings is doomed to failure.
However, absolutization of the will and of the subjective 
can lead to the dangerous tendencies of evolvement and ratio-
nalism. In this regard, Dilthey does not neglect the rationality, 
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objectivity, and rigour of the natural sciences. Rather, he at-
tempts to reconcile scientific objectivity with human subjec-
tivity and human life, giving due weight to historicism, philos-
ophy of life, and romanticism.
Dilthey also believes that all knowledge ultimately comes 
from experience. He adopts an empirical view from epistemol-
ogy. However, unlike his predecessors, Dilthey draws attention 
to emotions and will. He explains and applies specific objec-
tive standards to a number of disciplines (history, classical phi-
lology, literary studies, anthropology, and psychology) in or-
der to avoid and minimize the influence of positivism on them. 
People, according to Dilthey, have both physical and mental 
qualities. Thus, the methods applied in the humanities differ 
from those used in positivist science, and one should study a 
person from a different perspective. A perspective where his-
torical knowledge is of primary importance for understanding.
Dilthey distinguishes two approaches to obtaining knowl-
edge, namely explanation and comprehension. The purpose of 
the natural sciences is to provide an explanation. Explanatory 
science is the main subject of Kant’s critique of pure reason. In 
contrast, the humanities focus on the expression of mind or 
spirit – they study actions, statements, institutions, etc., and 
have an intrinsic meaning. The methods of obtaining knowl-
edge in these sciences are different. Dilthey tried with his her-
meneutical approach to analyse the components of compre-
hension and objectification of the mind. Comprehension is a 
process, where we get to know from signs given sensually to us, 
the true sense, which these signs originally express.
The task of hermeneutics is to interpret the controversial and 
unclear fragments of various texts, including religious ones. How-
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ever, even if a piece of text seems to be clear, it does not necessarily 
mean that one has grasped its meaning, because context changes 
with time, and the meaning of words in certain historical con-
texts can be different. Therefore, the importance of hermeneu-
tics should not be underestimated, and it should be addressed 
not only in challenging situations of understanding sacral and 
philosophical texts but in the understanding of modern cultural 
context as well. Dilthey believes that the ‘part to whole’ relation 
is important in interpretation, just as the understanding of a text 
as a whole. The understanding of the text as a whole makes it pos-
sible to appreciate its individual fragments, since the same words 
can mean different things in different contexts – the context is 
essential. The practice of interpretation may be circular in nature, 
since both the whole text and its fragments matter. The elements 
of the system cease to be mechanical in meaning and words, 
because they matter as a whole. They have a holistic character 
(holism). We should also attribute the text to a certain tradition, 
discourse, and genre. We should try to understand authors from 
the point of view of their cultural environment and their histori-
cal context. Dilthey believes that by ‘complete obedience to the 
text’ and through knowledge of the context, we can constantly 
achieve a better understanding, rediscover and update the origi-
nal meaning of the text, and derive a meaning as close as pos-
sible to the author’s original intentions. In later works, Dilthey 
was influenced by Edmund Husserl’s critique of psychologism. 
He focuses on ‘the insight that experience itself is organized by 
symbolic structures’ (Habermas, 1972, 147), such as language. 
Decoding these symbolic structures is the task of hermeneutics. 
In general, Dilthey claims that, although the interpreters remain 
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subjective, it is still possible for them to overcome their own his-
torical subjectivity and find a universally accepted interpretation.
Unlike Dilthey, Gadamer treats hermeneutics as a key to 
the nature of truth. The truth is revealed by understanding and 
interpretation. Understanding has an ontological character; 
therefore, hermeneutic claims can be universally similar to 
the claims of natural science. The development of a method to 
guarantee the objectivity of results was Dilthey’s project. But 
unlike Dilthey, Gadamer aims at finding the limitations of this 
method. This means that the human sciences can achieve ob-
jectivity only by abandoning a claim of methodical objectivity. 
These sciences must rely more on the human being’s funda-
mental abilities, such as understanding. Gadamer believes that 
philosophy must investigate the life-world itself as a historical 
and intersubjective horizon of human experience.
Firstly, contrary to Dilthey’s view, hermeneutics is a rela-
tion between two horizons. Since a primeval transparency 
of the original text is impossible, we can only seek to avoid a 
distortion of the truth. We not only attempt to understand a 
certain situation, but also what is important from the situation 
and the horizon. The vision is inseparable from the point of 
view. A situation is a point of view but it limits the vision. Sec-
ondly, the problems in any historical context have developed 
under the influence of a specific tradition of the same texts. 
The interpretation addresses the present needs to ensure better 
understanding, but we should remember that these problems 
originated in past traditions. Thirdly, the meaning is rather in-
exhaustible and no one interpretation is able to reconstruct 
the meaning of the work to its full extent. However, it does not 
mean that all interpretations are the same.
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According to Gadamer (Kearney, 1996), the meaning is 
similar to a thing-in-itself. Although the thing-in-itself is non-
cognizable, it supposedly explains the sequence of phenomena 
comprising our experience of the external world as indicated 
in Kant’s philosophy. Consequently, a corresponding theory of 
interpretation is impossible. We can only investigate a chain of 
various interpretations. As in the case of experience in the ex-
ternal or physical world, exposure to a wide range of phenom-
ena is inevitable.
Language is the fundamental mode of activity of our being 
in the world and an all-inclusive form of the constitution of 
this world. At the same time, we constantly perceive a non-ver-
bal communication of science and our task is to reconnect this 
with our world, that is, to merge the objective world of technol-
ogy with fundamental forms of human existence.
No judgement can be understood if it is not understood as 
an answer to a question. Methodology and knowing method-
ology are very important for science, but there is such a notion 
as ‘sterile methodology’. By using some methods, we can deal 
with entirely insignificant issues, but such methods and solu-
tions cannot lead to the creation of new things.
The endless dialogue in the direction of the truth is possible 
solely due to our finitude – in which we also find the particular-
ity of our being in the variety of languages. Again, language ap-
pears in vocabulary and grammar, as always, and never without 
the inner infinity of the dialogue that is in progress between 
every speaker and the listener. That is why the hermeneutical 
circle is endless.
This fundamental dimension of hermeneutics – genuine 
communication which wants to speak out – however, does 
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not produce primarily arranged signals, but rather seeks words 
which allow reaching another person – it is not only a universal 
human task, but also the task of the hermeneut, who has an op-
portunity to utter a new word that will remain written.
In ‘Culture and the World’, Gadamer (1998) develops his 
idea that culture empowers a person. However, such a positive 
definition of culture has always raised questions. With regard 
to culture, there has always been a note of pessimism, and the 
debate on the culture concept continues to this day. As Ga-
damer aptly noted, we all understand that there is culture, both 
instinctively and intuitively, but defining this concept still re-
mains a rather complex task: ‘although we would all know that 
culture is something that supports us, none of us would be so 
knowledgeable as to say what culture is’ (Gadamer, ‘Culture’, 
1998, p. 1).
In Gadamer’s view, the Enlightenment’s faith in human rea-
son was arrogant. He believes that the subsequent development 
of bourgeois society and industrial society not only failed to re-
move this arrogance and its negative consequences, including 
dehumanization, disregard of the Other, and uncontrolled in-
dustrialization, but also exacerbated the existing problems. In 
this regard, one of the key questions of Gadamer’s philosophy 
is the following: ‘What moral advancements does mankind 
owe to the unfolding of the sciences and the arts?’ (Gadamer, 
‘Culture’, 1998, p. 1).
Gadamer notes that the main directions of development in 
twentieth-century society also challenged the bourgeois idea, 
which consists in upholding the ideal of equality. According to 
Gadamer, he himself belonged to the generation of those who 
‘went to the woods’. At the same time, industrial society was 
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also based on the legacy of the bourgeois system. Gadamer has 
no illusions – science dominates in modernity and postmoder-
nity. In ‘Man and His Hand in Modern Civilization: Philosoph-
ical Aspects’ (5), Gadamer describes the form of the modern 
era in full detail and poses the following questions: how can 
a person, a creator, coexist with the given data? How can one 
preserve the ability to create, where loss can be equated with 
the ultimate loss of oneself and the loss of mankind as a whole 
in a dehumanized industrialized world, where people have be-
come tools? It is worth noting that the emphasis on this kind 
of knowledge is put on the technical side of the question, with 
reliability and mathematization leading to a new culture of de-
humanized knowledge. In general, the process of dehumaniza-
tion leads to barbarism, which is most clearly manifested in the 
externalization on to the Other.
Any persistent differences between people can be overcome 
through reconciliation. Insuperable otherness can be eliminated 
only by way of reconciliation in a verbal culture. The key word 
is reconciliation. At the same time, Gadamer, in his fight against 
the dehumanization of society, suggests going deeper into hu-
man ‘non-specialization’, where our flesh (‘our hand’) is the cre-
ating organ of the man-creator: The hand is an intellective or-
gan, a limb that serves for many things and makes many things 
serve it. That is why this part of the body is so closely linked with 
language. The hand not only makes and handles things, it also 
points to things’ (Gadamer, ‘Man and his Hand’, 1998, p. 116).
Here, Gadamer establishes a connection between the ‘intel-
lectual hand’ and the voice, thus creating an allegory of the notion 
of culture, that is, the ‘verbal culture’. ‘Together the hand and the 
speaking voice represent the highest perfection of human non-
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specialization’ (Gadamer, ‘Man and his Hand’, 1998, p. 116). 
Man has always been looking for an answer to the following ques-
tion: what is human nature; what is the role of homo humanus, 
that distinguishes him from all other living creatures, making 
him stand out from the rest of the animal kingdom, and giving 
meaning to his existence in the cultural community as opposed 
to the ‘instrumentalized’ slavish existence that lowers him to the 
level of a thing, and reduces him to nothing more than a cog in 
a machine, which strives solely to boost good fortune? Addi-
tionally, an artificial human specialization occurs, which we can 
only overcome by force of will and action. Gadamer famously 
said on the subject: ‘Man needs to form himself into something’ 
(Gadamer, ‘Man and his Hand’, 1998, p. 114).
According to Gadamer, people can engage in self-reflection, 
express doubts, and eventually choose who to become, which 
in turn requires certain criteria serving as a basis for rational 
choice. Gadamer opposes the rational to the demonic impulse 
and instincts. However, our cognitive process helps us predict 
the possible outcomes, so that we can control our instincts, that 
is, think before we act. Gadamer claims that the main challenge 
consists in finding the right balance between our instincts and 
moral aspirations; ‘Clearly, the problem of man is this: How 
can we find a balance that fulfils the law of our nature when we 
are just as much sensuous creatures as moral ones?’ (Gadamer, 
‘Man and his Hand’, 1998, p. 115)
Thus, Gadamer does not deny the subconscious in man, al-
though he insists that our common nature can be explained by 
much more than a self-preservation instinct, which is under-
scored by the fact that culture, history, progress, and regress are 
all natural. Our human capabilities – the original ‘non-special-
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ization’–give us a chance to be creators of culture. However, this 
‘non-specialization’ poses a threat by creating an artificial trend 
of differentiation. Man ceases to be a creator and becomes a 
machine, a tool in the hands of others: ‘As a result of our whole 
cultural process, the individual finds himself more and more in 
the service of functions, circumscribed by functioning robots 
and machines – a new kind of universal slavery has come over 
mankind’ (Gadamer, ‘Man and his Hand’, 1998, p. 117).
As a result, man is falling into a new form of slavery. One may 
wonder how to balance these patterns in the paradigm suggest-
ed by Gadamer. Gadamer argues that there is no conflict (nor 
should there be any) between the senses and the intellect. The 
creating hand is an intellectual organ, and our senses are spiri-
tualized and cultivated to the extent that they are ‘inspired’ by 
the human ‘hand’, which has absolute freedom. It can touch, em-
brace, specify, and create. The senses have their own intellect. Ac-
cording to Gadamer, this intellect protects us from wild instincts 
and deep prejudices. The ‘cultural senses’ are the result of the de-
velopment of the human capacity for choice and judgment.
Both theory and hypothesis recognized in positivist phi-
losophy imply that reason and intuition (faith) can be consid-
ered as crucial methodological key stones which would tend to 
deny that the philosophy of positivism is pure empiricism or 
simple materialism. However, we must state that the positiv-
ist’s anti-metaphysical approach rejects Absolute Truth even 
though nobody from among the positivists rejected truth in 
general as an “organizing form of experience”.
Auguste Comte believed that “positive philosophy” could be-
come the religion of humanity. Artists, Scientists, and Positive 
Philosophers would make this possible; they would become 
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so-called “positive priests”. With the help of their attempts, the 
synthesis of feelings and reason, science and faith would become 
real. However, this is not possible without self-reflection because 
one can never discover a soul without self-reflection.
Furthermore, Mill paid more attention to the facts of self-
observation than Comte, who denied that this (self-reflection) 
can be a positive fact as well. It should be stressed again that 
the self-reflection of the Spirit was one of the main topics dur-
ing the “metaphysical era”, that is in Hegel’s phenomenologi-
cal approach (Phenomenology of Spirit) and in the transition 
period of positivism. Self-reflection gave and gives much more 
than the simple experience of “here and now”. Nevertheless, it 
is remarkable that even in the philosophy of positivism Mill 
does not agree with this point, that self-reflection could not be 
a positive fact. Mill believed that there is an unbreakable wall 
between the way of explaining nature and the way of explaining 
our soul. This was a point for further development in the her-
meneutic approach. Thus, the paradigm of thinking which only 
aimed at external knowledge of the world cannot be exhaustive 
and adequate for humans and we cannot base our future solely 
on scientific knowledge gained by experience. Doing so could 
mean running the risk of losing something very important in 
our life, that is, losing our own subjectivity and, thus, subjec-
tive goals for own free life. It is also remarkable that Spencer 
too did not believe that religion would lose its position with 
the development of science. According to him, science and re-
ligion must be reconciled.
One of the first philosophers who introduced the way ‘to un-
derstand the facts of the human world without either reducing 
them to mere contingency or explaining their order by way of 
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speculative principles of the sort generated by traditional meta-
physics’ (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vico Giambat-
tista) was Giambattista Vico. Thereafter, the notion of recon-
ciliation between scientific and humanitarian discourse was 
developed by the philosophers of the hermeneutic tradition: 
Wilhelm Dilthey and Hans Georg Gadamer. Wilhelm Dilthey’s 
hermeneutics war aimed at finding a rigorous method of under-
standing and interpretation in the humanities, where subjectiv-
ity is emphasized as being of great importance as opposed to 
the natural sciences. The historical flow of ideas and history as 
a whole were the main key stones for achieving understanding.
The dualistic interpretation of the world, according to which 
nature and spirit and realities are deduced from one another 
by a causative-consecutive approach, is erroneous. Spirit is in 
itself, for itself, and self-sufficient, and only this allows its ratio-
nal comprehension. To overcome the crisis of European soci-
ety, Europe must consider the historical endless aims of reason 
arising from the philosophical spirit. The cause of the current 
crisis is misunderstood rationalism, namely, not rationalism it-
self but rationalism interpreted as naturalism and objectivism.
The cognitive process is as old as humanity itself; there-
fore, a hermeneutic approach to symbolic structural units is 
extremely important. Ideology requires critical hermeneutics; 
hermeneutics should reveal a hidden, distorted, obscure mean-
ing lying motionless under general, superficial truths of life.
What could replace the Absolute spirit, the abstract idea? 
Many proponents of the analytic and hermeneutic approaches 
drew attention to language, to this ideal substance which is nei-
ther immanent nor a pure abstraction precisely because it is con-
nected with human nature. Gadamer’s hermeneutics focuses on 
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the word, namely on its enlightening quality. According to Ga-
damer, we are a unified history of mankind, a “conversation”.
It is clear that scientific and technological progress has not 
been accompanied by humanitarian progress, nor has it de-
fused the conflicts, which may pose even greater threats than 
those experienced by humanity in the 20th century. The word 
of reconciliation should be the first and the last word – the 
alpha and omega that can prevent humanity’s slide into bar-
barism. The task of true philosophy is to bridge this gap and 
eliminate this difference between the world, as it is understood 
by science and our ordinary life-world.
We need to connect the notions of positivism and hermeneu-
tical transformation and the concepts of reason and faith more 
closely with the acquisition of structure and meaning, with pat-
terns of world-interpretation, and with the space that is thus 
opened up for interpretative conflicts. Then, the hermeneutical 
transformation of the aforementioned aspects would affect a 
revision of the main prejudices: reason and intuition would be 
both abilities and competences (the mind will have an ability to 
ground and justify, to find and give reasons; intuition and faith 
will be an ability to foresee and imagine, to understand the pres-
ent and to foresee the future). Then, both reason and humanitar-
ian discourse might be considered as dimensions or equivalent 
structures of culture, or to be more precise, as the ways of arriv-
ing at a cultural understanding of the world.
In consequence, reason and humanitarian discourse can be 
understood in a broader historical context than that of the 20th 
century: they should be considered as the basis of the modern 
humanitarian culture development, engaged in its scientific ap-
proach towards the world and in self-reflection dialectics.
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Chapter 3. Attempt at synthesis 
in phenomenology
Having analysed the postmodern state of continental 
thought and identified the fundamental epistemological diffi-
culties of the analytical tradition, we believe that the main fac-
tor in understanding human life is the historical course of thought 
and being in general. The analytical approach can only serve as 
an effective tool in clarifying certain concepts and perspectives, 
but it is not placed in the historical context, and, for this reason, 
remains in formal and instrumental space.
For a more detailed analysis of the outlined problems, let 
us consider the hermeneutic philosophical tradition from 
the point of view of the interpreted concept of ‘knowledge’. 
Hermeneutics consists in the application of a rigorous method 
for understanding and interpreting, which, at the same time, 
combines history with the philosophy of life. However, absolu-
tization of will and subjectivity can lead to dangerous tenden-
cies in the development of irrationalism. Therefore, without 
neglecting rationality, hermeneutics tries to gather facts of sci-
entific objectivity and human subjectivity by placing emphasis 
on the interrelation of parts and the whole for interpretation, 
since it is necessary to understand the text as a whole. The 
practice of interpretation is circular, as both parts are generally 
significant. It is necessary to consider the authors and their cul-
tural environment in their historical context. Retaining subjec-
tivity, interpreters are nevertheless able to overcome historical 
subjectivism and find a generally accepted interpretation.
62 Dimitry N. Mentuz THE IDEA OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS EVOLUTION IN MODERN DISCOURSE
According to Hans-Georg Gadamer, hermeneutics is the 
key to the nature of truth. The truth is revealed through under-
standing and interpretation. Understanding has an ontological 
nature, so hermeneutic claims may be similar to the claims of 
the natural sciences. The development of the method guaran-
tees the objectivity of the results, but it is not Gadamer’s goal. 
Gadamer seeks to find limitations to this method. This means 
that the human sciences can achieve objectivity only by aban-
doning the search for methodological objectivity. They should 
rely more on the fundamental abilities of a person. Under-
standing is one of the examples.
Gadamer believes that philosophy should explore the life-
world as a historical and intersubjective horizon of human 
experience (Gadamer H. G., 1980, р. 84). There is no fixed 
transcendental field of subjectivity, as may be required by meth-
odological dogmatism. Hence, education cannot be consid-
ered a reliable method. There is only a questioning technique. 
There is no single true interpretation of texts for all times and 
for all nations, but a better or worse interpretation is possible. 
Firstly, hermeneutics is a link between two horizons. Original 
transparency of the source text is impossible, but one should 
strive to avoid distortion of the truth. Not only are we able to 
try to gain insight into this or that situation, but also – which 
is just as important – consider this kind of situation from the 
point of view of the horizon. Vision depends on the point of 
view. A situation is a point of view, but, at the same time, it lim-
its our vision. Secondly, all issues in the historical context were 
influenced by a certain tradition of interpreting the same texts. 
Interpretation satisfies the requirements and provides a bet-
ter understanding of the present, but we must remember that 
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these issues originated in the past. Thirdly, the meaning is in-
exhaustible, and a single interpretation cannot reconstruct the 
meaning of the full text. However, this does not mean that all 
interpretations are identical to each other.
According to Gadamer, meaning is similar to the thing-in-
itself. Although the thing-in-itself is not knowable, it allegedly 
explains the sequence of phenomena, including our percep-
tion of the external world, as noted by Kant. Therefore, a cor-
responding theory of interpretation is out of the question. We 
can only study a chain of different interpretations. Similar to 
the experience of the external or physical world, the diversity 
of phenomena is inevitable (Gadamer H. G., 1980, р. 84).
Heidegger believes that avoiding the erroneous execution 
of the Absolute is possible, if we take a different course at the 
basic level, that is, at the level of ontology. Heidegger’s most 
famous work is ‘Being and Time’ (1927). Understanding can 
be achieved by attracting the essential and historical categories 
in their original unity. Such an approach requires an answer to 
the question of ‘What is Being?’ (Heidegger M., 2010, p. 35). 
The question can be posed by man from a certain point of view. 
Not only does man exist, he is also aware of the fact. This infor-
mation, as well as the ability to ask a question about one’s own 
nature, characterize human existence.
Heidegger and Sartre developed their fundamental onto-
logical theories based on a phenomenological approach. The 
traditional perception of reality is centred around dualistic 
oppositions: abstract and material, mind and body, reality 
and possibility, visibility and essence. According to both phi-
losophers, phenomenology makes it possible to abandon the 
aforementioned dualism and restore the ontological unity of 
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the world on a different basis. Despite the fact that both au-
thors were greatly influenced by Husserl, who represented the 
phenomenological philosophical tradition and used the same 
method, their ontological theories have a number of signifi-
cant differences, namely: the principles of interpretation of the 
structure of being, the concept of human freedom, and the re-
lationship of man to the Other, as well as the understanding of 
language and the role of art.
It is advisable to consider a detailed explanation of being 
and existential relationships as they were presented in Hei-
degger’s ontological work. Heidegger coined the term for the 
kind of being intrinsic to human existence, calling it Dasein 
(German Dasein–‘being there’; Da–‘here, there’). This kind of 
human existence is constantly present in the world, forming a 
single and indivisible structure with the latter; moreover, and 
most importantly, such a particular kind of being is capable of 
raising (and it raises) the question of its own being.
Human being is fundamentally different from the existence 
of other things. The term ‘Dasein’ applies only to human exis-
tence and may be the key to understanding being in general. 
Dasein exists (German existiert – to exist, to be), which is its 
main difference from other objects on the Earth: a rock or a 
tree do not inquire about their own existence; hence, they do 
not exist. In other words, they are incapable of being or not 
being by themselves: ‘Being-in-the-world belongs to Dasein’s 
ontological constitution. Nature, extant entities, can be with-
out a Dasein existing because Dasein’s world is not the natural 
world but rather a phenomenal world. The phenomenal world 
is more than the natural world, and Dasein cannot exist with-
out the phenomenal world because the phenomenal world be-
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longs to Dasein’s Being. Therefore, in a traditional sense, there 
are radical differences of ontological constitution between res 
extensa and res cogitans’ (Çüçen K., 2008, р. 60).
Existence precedes essence: the existence of human reality 
is primary, and only then it defines itself. This is the moment, 
where existence means the possibility of Dasein to ‘be itself or 
not itself ’ (Heidegger M., 2010, p. 33). Ultimately, existence 
encompasses the full responsibility of human reality for its re-
alization: the ability of a person to ask himself/herself ques-
tions and define his/her own being in relation to the world and 
forming a single structure with the world.
According to Heidegger, to confirm the interpretation of the 
structure of the relationship between Dasein and being, it is first 
of all necessary to raise the question of being, which, according 
to the philosopher, was forgotten in the context of the Western 
metaphysical tradition. The evolution of the question of being 
begins with an analysis of a particular kind of being, which is 
able to raise the question of its own existence, and so it has an 
implicit understanding of being – from the existential analy-
sis of Dasein. The authentic and inauthentic being of Dasein is 
structurally revealed in existentials. The fundamental existential 
of Dasein is care; ‘being-in-the-world’ is the most important ele-
ment of Dasein; structure is revealed in authentic (understand-
ing and interpretation) and inauthentic (ambiguity, curiosity, 
and idle talk) modes (Heidegger M., 2010, p. 34).
Dasein is a participant in the world process, not a stand-
alone observer. For Dasein, things are ‘ready-to-hand’ (German 
zu handen) rather than existing in general. The world is insepa-
rable from conscious being, and being, in turn, is inseparable 
from the world – this means unity, a single structure. This is 
66 Dimitry N. Mentuz THE IDEA OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS EVOLUTION IN MODERN DISCOURSE
Heidegger’s challenge to objectivist subjectivism, where the 
subjective and objective spheres are separate. The basic struc-
ture of Dasein also coexists with others. Apart from the things 
that are ready-to-hand (‘zu handen’), we also have an opportu-
nity to get to know other Daseins. At the same time, relation-
ships with other people may be inauthentic – there is a possi-
bility of existence in the impersonal mode of das Man.
Moreover, Dasein is free to identify itself as a true being. At 
the same time, Dasein is always situation-specific and charac-
terized by freedom of self-determination. Dasein has a limited 
number of possibilities presented by the world. Authentic Da-
sein is possible only if it comes to realize its own mortality, that 
is, it is necessary to understand that death as the possibility to 
end all possibilities is inevitable at some point. Facing its own 
mortality, Dasein becomes true and authentic. Heidegger’s 
‘Being and Time’ had a profound influence on the continental 
philosophy and philosophers of the twentieth century. Most 
importantly, on such philosophers as Jean-Paul Sartre, Hannah 
Arendt, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
As opposed to Heidegger, Sartre’s ontological project is fo-
cused on Being and Nothingness. Nothingness is considered 
as a phenomenon of human reality, but from a slightly differ-
ent perspective (as  compared to Heidegger). For Sartre, it is 
essential not to reduce it to the dualism of the preceding meta-
physical concept. Additionally, Sartre develops his theory in 
the phenomenological context. The principal characteristic of 
consciousness in phenomenology is its intentionality, that is, a 
focus on an object. This object (‘noema’), which is materialized 
through an act of thought (‘noesis’) directed to it, is attributed 
to the consciousness, namely to the process of thinking (no-
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esis). In this regard, Sartre believes that Nothingness may also 
have the characteristics of being (for instance, Pierre, whose 
absence in the cafe was not immediately noticed by the person 
who had fixed a meeting with Pierre in this cafe) (Sartre J.-P., 
2003, р. 9). Non-being in phenomenological ontology is just as real 
as being of a ‘positive’ thing.
There are two sides of being: being-for-itself (being of con-
sciousness) and being-in-itself (positive being as totality). Be-
ing-for-itself is a special way of being, which is realized through 
a series of negations of everything, and so can be opposed to 
everything else. For-itself is such a being, which, approaching 
the issue of its own nature, turns out not to be a being at all, 
since it immediately considers it different from itself – this is a 
specific mode of human being (Sartre J.-P., 2003, р. 181).
When it comes to cognition, being, which is not ‘Self ’, is 
‘absolute totality’, ‘being-in-itself ’. This implies that everything 
that represents the object of cognition is the world – the world 
as totality: ‘Yet it is not a purely subjective modification of the 
for-itself since it causes all subjectivity to be possible. But if the 
for-itself is to be the nothingness whereby ‘there is’ being, then 
being can exist originally only as totality. Thus, knowledge is 
the world. To use Heidegger’s expression, the world and out-
side of that – nothing. But this nothing is not originally that 
in which human reality emerges. This nothing is human reality 
itself as the radical negation by means of which the world is 
revealed’ (Sartre J.-P., 2003, р. 181).
The ‘proscenium’ of multiple groups of things in their entire-
ty is space. Thus, space represents the world’s instability: ‘Space 
is not the world, but it is the instability of the world apprehend-
ed as totality, in as much as the world can always disintegrate 
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into external multiplicity’ (Sartre  J.-P., 2003, р. 184). In this 
passage, Sartre points out the existential origin of space, im-
plicit (forgotten, not quite understood) in science; thus, in ge-
ometry, for instance, hypostatization of external multiplicity 
into matter existing in itself has occurred.
Arguing further about knowledge, Sartre interprets it as fol-
lows: ‘Knowledge is nothing other than the presence of being 
to the For-itself, and the For-itself is only the nothing which 
realizes that presence. Thus, knowledge is by nature ecstatic 
being, and because of that fact it is confused with the ecstatic 
being of the For-itself. The For-itself does not exist in order sub-
sequently to know; neither can we say that it exists only in so far 
as it knows or is known, for this would be to make being van-
ish into an infinity regulated by particular bits of knowledge. 
Knowing is an absolute and primitive event; it is the absolute 
upsurge of the For-itself in the midst of being and beyond be-
ing, in terms of the being which it is not and as the negation of 
that being and a self-nihilation’ (Sartre J.-P., 2003, р. 216).
Thus, knowledge is, by nature, an ecstatic being and is noth-
ing more than the presence of being-for-itself, which (For-it-
self) is, in turn, Nothing, aware of this presence. For-itself does 
not exist for the purpose of knowing later; at the same time, it 
is impossible to say that it exists for itself only when it ‘knows’. 
According to Sartre (Sartre J.-P., 2003, p. 216), when it comes 
to being, this is a case of absolute denial and self-denial.
Hence, according to both Heidegger and Sartre, the being 
of human reality is ecstatic and pre-reflective, which makes it 
different from the Cartesian reflective Cogito, where being is 
the product of thinking. According to Heidegger, the being of 
human reality forms a single structure with the world, while 
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being-in-the-world is its basic characteristic. According to Sar-
tre, the single structure of being-in-itself and being-for-itself is 
a mobile quasi-totality with points of attraction between the 
two types of being. At the same time, being-for-itself tran-
scends into the ‘state of awareness’ by deliberate action. The 
result of this transcendence, according to the philosopher, is 
the world as a proven being. These points of view are neither 
idealistic nor realistic, since there is no struggle for the onto-
logical superiority of a particular structure of being.
In addition to ‘being-in-the-world’, coherence with the world 
and understanding of the world are among the main existentials. 
Understanding of the world is rooted in the act of understanding 
rather than in the knowledge of things. We perceive the world 
through our intuitive understanding of things. Let us compare 
the views of Heidegger and Sartre in this respect. Sartre believes 
that every single cognitive process is ultimately intuitive: ‘There 
is only intuitive knowledge. Deduction and discursive argument, 
incorrectly called examples of knowing, are only instruments 
which lead to intuition’ (Sartre J.-P., 2003, р. 172).
The dialectic of our freedom and being-in-the-world is re-
vealed through our special states: sadness, anxiety, and fear. The 
main state here is ‘disposedness’ (Germ. Befindlichkeit – mood, 
state of mind). Existential states are elements of this structure, 
characterized by spontaneity – for instance, what happens to a 
person when feelings overwhelm him/her (Germ. überfallen – 
attack, overwhelm). These states do not depend on human will. 
Such existential states are not subjective. At the same time, there 
are social existential states (Wrathall  M., 2006, р. 30). How-
ever, such states are non-objective and secondary to the ex-
istence of the world: ‘So disposedness [Befindlichkeit] is an 
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“attunement”, a way of being tuned in to things in the world, 
and tuned by the things of the world. This disposedness is 
something we can never fully master. But far from that being a 
detriment to our freedom, it is the condition that first makes it 
possible’ (Wrathall M., 2006, р. 4).
Attunement is uncontrollable. Sartre represents his under-
standing of being in a completely basic, universal, and compre-
hensible form of disgust or total negation, which is reflected in 
his novel Nausea. Here we have the motives of abandonment 
in the world, attunement with the Absolute, monotony – the 
spontaneity of overpowering existential anxiety, revealing the 
very being, the true essence of things.
The question of authenticity is one of the fundamental ques-
tions of human being raised in the philosophical theories of 
Heidegger and Sartre. Studying the impersonal phenomenon 
of das Man, explaining ways to understand human conscious-
ness, ‘bad faith’, and sincerity – all this occupied the minds of 
both philosophers dealing with the subject of human existence 
in the world – the issue of being yourself. The phenomenon of 
das Man (derived from the impersonal singular pronoun man 
in German), analysed by Heidegger, encompasses impersonal 
Others. This phenomenon is impersonal, but it has a voice, a 
general understanding, and acts in a conventional way.
According to Heidegger, a person can hear the voice of con-
science. It is a call to be yourself, to be human. This voice exists 
exclusively within Dasein, preceding any action and any real 
guilt. Social consciousness is the voice of das Man. Following 
the voice of das Man, Dasein loses its authenticity: ‘The voice 
does call back, but it calls back beyond the past deed onto 
thrown being-guilty, which is “earlier” than any indebtedness 
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[Verschuldung]. But the call back at the same time calls forth a 
being-guilty, as something to be seized upon in one’s own exis-
tence, in such a way that authentic, existential being-guilty pre-
cisely comes after the call, and not the other way around. Basi-
cally, bad conscience is so far from reproving and pointing back 
that it rather points forward by calling back into thrownness’ 
(Heidegger M., 2010, р. 279). Thus, this brings Heidegger back 
to basic existential structures, such as care (upon serious reflec-
tion and realization of one’s commitment) and ecstatic being, 
which are not an assessment of the events that have taken place. 
Additionally, Heidegger speaks about authenticity, responsi-
bility, and the incompleteness of Dasein.
In his writings, Heidegger paid special attention to the cat-
egory of inquiry and its structure. Thus, the following are the 
structural elements of inquiry: the content of the question 
(das Gefragte), that which is interrogated (das Befragte) and 
that which is to be found out by asking, that is, the intended 
answer (das Erfragte). That which is inquired has an obligatory 
connection with such categories as thinking and being. The 
category of inquiry can reveal being from the point of view of 
dialogism, representing it as Mit-sein, as well as a relationship 
of such aspects as Self and non-Self, or Self and the Other.
According to Sartre, man may face a tough choice or be 
trapped in a specific paradigm of subordination, which is com-
parable with the loss of authenticity. Unlike Heidegger, Sar-
tre does not focus on ‘public opinion’, ‘voice of das Man’, or 
‘care’. Instead, he describes the phenomenon of ‘genuine’ self-
deception, that is the phenomenon of ‘bad faith’, which is, in 
other words, a conflict between ‘for-itself ’ and ‘in-itself ’. The 
‘bad faith’ of man manifests itself in a negation directed at itself: 
72 Dimitry N. Mentuz THE IDEA OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS EVOLUTION IN MODERN DISCOURSE
man subjectively denies something, but in reality, does the op-
posite in a customary, disinterested, and sincere manner. There 
is a deception of ‘bad faith’ behind such inconsistency. Another 
example of ‘bad faith’ is a situation where a man/woman claims 
or denies something, but the meaning of his/her words either 
neutralizes or invalidates his statement or negation. Thus, the 
decision is hidden from itself in a situation of self-denial, which 
is also ‘bad faith’. ‘Bad faith’ is a state. The opposite of ‘bad faith’ 
is authenticity. However, authenticity is not a state, but rather a 
requirement to be who we are. It is not equal to being-in-itself, 
as, for example, being a table or any other object. The desire to 
be truly genuine is a feeling of being-for-itself, growing out of a 
sense of guilt, which Sartre called existential guilt.
Thus, both philosophers share the same view on the orig-
inal existential guilt of man, which is based on our desire to 
be authentic, to be ourselves. Nevertheless, they use different 
methods of explanation. The most important philosophical 
problem for Sartre, which reveals to a great extent his ontologi-
cal position and its difference from the views of Heidegger, is 
the problem of the Other: ‘Others are the Other, that is the self 
which is not myself. Therefore, we grasp here a negation as the 
constitutive structure of the being-of-others’ (Sartre J.-P., 2003, 
р. 230). This point of view makes Sartre stand out among ma-
terialists and idealists. According to materialism, bodies are lo-
cated in physical space. Ontologically speaking, the negation ‘I 
am not’ expresses the same idea as the phrase ‘the table is not a 
chair’. Idealism distinguishes between two types of conscious-
ness, using the traditional method of hypostatization. The dif-
ference lies in the fact that the space, where the two types of 
consciousness are distinguished, is ideal. From the point of 
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view of materialism and idealism, the Other is presented in 
consciousness as something external, merely pertaining to it. 
Sartre, by contrast, uses a phenomenological approach. In my 
opinion, his point of view cannot be called materialistic, ideal-
istic, or dualistic. In Sartre’s ontology, ‘matter’ is not important.
In the first chapter of the third part of ‘Being and Nothing-
ness’, Sartre studies the concepts of three philosophers: Husserl, 
Hegel, and Heidegger. These concepts include expectations of 
solipsism, deemed inevitable, if the issue is considered from the 
point of view of dualism: in other words, the two substances 
are separated from each other to explain the relationship be-
tween the Self and the Other. In fact, any attempt to combine 
the separated substances will be weak. However, we can try to 
understand the relationship between the Self and the Other 
from the phenomenological point of view – as they originate in 
the intentional activity of consciousness itself. In this case, such 
consciousness is not Cogito. On the contrary, we encounter the 
Other without Cogito and the existence of the Other brings 
Cogito into existence the moment we see ourselves as objects. 
For Sartre, the existence of a universal abstract structure of the 
Other, the issue of personal aspirations is more important: ‘If we 
are to refute solipsism, then my relation to the Other is first and 
fundamentally a relation of being to being, not of knowledge to 
knowledge’ (Sartre J.-P., 2003, р. 244).
Heidegger also attempted to get around solipsism. He intro-
duced new concepts to describe human reality: ‘being-in-the-
world’, where ‘world’, ‘being-in’, and ‘being’ are all moments of 
the same structural unity. Ways of sharing reality with the Oth-
er are moments that are essential to being human (subordina-
tion), authentic ‘Being-with’ (German: Mit-sein – being with 
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others). In this case, the Self encounters the Other afterwards, 
in Dasein’s ontological structural whole. This concept of being 
is different from Cogito. It is Dasein, ‘which belongs to me’. The 
moment of building a relationship with the Other is a moment 
in the structure of Dasein.
The difference in the positions of the two philosophers lies 
in connotative interpretations of the relationship with the 
Other. For Heidegger, this can be ‘Being-with’ (‘Mitsein’) or 
das Man (inauthentic ‘they-self ’). For Sartre, the relationship 
with the Other is a fatal ‘conflict’. According to Heidegger, 
Dasein always understands itself in terms of possibilities; it 
is future-oriented in its authentic being. A very interesting 
question arises: What is the cause of the transition from inau-
thenticity to freedom? Can philosophy be the trigger mecha-
nism? ‘What motivates the transition from inauthenticity, as 
the initial mode of human Dasein, in which it “initially and 
for the most part” is, to the authenticity of its very being at 
all? Heidegger’s answer is: anxiety (die Angst). <…> …anxi-
ety has the same function as philosophizing, namely that of 
bringing-back Dasein to its existentiality as its proper way of 
being’ (Patkul A., 2014, р. 136).
If we proceed from the idea that human capabilities are 
limited by the world and humans’ own character, this may cast 
doubt on the relationship of freedom with the structure of the 
world. Once again, the question arises: What is the cause – the 
trigger mechanism – for the transition to the ‘authentic being’ 
to freedom? While Heidegger believes that the voice of con-
science can be a motivational factor, Sartre argues that freedom 
should be defined as the actual ability of man to create projects. 
At the same time, in his opinion, freedom in itself can never 
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exist outside a ‘resisting world’, where ‘success is not important 
for freedom’ (Sartre J.-P., 2003, р. 483).
To exist, freedom needs neither Aristotle’s ‘matter’, nor the 
Stoic ‘pneuma’: in relation to being-in-itself, being-for-itself 
produces a negation. Sartre maintains that ‘a situation and 
motivation are one and the same’ (Sartre  J.-P., 2003, р. 487). 
This brings us to the paradox of freedom: freedom is possible 
only in a certain situation, but a situation is always associated 
with freedom. ‘We are a freedom which chooses; but we do 
not choose being free: we are condemned to freedom, as we 
said earlier, thrown into freedom or, as Heidegger says, “aban-
doned”’ (Sartre J.-P., 2003, pp. 484–485).
In ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, Sartre maintains that if 
existence really precedes essence, then man is responsible for 
what he is. We, according to Sartre, are left alone on the plain 
with other people, without a justification or a reasonable ex-
cuse. This situation reflects our position in the world and cor-
relates with the movement of the given towards the intended 
purpose: all that is given is turned away from incompleteness–‘it 
is not there yet’, and so there will be no situations that could pro-
vide ‘more freedom’.
A comparative analysis of the views of the two philosophers 
leads to the following conclusion: both Heidegger and Sartre 
use a phenomenological approach to raise fundamental onto-
logical issues in their works. Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ fo-
cuses on the explanation of the concept of Dasein by analysing 
its existentials, including the most important ones–‘being-in-
the-world’ and care. Sartre, in turn, begins to develop his theory, 
focusing on Nothingness, which is just as real as positive being 
as a whole, divided into two components: being-for-itself and 
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being-in-itself. Both philosophers believe that human being is 
ecstatic: while Dasein consists in care and forms a single struc-
ture with the world, Sartre believes that this separate structure 
is a quasi-totality with points of attraction between the two 
types of being. At the same time, being-for-itself transcends 
into the ‘state of awareness’ by deliberate action.
According to both Heidegger and Sartre, the problem of au-
thenticity is one of the main issues of human existence. In both 
cases, the phenomenon of authenticity is closely connected with 
the inner voice of human consciousness and the existential guilt. 
Sartre recognizes the importance of interpreting a special rela-
tionship with the Other. The difference in the views of the two 
philosophers lies in connotative interpretations of such a rela-
tionship. According to Sartre’s interpretation, the relationship 
with the Other constitutes an inevitable ‘conflict’. As for freedom, 
Sartre considers this phenomenon using a far more radical ap-
proach – it is impossible not to be free, and man is the embodi-
ment of freedom. In his later writings, Heidegger focused on re-
thinking the phenomenon of the alienated human reality in the 
Technosphere. Also, the views of the philosopher are reflected 
in the analysis of the phenomena of art and language, which he 
believed to be the ‘house of being’. At the same time, Sartre’s lit-
erary and philosophical genius was able to describe human ex-
istence, the feeling of being ‘abandoned’ in the world, the fatal 
borderline states of human existence, as well as the situation of a 
fateful choice both in his early writings (‘Nausea’ and ‘The Wall’) 
and in later novels, plays, and essays (‘Situations II: What Is Lit-
erature?’, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’).
Although primarily a philosopher, Sartre pays attention to 
the performative role of language and art. Thus, the proposi-
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tional function of language is not reduced to merely a significa-
tion of reality or ideas: ‘Similarly, the signification of a melody, 
if one can still speak of signification, is nothing outside of the 
melody itself, unlike ideas, which can be adequately rendered 
in several ways. Call it joyous or sombre. It will always be over 
and above anything you can say about it’ (Sartre, 1949, p. 10).
Consequently, we can comprehend the living truth through 
the greatest works of art, where a word of a genius of literature 
may become for us a part of our spiritual endeavours. Sartre 
also believed that art helps a person arrive at complex philo-
sophical ideas. Sartre’s main philosophical categories– freedom, 
consciousness, choice, the Other, bad faith, and truth – were re-
flected in his brilliant essays, the novel ‘Nausea’ and his plays. For 
his literary work, Sartre was awarded the Nobel Prize, which the 
author chose to refuse, emphasizing the independence of his po-
sition with regard to any institution. Apart from his philosophi-
cal and literary contribution, Sartre was deeply engaged in civic 
activities, and fought in the French Resistance during the Nazi 
occupation. The great philosopher’s views were appreciated by 
people who held on to left-wing ideas in France and around the 
world, and many intellectuals saw the true value of Sartre’s philo-
sophical, literary, and civic activities. More than fifty thousand 
people came to pay their last respects to Sartre after his death in 
Paris. First and foremost, Sartre’s basic philosophical concepts 
are briefly discussed in my essay: being-in-itself, being-for-itself, 
Nothingness, and the possibility of knowledge. Sartre belongs 
to the phenomenological school of philosophy. For this reason, 
I  will occasionally compare Sartre’s views with those of Hus-
serl and Heidegger in order to clearly outline his position. Be-
sides, such important aspects of human existence as freedom, 
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conscience, and bad faith will also be discussed while analysing 
Sartre’s literary works: the novel ‘Nausea’, the essay ‘Existential-
ism is a Humanism’, and three of his plays ‘No Exit’, ‘The Flies’ 
and ‘The Victors’.
Does freedom have limits? How does Sartre understand 
freedom? And what does he mean when he says ‘humans are 
free’? Do people have unlimited possibilities, and, if not, what 
is the ultimate expression of freedom for each person? And 
how should we understand conscience, which is directly re-
lated to both freedom and truth? How can a free person gain 
knowledge and what is the Truth for a human being?
Sartre’s novel Nausea was published in 1938. It is set in a 
provincial town with its measured and calm life. The protago-
nist of the novel is a certain Roquentin, a researcher, working 
on a biography of the nobleman Marquis X for the rich heirs 
of the latter. Soon it becomes clear that the work does not give 
Roquentin any pleasure. In fact, his clients are indifferent to it, 
too. Neither party is interested. Roquentin starts to suffer from 
bouts of nausea for no particular reason. In the agony of intro-
spection, Roquentin gradually comes to realize that it is pre-
cisely the lack of interest that causes this disgust for the world, 
as well as the nausea. But what is the essence of this disgust? 
Can it be the most basic and universal form of negation associ-
ated with being that Sartre conveys allegorically in his novel?
According to Sartre, being-for-itself is such a being, which 
in terms of its own being is essentially a way not to be a certain 
being, which it immediately recognizes as different from itself. 
In the limelight of existence, being produces a series of consec-
utive negations that gets to the essence of things. There is noth-
ing left but existence, all words are peeled off like varnish, while 
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things are turned into a ‘single viscous mess’: ‘And suddenly, 
suddenly, the veil is torn away, I have understood, I have seen.
‘6.00 p. m.
‘I can’t say I feel relieved or satisfied; just the opposite, I am 
crushed. Only my goal is reached: I  know what I  wanted to 
know; I  have understood all that has happened to me since 
January. The Nausea has not left me and I don’t believe it will 
leave me so soon; but I no longer have to bear it, it is no longer 
an illness or a passing fit: it is I.
‘So, I was in the park just now. The roots of the chestnut tree 
were sunk in the ground just under my bench. I  couldn’t re-
member it was a root any more. The words had vanished and 
with them the significance of things, their methods of use, and 
the feeble points of reference which men have traced on their 
surface. I was sitting, stooping forward, head bowed, alone in 
front of this black, knotty mass, entirely beastly, which fright-
ened me. Then I had this vision.
‘It left me breathless. Never, until these last few days, had 
I understood the meaning of “existence.” I was like the others, 
like the ones walking along the seashore, all dressed in their 
spring finery. I said, like them, “The ocean is green; that white 
speck up there is a seagull,” but I didn’t feel that it existed or that 
the seagull was an “existing seagull”; usually existence hides it-
self. It is there, around us, in us, it is us, you can’t say two words 
without mentioning it, but you can never touch it. When I be-
lieved I was thinking about it, I must believe that I was thinking 
nothing, my head was empty, or there was just one word in my 
head, the word “to be”’ (Sartre, 2000, pp. 127–128).
Thus, amid the existential angst, the total disgust for the 
world and nausea having reached an extreme point, the 
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protagonist understands what it means ‘to be’. Roquentin 
does not commit suicide, bouts of nausea continue, and he 
realizes that they may never disappear, but they no longer 
make him suffer.
Sartre represents his understanding of being in a complete-
ly basic, universal, and comprehensible form, namely, in the 
form of disgust, which is depicted in the novel as a total nega-
tion. Here we have the motives of ‘abandonment’ in the world, 
being attuned with the absolute, monotony – the spontaneity 
of sudden and overpowering existential anxiety, revealing the 
very being, the true essence of things.
Existential anxiety is only one of the states of mind, where 
the meaning of life is revealed. But there are many other situa-
tions, such as existential angst or a life choice. Sartre brilliantly 
describes these situations in his plays: The Victors, The Flies, The 
Devil and the Good Lord, No Exit, as well as in the philosophical 
essay ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’.
Sartre’s essay ‘Existentialism Is a Humanism’ is his response 
to certain critical remarks of Catholics and Communists on ex-
istentialism. In short, Communists claimed that existentialism 
is a philosophy of inaction, ultimately leading to a ‘quietism of 
despair’. Others accused existentialism of focusing only on the 
dark side of life, neglecting many bright and positive aspects of 
human existence – this accusation came from Catholics. Both 
Communists and Catholics criticize existentialism for ignor-
ing the solidarity of humankind and concentrating on the indi-
vidual as an isolated being. That is, according to Communists, 
existentialists consider a person based on Descartes’ ‘Cogito’ 
statement and, what is more, at the moment of self-reflection 
in solitude, which, in their opinion, closes the door to solidar-
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ity. Christians blame existentialists for their denial of reality, as 
well as for diminishing the value of human actions.
Sartre responds to these critical remarks and defines existen-
tialism as a doctrine making genuine human life possible, which 
states that the truth and actions imply both an environmental 
and a human subjectivity. Sartre distinguishes two groups of ex-
istentialist thinkers: Christian existentialists, such as Jaspers and 
Gabriel Marcel, a professed Catholic, and atheistic existential-
ist, such as Heidegger and the French existentialists (including 
himself). Representatives of both groups, however, believe that 
existence precedes essence or, according to Sartre, that ‘we must 
begin with from the subjective’. (Sartre, 1996, p. 66). It does not 
mean that Sartre is solipsist or subjective idealist, ‘to begin from 
the subjective’ means that we recognize the humans’ free will, 
and that their free choice is not determined externally.
Sartre further provides some examples of essence preced-
ing existence. For instance, God as the creator is regarded as a 
‘supernal artisan’. Whatever the doctrine – that of Descartes or 
of Leibniz – it is always assumed that the will is, to one degree 
or another, the consequence of understanding, it means that 
humans’ will is predetermined in some way by understanding 
externally. For instance, when God creates, He is well aware of 
what He is creating. (Sartre, 1996, p. 67) Thus, the concept of 
a ‘man’ in the mind of God is similar to the concept of a ‘knife’ 
in the artisan’s mind. In this particular case, essence is prior to 
existence. Then Sartre argues that the philosophical atheism 
of the eighteenth century may have limited the notion of God, 
(Sartre, 1996, p. 67.), but not the idea that essence precedes 
existence, which is expressed to a varying degree in the works 
of Diderot, Voltaire, and Kant.
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Humans possess a specific human nature, that is, every single 
person is only a special case of the universal concept of ‘Human’. 
According to Kant, for instance, this universality means that the 
human of the woods – the natural human – and the bourgeois 
are defined in the same way and possess the same fundamental 
qualities. Consequently, here again, the essence of the human 
precedes his/her historical existence. At the same time, atheistic 
existentialists are more consistent. They argue that even if there 
is no God, there is at least one being, whose existence comes 
before essence. This being is human or, as Heidegger puts it, the 
human reality. Hence, existence precedes essence. In the begin-
ning, the human exists, he/she is found in nature, appears in the 
world. Then he/she defines himself/herself. Humans cannot be-
come anything until later, and then he/she becomes what he/
she makes of himself/herself.
Consequently, there is no human nature, as there is no God 
Who would conceive it. Humans will become what they choose 
to become. Now that he exists, man is able to conceive himself 
and express his will; he is only what he makes of himself – this 
is the first principle of existentialism. That is, an individual is 
above all a project, which is experienced subjectively, not some 
kind of moss or mould.
A human will become what he/she purposes to be and not 
what he/she may not wish to be. By a wish we usually under-
stand a conscious decision, taken by most people after they 
have made something of themselves. I may wish to join a party, 
write a book or marry, but all this is only a manifestation of 
a more original, more spontaneous choice than what is com-
monly known as will. Nevertheless, if existence really precedes 
essence, then a human is responsible for what he/she is.
Chapter 3. Attempt at synthesis in phenomenology 83
Existentialism means, on the one hand, that an individual 
chooses himself and, on the other hand, that man cannot go 
beyond the boundaries of human subjectivity. It is the second 
deep meaning, which is essentially existential. Man is anxiety. 
If an individual makes a conscious choice in favour of his own 
being, he commits not only himself but acts as a legislator mak-
ing a commitment on behalf of all mankind.
Existentialists are concerned that there is no God, and 
without God – and they believe that this is indeed the case 
(Sartre, 1996, p. 67)–all possibility of finding values in an in-
telligible heaven disappears. Sartre believes, that we are on 
a plain, surrounded only by other people. Justifications or 
excuses are neither behind us nor before us in a luminous 
realm of values. We are left alone without excuse – a human 
is condemned to be free. A human did not create himself and, 
yet, is thrown into the world, where he/she is responsible for 
his/her deeds. Existentialists do not believe that a human can 
find help on earth through some sign – a human interprets 
signs as he/she chooses.
Who can choose a priori? No one. To choose an adviser 
means to commit oneself to that choice: ‘I cannot affirm that 
the Russian Revolution will necessarily lead to the triumph of 
the proletariat: I  must confine myself to what I  can see. Nor 
can I be sure that comrades-in-arms will take up my work af-
ter my death and carry it to the maximum perfection, seeing 
that those men are free agents and will freely decide, tomorrow, 
what man is then to be. Tomorrow, after my death, some men 
may decide to establish Fascism, and the others may be so cow-
ardly or so slack as to let them do so… There is no reality ex-
cept in action. …Man is nothing else but what he purposes,…
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the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is’ (Sartre, 
1996, p. 74–75).
No other truth apart from ‘I think, therefore I am’ can be 
the starting point. It is the absolute truth of consciousness. To 
define the probable, one must possess the truth. Consequently, 
for any truth to exist at all, there must be absolute truth – sim-
ple, easily attained, accessible to everybody and immediately 
grasped.
Contrary to the philosophy of Descartes, contrary to that of 
Kant, when we use the ‘Cogito’ formula, we get to know our-
selves in the presence of the Other, who is just as real as we are. 
Thus, the human who discovers himself/herself directly in the 
Cogito also discovers all the others, who are, in fact, the con-
dition of his own existence. In order to obtain any truth about 
myself, I should recognize the Other and act through him/her. 
The Other is essential for both my existence and self-reflection. 
Thus, a human discovers a whole new world of inter-subjectivity, 
where he/she has to decide what he/she is and what others are.
A moral choice is similar to the creation of a work of art. A 
human is obliged to draft his/her own moral law, it is not pro-
vided to him/her a priori. A human creates himself/herself by 
choosing the morality of pressure. The circumstances are such 
that he/she cannot fail to choose his/her morality – we define 
a person only with regard to his/her decision to take a position.
In each particular case, freedom can have no other purpose 
but itself. Once a human has admitted that in a state of aban-
donment he/she is the one to establish all values, he/she can 
now strive for one thing – freedom as the foundation of these 
values. Life has no meaning a priori. Life is nothing until hu-
mans find their way to live it. Humans must give it a meaning. 
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The meaning humans choose is what their life is worth. Exis-
tentialists do not treat humans as an end, because humans are 
always an unfinished project and are capable of choice.
Existentialists do not believe that humanity is something 
with which people can set up a cult, after the manner of Au-
guste Comte. Humanism can be understood differently. A hu-
man being is constantly beyond himself/herself; it means pro-
jecting himself/herself to show that he/she exists as a human 
being, while pursuing transcendent aims and self-surpassing.
Being transcendental, a human being is at the heart of self-
surpassing. There is no other universe here except the human 
universe. This relation of transcendence as a constitutive char-
acteristic of humans (not in the sense of transcendent God, but 
in the sense of self-surpassing) with subjectivity (meaning that a 
human is not confined within himself/herself but is forever pres-
ent in a human universe) is what existentialists call existential 
humanism (Sartre, 2000, p. 76). More precisely, it is the relation 
of transcendence and subjectivity that constitutes an individual. 
Plunging humans into despair is not the intention here.
Authenticity is one of the most important concepts of hu-
man existence in Sartre’s philosophy. Studying the impersonal 
phenomenon of man, explaining the understanding of human 
consciousness, ‘bad faith’, and sincerity – all this occupied the 
mind of the philosopher dealing with the subject of human ex-
istence in the world, addressing the issue of being yourself.
According to Sartre, a human may face a tough choice or 
be trapped in a specific paradigm of subordination, which is 
comparable with the loss of authenticity. Unlike Heidegger, 
Sartre does not focus on ‘public opinion’, ‘voice of das Man’ or 
‘care’. Instead, he emphasizes the phenomenon of ‘genuine’ self-
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deception, that is the phenomenon of ‘bad faith’, which is, in 
other words, a conflict between ‘for-itself ’ and ‘in-itself ’.
A person’s ‘bad faith’ manifests itself in a negation directed 
at itself: a human subjectively denies something, but in real-
ity does the opposite in a customary, disinterested, and sincere 
manner. There is a deception of ‘bad faith’ behind such a dis-
crepancy. Another example of ‘bad faith’ is a situation, where 
a person claims or denies something, but the meaning of his 
words neutralizes or invalidates his claim or denial. This means 
that the decision is hidden from itself in a situation of self-de-
nial, which is also ‘bad faith’.
‘Bad faith’ is a state. The opposite of ‘bad faith’ is authentic-
ity. However, authenticity is not a state, but rather a require-
ment to be who we are. It is not equal to being-in-itself, as, for 
example, being a table or any other object. The desire to be 
truly genuine is a feeling of being-for-itself, growing out of a 
sense of guilt, which Sartre called existential guilt.
In his play, The Flies, (Sartre, 1989, pp. 47–125) Sartre uses 
the power of artistic expression to convey such fundamental 
concepts of human existence as guilt, conscience, will, and 
freedom in a dramatic situation. Sartre resorts to the allego-
ries of the ancient myth of Electra and Orestes. The story is set 
in ancient Argos, where many years ago, Aegisthus and Queen 
Clytemnestra had united to kill Agamemnon, the legitimate 
king of Argos, get rid of Orestes, heir to the throne, and make 
Electra, daughter of Clytemnestra and Agamemnon, a servant.
The townspeople heard the cries of Agamemnon fighting 
for his life in the palace and understood what was happen-
ing, but pretended not to hear and preferred to remain silent. 
Subsequently, their tormented conscience tirelessly reminded 
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them of their fault. For this purpose, Sartre introduces flies – 
the tormenting Furies of Guilt, the goddesses of remorse. Tyr-
anny was established in Argos after the king’s assassination. Ae-
gisthus and Clytemnestra skilfully took advantage of the guilt 
of the townspeople, playing on people’s feelings, organizing an 
annual phantasmagoria to commemorate the dead. But Or-
estes was destined to survive and return to Argos.
At first, his will is asleep. In Argos, he meets Zeus, one of 
the characters in the play. Orestes tends to shift the responsi-
bility for his actions on to others’ shoulders. He asks the gods 
to give him signs, which Zeus does at once. Taking these signs 
seriously and acting on their basis, Orestes refuses to accept 
full responsibility for his decisions, since it is the hand of Zeus 
that shows him the way through signs. In this case, the will of 
Orestes is out of his hands.
Little by little, however, Orestes forces the weakness out; 
Electra, his sister, helps him along the way. She dares to appear 
at the ceremony of commemoration with a delay and in a white 
dress, declaring: ‘These dead are not mine!’ She knows that her 
conscience is clear, that she has been wrongfully humiliated, 
and has been made to suffer unfairly. Electra makes Orestes 
choose the path of revenge, helping him to realize that she re-
lies on him and is grateful to him for giving her hope. Finally, 
Orestes makes up his mind and kills the criminals – Aegisthus 
and Clytemnestra.
But Electra is mentally broken by the murder of her mother. 
Tormented by the Furies, Electra lacks the will to resist them. 
Orestes, realizing what he has done, understands that it is he 
who bears the burden of responsibility for all his deeds, past 
and future. He realizes that Zeus has no power over him, since 
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he does not believe in his signs any more. Now that he has his 
will under control, he chooses not to entrust the Furies (or any 
magical creatures) with his guilt.
Neither divine signs nor remorse can paralyze him now. He 
understands that it was a fair trial of murderers and that he, Or-
estes, is the master of his own destiny, the author of his own ac-
tions. In the play, Sartre clearly demonstrates that in a situation 
of facticity, a man of common sense always has a choice. This 
does not mean that a human possesses or will ever possess su-
pernatural or absolute powers. Far from it. A human being has 
no characteristics of the Absolute. However, a human is abso-
lutely not determined by the situation of facticity he/she finds 
himself/herself in, which means that in every situation there is 
at least one more alternative.
After all, the citizens of Argos had heard the death screams 
of their king, a victim of assassination. They could have come 
to his rescue. Naturally, many of these situations may lead to 
counter-violence, non-being, as was shown in the play, The Vic-
tors. But this does not change the ontological state of things. 
There is always an option in human existence; it is a permanent 
ontological characteristic of the human being, who does not 
possess absolute powers in a given situation.
Neither is it determined by signs or the situation itself. A 
human being is both the author of his actions and the doer. The 
question is whether this human is fully aware of ‘bad faith’ or 
leans towards it.
This is an example of a fundamental and transcendental con-
nection of the Self with the Other, which is established by con-
sciousness itself. This is similar to Hegel’s being-for-others, which 
he claims to be one of the stages of development of self-con-
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sciousness. The path to myself goes through the Other, through 
the recognition of the Self by the Other, since I can only become 
an object for myself if I first become an object for the Other.
Sartre describes the relationship of the Self with the Other 
as that of being to being: ‘if we are to refute solipsism, then my 
relation to the Other is first and fundamentally a relation of be-
ing to being, not of knowledge to knowledge. We have seen Hus-
serl’s failure when, on this particular level, he measures being by 
knowledge, and Hegel’s when he identifies knowledge and being. 
But we have equally recognized that Hegel, although his vision is 
obscured by the postulate of absolute idealism, has been able to 
put the discussion on its true plane’ (Sartre, 1956, p. 244).
Sartre does not try to solve the problem of the Other’s being 
using idealistic methods. Instead, he resorts to phenomenolog-
ical ontology and concentrates on the problem of finding the 
Other, which is brilliantly demonstrated in his literary work, 
No Exit (Sartre, 1989, pp. 1–47). Sartre’s play, No Exit provides 
an outstanding example of ‘bad faith’ and the fight against the 
Other. The play is set in hell. The main characters are Joseph, 
Inès, and Estelle, three damned souls, who ended up in hell. 
Their punishment was to spend eternity together.
Each of them bears the burden of guilt as a result of their ac-
tions. Being already in hell, each, nevertheless, attempts to con-
ceal his or her story along with the shame and tries to appear 
in the eyes of the Other as a better person. Estelle killed her 
child, Inez’s actions caused suicide, Joseph Garcin mistreated 
his wife for five years. He used to be a journalist and a political 
activist, but when a military dictatorship was established in his 
country, he lost his nerve and decided to flee. Eventually, he 
was captured and shot.
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Now each of the three has to share his or her story with the 
others, as it is no longer possible to keep it secret. They believe 
their stories are unique, but as they describe the details of their 
fall, it becomes clear that the Other knows it all too well. Us-
ing Sartre’s terminology, each of the souls in hell is in a state of 
being-in-the-world for the Other. Being-for-itself is lost. Inès, 
Estelle and Garcin have to spend eternity together. They have 
no choice – the Other is unavoidable. In the finale, Garcin says: 
Hell is – other people’ (Sartre, 1989, p. 45). But what if hell 
started much earlier, outside of the one-act play room, in the 
previous life, which is over at the moment when a person took 
the wrong path, abandoned freedom, mistreated the Other, 
impinged upon the rights of the Other to life, to freedom? In 
the situation of hell, in being-in-the-world for the Other, self-
hood and will are lost. Even when Garcin manages to open the 
door of hell, which had been locked for ages, he does not dare 
to leave, but stays in hell, because he has no will to cross the 
threshold. Thus, Inès, Estelle and Garcin remain judges and ex-
ecutioners of each other, each being completely objectified in 
the world of the Other, having lost their being-for-itself.
Ultimately, the purpose of the Self is to be authentic, to 
remain free, while being ‘different’ for the Other: I  am both 
the Self and the Other at once, in which case a contradiction 
arises, as I  want them to merge. This, according to Sartre, is 
the controversial and unattainable ideal of love (Sartre, 1956, 
pp. 364–365)
The protagonists of the play, The Victors (Sartre, 1967, 
pp. 83–147) appear to face difficult life choices amid tragic 
historical events. The play is set in a coastal city of France dur-
ing the Nazi occupation. After disrupting a military operation, 
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which resulted in civilian casualties, a group of resistance fight-
ers are detained by the police, collaborating with the Nazis.
Each of the main characters has to go in for questioning 
and face torture. None of them is sure if they will manage to 
endure it. At the same time, they have no information on the 
exact whereabouts of their leader. Meanwhile, the main task of 
the police officers, intensely conducting the interrogation, is 
to find his location. As the play progresses, another detainee is 
placed in the cell. The guerrillas recognize him as their leader at 
once. He was accidentally arrested during a raid. Police do not 
know that this is Jean, the commander of the group. But now 
they all face a tough choice. Now they know where their com-
mander is. Nevertheless, they must remain silent under torture. 
They also know what torture is, as some of them have been in-
terrogated.
Lucie, a young woman from the group, remains steadfast to 
the last; neither violence nor torture has broken her. She does 
not betray Jean and returns from the interrogation with an un-
broken spirit. Her fifteen-year-old brother is the next one to 
be interrogated. After a short conversation, it becomes clear to 
everyone that the boy will not endure it, that he will falter. The 
prisoners decide to kill Lucie’s brother, and she does not stand 
up to them. She is in grief over the death of her brother, but 
now she sees things clearly. At the same time, not all the pris-
oners are willing to admit that they killed him. Some of them 
tend to blame others, they are not fully aware of their free will. 
But Lucie has come to recognize it. She is ready to die.
Jean, their commander, is eventually released. Before going 
away, he tells his comrades to put the police on the wrong track 
by leaving his documents with the body of a man in his recent 
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hideout. He reveals the name of this place to his friends and 
offers to tell the police about it. Now the prisoners have hope. 
But Lucie, who has suffered torture and violence, has no expec-
tations. She rejects Jean’s plan and insists on silence until the 
very end, until her death.
The rain scene is the key and most dramatic one in the play. 
At this very moment, on the edge of a dramatic existential 
choice Lucie grasps, just like Roquentin does in Nausea, the 
true meaning of ‘being’. Despite the deal, the resistance fighters 
are executed by being shot. Lucie’s life and that of her compan-
ions ends at the moment of full awareness of being, in a situ-
ation of extreme cruelty, when they are just a step away from 
non-being, fully conscious of their choice and its consequences.
Once again, the question arises: what is the cause, the trigger 
mechanism for the transition to the ‘authentic being’, to free-
dom? While Heidegger believes that the voice of conscience 
can be a motivational factor, Sartre argues that freedom should 
be defined as the actual ability of man to create projects. At 
the same time, in his opinion, freedom in itself can never exist 
outside a ‘resisting world’, where ‘success is not important for 
freedom’ (Sartre, 1956, p. 483).
To exist, freedom needs neither Aristotle’s ‘matter’ nor 
the Stoic ‘pneuma’: in relation to being-in-itself, being-for-it-
self produces a negation. Sartre believes that ‘a situation and 
its motive are one and the same’ (Sartre, 1956, p. 487). This 
brings us to the paradox of freedom: freedom is possible only 
in a situation, but a situation is always associated with freedom: 
‘We are a freedom which chooses; but we do not choose being 
free: we are condemned to freedom, as we said earlier, thrown 
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into freedom or, as Heidegger says, ‘abandoned’ (Sartre, 1956, 
pp. 484–485).
Sartre develops his ideas and maintains that if existence ac-
tually precedes essence, then man is responsible for who he or 
she is, since he or she cannot go beyond the boundaries of human 
subjectivity (Sartre, 1996, p. 68)–this, according to Sartre, is the 
deep meaning of existentialism. It is impossible to discover any 
values, including the noumenal world. We, according to Sartre, 
are left alone with other people – without a justification or a 
reasonable excuse.
This situation reflects our position in the world and cor-
relates with the movement of the given towards the intended 
purpose: all that is given is turned away from incompleteness – 
‘it is not there yet’, and, therefore, there is no situation that can 
provide ‘more freedom’.
On a final note, Sartre uses a phenomenological approach 
to raise fundamental ontological issues in his works. He begins 
to develop his theory, focusing on Nothingness, which is just 
as real as a positive being as a whole, divided into the two com-
ponents being-for-itself and being-in-itself. The philosopher 
believes that the being of human reality is ecstatic, a separate 
structure that is a mobile quasi-totality with points of attrac-
tion between the two types of being, while being-for-itself 
transcends into the ‘state of awareness’ by deliberate action.
The problem of authenticity is one of the main issues of 
human existence. Sartre puts it at the centre of his philoso-
phy. According to Sartre, man may face a tough choice or fall 
into a specific paradigm of submission, which is almost equal 
to losing authenticity. Sartre’s focus is not on ‘public opinion’, 
‘voice of das Man’ or ‘care’, but on the phenomenon of ‘genuine’ 
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self-deception, that is, the phenomenon of ‘bad faith’, which, 
simply put, is a discrepancy between the concepts of ‘for-itself ’ 
and ‘in-itself ’. However, in both cases, the phenomenon of au-
thenticity is closely connected with the inner voice of human 
consciousness and existential guilt.
Sartre recognizes the importance of interpreting a special 
relationship with the Other, constituting, in his opinion, an 
inevitable ‘conflict’. As for freedom, Sartre considers this phe-
nomenon using a far more radical approach. He maintains that 
it is impossible not to be free.
The literary and philosophical talent of Sartre was able to 
describe human existence, the feeling of being ‘abandoned’ in 
the world, the fatal borderline states of human existence, as well 
as the situation of a fateful choice, both in his early writings 
(Nausea) and in later novels, plays, and essays. Thus, according 
to Sartre, human freedom is limitless, even though there are 
certain limitations of human physical abilities. Absolute abili-
ties and freedom are completely different things. Freedom, ac-
cording to Sartre, is an inevitable, fatal characteristic of human 
existence, which essentially comes down to a state of choice. 
A person has at least one alternative. A person can choose to 
do and not to do, even if the choice is made in a tough situ-
ation or in a situation of extreme cruelty, taking into account 
the facticity of the human condition, as shown in Sartre’s dra-
mas The Flies, The Victors, No Exit. In this choice, man is not 
determined by anything. Facticity is the “stage” of choice in a 
situation, where a person has at least one more option. Only 
physical objects have no alternatives, as they are subject to the 
laws of nature. A human makes a choice himself/herself. This 
is what Sartre means by his famous statement ‘humans are free’ 
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and are an absolute expression of the freedom of each person. 
The path of conscience is the path of authenticity. There is an 
opportunity to learn the truth only by making a choice, by be-
ing sincere to oneself, by avoiding bad faith, that is, recognizing 
one’s choice and embracing it, by accepting responsibility for 
one’s actions. However, knowledge and truth, according to Sar-
tre, are intuitively attainable. It is impossible to go beyond the 
boundaries of subjectivity, this is the true essence of existen-
tialism, a philosophical doctrine to which Sartre made a great 
contribution. Deduction and discourse are important, but are 
only the tools to obtain knowledge. A human being can obtain 
knowledge and the truth only if he/she makes a choice and 
acts. Free choice makes a genuine human being.
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Chapter 4. Myth, its stryctural analysis 
and criticism in the modern world
Post-Enlightenment philosophical thought offers a certain 
set of tools for man to get rid of scepticism and gain confi-
dence in himself and his mind. Such techniques that are aimed 
at treating scepticism include the development of philosophy 
and society, as well as a rigorous in-depth analysis of the speech 
of subjects and language as a system of signs and laws of in-
terconnection and functioning of the signs. The methodology 
for such an analysis was developed within the philosophical 
school of thought known as structuralism.
From the point of view of structuralism, the Subject must be 
replaced – whether by an impersonal system of linguistic signs 
(Ferdinand de Saussure) or by cultural codes (Lévi-Strauss), by 
subjectivizing discourses and disciplinary practices of knowl-
edge (Michel Foucault), or an endlessly disseminating field of 
différence ( Jacques Derrida).
An important source of alternative thought of the post-
Subject era is Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural linguistics. 
Saussure focuses more on the language than on the speak-
ing Subject. Language exists as a system of signs, words, and 
meanings, independently of the specific linguistic acts of in-
dividual subjects.
One of the varieties of structuralism and its use as a method 
for research in the humanities is the structural anthropology 
of Claude Lévi-Strauss. Like the rules of language, social orga-
nization is passed on to future generations unconsciously and 
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unintentionally. Hence, one cannot fully understand society by 
studying the actions of its individual representatives.
Lévi-Strauss paid particular attention to his studies of the 
social structures of the archaic, preliterate Aboriginal societ-
ies. Beliefs, taboos, kinship systems, and especially myths were 
structurally analysed. In an archaic society, myth has an impor-
tant epistemological function (total explanation of the world 
of phenomena), a social function (resolving social conflicts, re-
flecting social hierarchy), and a therapeutic function (elimina-
tion of fear of the future by explaining the mechanism of action 
of the Universe structures).
Apparently, myth has existed as long as mankind. Did myth 
and mythological thinking fall into oblivion as one of the stages in 
the development of the human spirit in preliterate societies? Far 
from it. Philosopher Roland Barthes continued the structural, lin-
guistic, social, and anthropological analysis of myth. Myth perme-
ates the social life of modernity. Myth itself has become modern. 
What are the positive and negative aspects of mythological think-
ing in the present stage? What conclusions can we draw by study-
ing the structure of myth and mythological thinking in order to 
minimize the negative aspects of modern mythmaking? How do 
such phenomena as power, myth, political ideology correlate?
Ferdinand de Saussure expressed a revolutionary opinion 
that language should be considered a system of structural rela-
tions, which precede any supposed statement, sound, or word. 
The new theory of language was named semiology. Saussure 
believed that semiology, as a discipline, could potentially be 
expanded to analyse all systems of culture which use symbols.
Saussure noted that the acoustic aspect of language repre-
sents the system of relations and sounds, or binary oppositions, 
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which enable sense. Thanks to differences in phonemes – the 
smallest acoustic units – we can differentiate words in English: 
for example, ‘bad’, ‘had’, ‘cat’, ‘sad’, etc. – all these words have 
different meanings, but the difference between them only con-
sists of one phoneme (Kearney, 1996, p. 290). Our ability to 
articulate and hear such binary phonemes, different from each 
other, is the key to constituting the meaning within the self-
regulated system called language.
Saussure distinguished between language (‘langue’) and 
speech (‘parole’). The difference between them is at the cen-
tre of structuralist analysis. Language is a totality of an abstract 
system governed by rules that already comprise individual 
words, individual statements. Hence, language is a social phe-
nomenon, not just an expression of ideal essence or specula-
tive grammar. Language is always available to us on a prelimi-
nary basis: we never make it up, but participate in it.
Speech activity has two sides – individual and social – and 
they cannot be understood separately. Speech activity presup-
poses both the established system and its evolution. At any 
moment, speech activity is simultaneously an acting formation 
and a product of the past, and it is difficult to separate them.
There is only one way to overcome these dialectic contra-
dictions – we must take language as the basis for any other 
manifestations of speech activity from the very beginning.
It is not our speech activity (like talking) that is natural and 
peculiar, but our ability to create language, that is, a system of 
differentiated signs corresponding with differentiated notions.
Distinguishing between language and speech, we distin-
guish between social and individual, essential and incidental, 
more and less accidental. Language is not an activity of the 
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speaker; language is a finished product registered by the speak-
er in a passive way. On the contrary, speech is an individual act 
of will and reason; in this act, we must distinguish combina-
tions of the language code used by the speaker to express his 
or her thought.
As a matter of fact, every society knows, and has always 
known, language only as a product inherited from previous 
generations, which must be accepted as it is. That is why the 
question of the origin of language is not as important as is gen-
erally assumed.
Learning a language implies, first of all, mastering a system 
of differences and contrasts – every language has this system. 
A child learns to speak by learning to draw a basic distinction 
between words, not by learning the meaning of an increasing 
number of words. Meaning, therefore, is not bound up with in-
dividual speaking Subjects. It is only possible to say something 
in your own words thanks to the already existing system of se-
mantic oppositions, which is inherent in the language. In fact, 
structuralism is the extension of Saussure’s structural method 
to the entire field of the humanities.
One of the varieties of structuralism and its use as a method 
for research in the humanities is the structural anthropology of 
Claude Lévi-Strauss. Like the rules of language, social organi-
zation is passed from generation to generation unconsciously, 
unintentionally. Hence, one cannot fully understand society by 
studying the actions of its individual representatives.
According to Lévi-Strauss, all human cultures have a single 
underlying structure. Consequently, there may be a common 
human nature that determines the way people think, rather 
than what they think.
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Lévi-Strauss deliberately transfers the methods of structural 
linguistics to social life and anthropology (Lévi-Strauss, 1945, pp. 
33–53). His line of reasoning is as follows: both linguistics and 
anthropology have a social dimension; at the same time, linguis-
tics achieved tremendous results in the 20th century, using the 
structuralist method. Considering the development of phonol-
ogy and the structural analysis of language, this method can be 
productive in other human sciences, particularly in anthropology.
Models and methods established as a result of structural 
studies in anthropology may prove useful for solving problems 
in other social sciences (Lévi-Strauss, 1953, p. 525). Social re-
lations are a kind of material for building models, where social 
structures can be recognized later (Lévi-Strauss, 1953, p. 525). 
Accordingly, the structural method can rightly be used to anal-
yse myth as a social and linguistic phenomenon.
In ancient times, not only did myth constitute a story, an 
allegory, but also performed the function of an important so-
cial institution that guaranteed the stability of the world that 
people lived in at the time. Myth reflects life, its aspirations, 
fears, contradictions, provides explanations for the Universe as 
a whole, and for individual events that take place both in na-
ture and in society. This is concrete, life-oriented thinking and, 
despite its ancient origin, it will always be the heritage of man-
kind. While analysing myth, I will try to show that mythology 
plays, at times, a very important role in modern society. The 
mythological way of thinking, therefore, has not disappeared. 
Myth, being a product of immature thinking, is not an estab-
lished fact. This way of thinking requires explanation, while the 
very structure of myth requires analysis, as long as understand-
ing of this mind-set leads to man’s self-understanding.
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The origin of the world, gods and man, stages of life, ele-
ments of nature, heroic deeds, and death are among the recur-
rent themes in myth. In ancient times, myth was both a univer-
sal form of consciousness and an expression of the worldview 
of ancient man. Myth was created in the search for the unity of 
man and nature, as a means of explanation and resolution of 
social contradictions and worldview formation. Myth had an 
invaluable and indelible influence on the entire future culture 
of mankind. Mythical epics contributed to the development of 
classical antique literature early on. Myth has a positive impact 
on culture even today.
To analyse myths, Lévi-Strauss formulated the following 
methodological postulates:
1. The meaning of myth is not to be found in its isolated 
constituent elements, but in the way in which these elements 
are combined.
2. Myth is a linguistic phenomenon.
3. Myth exists outside ordinary language, in metalanguage 
(Lévi-Strauss, 1996, p. 310).
Preliterate societies, where mythological consciousness 
prevails, are not necessarily governed by physical needs; they 
may also have abstract thinking, and myth is one of the forms 
of such thinking, despite the harsh material conditions charac-
terizing their existence. All people strive to understand society 
and the world, and explain phenomena and social life.
At the same time, abstract thinking should not necessarily 
be scientific. In ‘Myth and Meaning’, Lévi-Strauss maintains 
that ‘it remains different in a way, and inferior in another way. 
It remains different because its aim is to reach by the shortest 
possible means a general understanding of the universe – and 
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not only a general, but a total understanding’ (Lévi-Strauss, 
1978, p. 12). Thus, the task of myth in a preliterate society is 
to give a total explanation and ultimately to gain a total under-
standing of the world. In my opinion, this is a task not only for 
preliterate societies. As we shall see later, myth is still alive to-
day. Apparently, total understanding is one of the basic human 
needs. In this regard, mythological thinking cannot but differ 
from scientific thinking. If myth gives us a total understanding 
of the world, removes the contradiction between knowledge 
and ignorance – and this is one of its main tasks, at least in a 
preliterate society – then scientific thinking works in a com-
pletely different way, gradually postulating, solving local prob-
lems one by one, leaving the process of cognition incomplete, 
believing that there is always something to learn.
Nevertheless, Lévi-Strauss agrees that myth ‘gives man, 
very importantly, the illusion that he can understand the uni-
verse and that he does understand the universe. It is, of course, 
only an illusion’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1978, p. 13).
In analysing myth, Lévi-Strauss to some extent defends pre-
literate societies with mythological thinking. One such thesis 
of Lévi-Strauss is the need for cultural diversity. In order for a 
culture to produce something, it needs uniqueness, original-
ity and, even, ‘to some extent, <…> superiority over the oth-
ers’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1978, p. 15). On the one hand, there is a 
tendency towards universalism, unification of cultures, and on 
the other, an opposite tendency towards new distinctions. Al-
though Lévi-Strauss did not give an explanation, he realized 
this contradiction intuitively: ‘The more a civilization becomes 
homogenized, the more internal lines of separation become ap-
parent; and what is gained on one level is immediately lost on 
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another. This is a personal feeling; in that I have no clear proof 
of the operation of this dialectic. But I don’t see how mankind 
can really live without some internal diversity’ (Lévi-Strauss, 
1978, p. 16).
A structural analysis of myth led Lévi-Strauss to the con-
clusion about the key role of binary oppositions or the binary 
way of thinking in its functioning. As an example, Lévi-Strauss 
considers a myth from Western Canada about a skate, which 
succeeds in mastering the South Wind. It goes back to the be-
ginning of time, at least to an archaic period, which is one of 
the distinguishing features of myth in general.
Ancient tribes were extremely bothered by the winds, since 
the winds made it impossible for them to fish, to gather shell-
fish on the beaches, and, in general, were rather disturbing. 
This problem required a solution, and the skate entered the sto-
ry as one of those who calmed down the South Wind, making 
him promise not to blow all the time, but only once in a while. 
The skate is a key figure here, just as the subsequent zoning of 
the South Wind, appearing at times, following the skate’s order. 
First, people needed to deal with the fear of the South Wind: 
its constant and powerful whiff could lead to hunger. Obvious-
ly, this caused the fear of death in society.
To eliminate such a social fear, it was necessary to find a 
reasonable explanation for its periodicity, and this explanation 
would put the fear of death aside. The choice of the skate, act-
ing as the lord of the wind, was not random. It is a fish that 
can dodge an arrow, quickly bending its flat body. Thus, it in-
stantly changes its shape: now it is horizontal, showing its flat 
profile, the next moment it is vertical. The transformation is 
immediate, and its body is invulnerable. In this allegory, a ‘yes’ 
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or ‘no’ binary opposition is obvious. The skate is believed to 
be an invulnerable creature, the embodiment of ‘yes’ and ‘no’: 
on the one hand – a flat body, on the other – a vertical line, 
when it suddenly turns or slips and shows only its profile. First, 
the fear of death, second, the phenomenon of nature, which is 
uncontrollable, and third, the skate as an invulnerable lord of 
the wind: resolving the contradiction, explaining the phenom-
enon of nature, and relieving the fear of death.
Thus, myth gives people solid ground to stand on, elimi-
nating social fear, explaining the Universe and satisfying their 
need to understand the world. ‘This is the originality of mythi-
cal thinking – to play the part of conceptual thinking: an animal 
which can be used as what I would call a binary operator can 
have, from a logical point of view, a relationship with a prob-
lem which is also a binary problem. If the South Wind blows 
every day of the year, then life is impossible for mankind. But 
if it blows only one day out of two –‘yes’ one day, ‘no’ the other 
day, and so on – then a kind of compromise becomes possible 
between the needs of mankind and the conditions prevailing 
in the natural world’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1978, p. 17). Tracing the 
binary opposition in the myth, we can understand the way the 
myth functions and what it refers to.
Some people believe that every society uses myths to ex-
presses the basic emotions and universal feelings of love, hate, 
and revenge. Others claim that myths are an attempt to ex-
plain obscure phenomena: astronomical, meteorological, etc. 
However, some ethnologists, just like psychoanalysts, tend to 
replace the naturalistic concept with other explanations, more 
specifically, mythology is becoming a reflection of the social 
structure and social relations. The results are contradictory – 
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in a myth, everything is possible. It seems that any subject can 
take any predicate (Lévi-Strauss, 1996, p. 308).
To understand the mythological way of thinking, we must 
recognize that myth is both an intra-linguistic and an extra-
linguistic phenomenon. According to Saussure, language has 
structural and statistical levels. Language is reversible in time, 
while speech is not. The third system is temporal. It combines 
the properties of both structural and statistical systems, and is 
particularly relevant. Myth always refers to the events of the 
past, before the creation of the world, at the beginning of time, 
or at least long, long ago, but all these events are also timeless.
And this is the point of myth. It explains past, present, and 
future. There are plenty of similarities between mythology and 
political ideology. The dual structure of myth – historical and 
non-historical at the same time – explains how myth relates to 
speech as such and to the language in which it is told. The third 
level of its analysis is something Absolute.
The third level also has a linguistic nature. Myth is the exact 
opposite of poetry, despite the similarities. Poetry is difficult 
to translate into another language. At the same time, the value 
of myth as such cannot be destroyed even by the worst transla-
tion. The accuracy of myth is not in its style, form of narration, 
or syntax, but in the story itself.
Myth is a language that works at the highest level. One can 
separate its meaning from the linguistic basis on which it has 
developed (Lévi-Strauss, 1996, p. 310).
Thus, myth is determined by the way its elements are com-
bined. Myth is a phenomenon of linguistic order. Nevertheless, 
the language of myth reveals specific properties, located above 
the general level of linguistic expressions. To put it simply, 
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these properties are of a more complex nature than the proper-
ties of linguistic statements of any other type, including poetry.
Let us draw conclusions from these three postulates and 
develop a working hypothesis. The first conclusion: Myth, like 
the rest of language, is made up of constituent units.
The second conclusion: these constituent units imply the 
existence of basic structural units of language, namely, a pho-
neme, a morpheme, and a semanteme. Each subsequent unit 
has a higher degree of complexity than the previous one. 
Therefore, Lévi-Strauss identifies the ‘gross constituent unit’ 
of myth or mytheme, as it is of a different order to that of the 
phoneme, morpheme, or semanteme, and is characterized by 
a relation with the highest level of speech and communication. 
One should identify these structural units at the phrase level.
A predicate is attributed to a subject, representing the most 
important relation. The gross structural unit is by its nature a 
relation.
But this does not explain the dual nature of time in myth: 
reversibility and irreversibility, synchronicity and diachronic-
ity. Another hypothesis suggests that the constitutive elements 
of myth are not isolated relations, but ‘bundles’ of relations 
(Lévi-Strauss, 1996, p. 311), and that these elements become 
functionally important only as a result of the combinations of 
such bundles.
Similarly, a functional significance is expressed in the har-
mony of an orchestral score (Lévi-Strauss, 1996, p. 312). An 
orchestral score makes sense only when it is read diachronic-
ally along one axis, namely, page by page, and synchronically 
along the other axis, that is vertically up and down the page 
for different musical instruments. All the notes along the same 
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vertical line in an orchestral score, that is played synchronously, 
represent a gross constituent unit or a bundle of relations.
Myth generally deals with contradictions, tending to their 
gradual removal and mediation.
Assuming that the purpose of myth is to provide a logical 
model capable of overcoming a contradiction (which is impos-
sible, if a contradiction is real), a theoretically infinite number 
of slates will be generated, each one slightly different from the 
others. Thus, myth grows spiral-wise until the intellectual im-
pulse which produced it is exhausted.
The growth of myth is a continuous process. Myth, there-
fore, is a creation of language, whose position in the realm of 
the spoken word is similar to that of a crystal in the realm of 
physical matter. It is an intermediary entity between an aggre-
gate of molecules and a perfect molecular structure.
Myth therefore occupies a position between language and 
speech. Language is an aggregate of molecules, a statistical di-
mension. Speech is an ideal molecular structure. Myth is a link 
between the two.
Thus, the kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous 
and strict as positive, scientific logic. In fact, they are quite sim-
ilar. The difference lies not in the quality of logical operations, 
but in the nature of the phenomena analysed.
Consider the following well-known fact: what makes a 
steel axe superior to a stone axe is not that the first one is bet-
ter made than the second – they are equally well-made – but 
steel is quite different from stone. And perhaps one day it will 
be evident that ‘the same logical processes operate in myth as 
in science, and that man has always been thinking equally well’ 
(Lévi-Strauss, 1996, p. 325).
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Roland Barthes defines myth as a type of speech in full 
compliance with its etymology (Barthes, 2017, p. 265). Surely, 
it is a special type of speech: ‘myth is a system of communica-
tion, … a message… myth cannot possibly be an object, a con-
cept, or an idea; it is a mode of signification, a form’ (Barthes, 
2017, p. 265). Barthes believes that the suggestive power of the 
world of messages is infinite, and, hence, anything can become 
a myth. However, myth is not defined by the subject of the 
message (it is possible to say anything about anything), but by 
the way the message is uttered. Hence, according to Barthes, 
mythical speech is a message, whether oral or written, repre-
sented in the form of an image, a pictogram, by means of mod-
ern photography etc.
Taking into account that mythology deals with types of 
speech (more precisely, with a particular kind thereof), Barthes 
believes it to be a part of a more general science founded by Sau-
ssure – semiology. Barthes maintains that mythology is ‘a part 
both of semiology inasmuch as it is a formal science, and of ide-
ology inasmuch as it is an historical science: it studies ideas-in-
form’ (Barthes, 2017, p. 269). In semiology, we single out two 
necessary elements characteristic of any semiological system: a 
signifier and a signified, which are in a relation of equivalence. 
In other words, there is no equality between these elements, but 
a correlation. The result of this correlation is a sign. Saussure 
dealt with the semiological system of language, where signs 
are represented by words, and the signified are the objects of 
the world around us. According to Barthes, myth has the same 
three-element system: the signifier, the signified, and the sign.
Then Barthes provides the key definition of myth: myth ‘is 
constructed from a semiological chain which existed before 
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it: IT IS A SECOND-ORDER SEMIOLOGICAL SYSTEM. 
That which is a sign (namely the associative total of a concept 
and an image) in the first system, becomes a mere signifier in 
the second’ (Barthes, 2017, p. 271). Thus, phrases, images, pic-
tograms of the first semiological system (everyday language) 
are embedded entirely in the new message with its new predi-
cate, arrangement, and meaning. To make a point, Barthes 
analyses the front cover of Paris Match magazine (Barthes, 
2017, p. 273). It is an image of a young black man, who is sa-
luting, with his eyes uplifted. Apparently, he is looking at the 
tricolour. However, the described facts are the data of the first-
order semiological system: a person with dark skin, saluting, 
looking up. But this is the first-order subject with its first-order 
predicates. Barthes comments: ‘whether naively or not, I see 
very well what it signifies to me: that France is a great Empire, 
that all her sons, without any colour discrimination, faithfully 
serve under her flag, and that there is no better answer to the 
detractors of an alleged colonialism than the zeal shown by 
this Negro in serving his so-called oppressors’ (Barthes, 2017, 
p. 273). Along with this secondary message, there is a semio-
logical suprasystem – a myth.
In this system, the primary message from the ordinary 
world (the fact of saluting in itself) is a fact from reality, the 
meaning, the signifier. In the myth itself, in the second-order 
semiological system, this meaning (the signifier) is lost, but not 
completely, not entirely. Myth in its secondary form (‘France 
is a great empire’) feeds on meaning (the primary form), mak-
ing it either more or less prominent. ‘It is this constant game of 
hide-and-seek between the meaning and the form which de-
fines myth’ (Barthes, 2017, p. 276).
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The essence of this statement, in my opinion, is that the pri-
mary message does not entirely lose its meaning, a complete 
break from reality is impossible; but at the same time, there are 
allegorical implications, forming a second-order semiological 
system. The presence of text and subtext enables human sub-
jectivity, either to bring the primary meaning closer or reduce 
it, giving preference to the myth itself, its secondary allegori-
cal form, the very concept of myth, which is always based on a 
story, aimed at something, which brings myth into being.
Barthes claims that the concept is in no way abstract 
(Barthes, 2017, p. 277). It is ‘a formless, unstable, nebulous 
condensation’, ‘the fundamental character of the mythical con-
cept is to be appropriated’; myth is aimed at a particular au-
dience. There are several mythical concepts that repeat them-
selves throughout history. Their number is limited. However, 
there is an abundance of primary forms of myth and ways of 
its expression. ‘This repetition of the concept through different 
forms is precious to the mythologist, it allows him to decipher 
the myth’ (Barthes, 2017, p. 278).
Let us now consider how concept and form correlate in 
myth, as Barthes describes it. Myth does not hide anything. 
Both form and concept are provided to us directly, but not in 
the same way: form – as a material carrier – and concept – as 
a bunch of vague ideas. The relationship between form and 
concept is essentially a relationship of deformation (Barthes, 
2017, p. 280). Concept obscures form, the primary message, 
it carries another message, which is imperative, a motivational 
thought, addressed to the consumer of myth.
How do we read a myth? It depends on our focus. If we 
focus on the second-order semiological system, that is on the 
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concept (or the minimized meaning of the primary semiologi-
cal message), such a reading will be literal. For instance, the 
saluting African soldier is a symbol of the French Empire. This 
form of reading is peculiar to producers of myths. If one distin-
guishes between the first-order and second-order semiological 
systems, the deformations of the primary form by the concept, 
as well as intentions, and, in some cases, the deceit of the pro-
ducers will become evident. In this case, the African soldier will 
be considered as a kind of ‘alibi’ for the French Empire. This 
type of reading is characteristic of a mythologist, who seeks to 
decipher a myth. His task is to identify a distortion of the first-
order semiological system caused by the concept of myth. If, 
however, we focus on the indissoluble unity of the first-order 
and second-order semiological systems (an inextricable whole 
of meaning and form), we become readers of a myth, dealing 
with its fabric and the direct effect it has on our consciousness. 
The first two types of reading destroy the myth, and only the 
third type is dynamic; the story is at once true and unreal.
It is the third way of reading a myth that makes it possible to 
pass from semiology to ideology, to understand the purpose it 
serves today. Myth cannot conceal anything; both the first-order 
and second-order semiological systems are evident. If one reads 
it using either the first or the second way, such a myth will be 
destroyed. A myth relying purely on everyday language may turn 
into a banal political statement. Myth comes into being when it 
uses the primary semiological message as a kind of natural, in-
trinsic justification. In other words, what is reported implicitly, 
metaphorically, must nevertheless be real and ‘objective’.
The primary image (the African soldier) should naturally 
produce the concept (French imperiality) in the eyes of the 
112 Dimitry N. Mentuz THE IDEA OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS EVOLUTION IN MODERN DISCOURSE
reader. Myth arises at the moment when the aforementioned 
reader (using the third way of reading) starts to perceive French 
imperiality as a natural phenomenon. Resulting from this way 
of reading, the reader sees myth not as a semiological system, 
but as an inductive one, that is, instead of a semiological rela-
tionship, there is a causal relationship between the form and 
the concept. The concept becomes a consequence of the form.
Barthes’ view of contemporary bourgeois society was nega-
tive. Let us remember his famous inaugural lecture at his ac-
cession to the Chair of Literary Semiology at the Collège de 
France. Analysing myth, Barthes proceeds with the politi-
cal analysis of modern society. He distinguishes between the 
myths of both left and right ideologies.
If myth is a second-order semiological system using meta-
language, then, as Barthes puts it, for purposes of demystifica-
tion, it is possible and necessary to refer to language once again. 
According to Barthes, there is a language that destroys myth – 
the language of man as a producer. It serves to transform real-
ity, rather than eternally preserve it, it provides a total explana-
tion, and removes all contradictions: ‘There is therefore one 
language which is not mythical, it is the language of man as 
a producer: wherever man speaks in order to transform real-
ity and no longer to preserve it as an image, wherever he links 
his language to the making of things, metalanguage is referred 
to a language-object, and myth is impossible’ (Barthes, 2017, 
pp. 306–309).
For this reason, revolutionary language cannot be mythi-
cal. ‘It is because it generates speech which is FULLY, that is 
to say initially and finally, political, and not, like myth, speech 
which is initially political and finally natural, that Revolution 
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excludes myth’ (Barthes, 2017, p. 309). This does not mean 
that there are no myths ‘on the Left’. Barthes believes that 
left-wing myths arise when left-wing forces lose their revolu-
tionism: ‘Left-wing myth supervenes precisely at the moment 
when revolution changes itself into “the Left”, that is, when it is 
prepared to wear a mask, to hide its name, to generate an inno-
cent metalanguage and to distort itself into “Nature”’ (Barthes, 
2017, pp. 311–312).
Barthes characterizes left-wing myths as essentially pover-
ty-stricken: they are not as diverse as bourgeois myths, affect-
ing only some levels of human existence. They are used as part 
of a tactics, a deviation; they are limited in time and purpose.
At the same time, myth on the right-wing side of the politi-
cal spectrum is much more widespread and diverse (Barthes, 
2017, p. 312). Bourgeois myth is rich, flexible, since the lan-
guage of the bourgeoisie is more developed than the language 
of the proletariat. The main function of such a myth is to postu-
late the unchanging world and supposedly resolve social con-
tradictions.
Bourgeois myth is characterized by rhetorical forms – a set 
of fixed, repeating figures in the mythical signifier (first-order 
semiological system). Among the principal rhetorical forms of 
bourgeois myth, Barthes distinguished the ‘inoculation’–ad-
mitting the accidental evil of a class-bound institution the bet-
ter to conceal its principal evil.
Another rhetorical device is the ‘privation of history’, dic-
tating the enjoyment of a beautiful object or wealth ‘without 
wondering where it comes from’.
‘Identification’ is a rhetorical figure, commonly used in the 
petit-bourgeois world: ‘The petit-bourgeois is a man unable to 
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imagine the Other’. He either denies the Other, or transforms 
him into himself.
‘Tautology’–defining like by like (for instance, ‘Drama is 
drama’). In tautology, according to Barthes, we have a double 
murder: one kills rationality because it resists one; one kills lan-
guage because it betrays one. ‘Tautology is a faint at the right 
moment, a saving aphasia’ (Barthes, 2017, pp. 316–317). Ex-
amples of tautological replies: ‘BECAUSE THAT’S HOW IT 
IS’, or even better: ‘JUST BECAUSE, THAT’S ALL’ (Barthes, 
2017, pp. 316–317).
Another rhetorical device that Barthes unveils is ‘Neither-
Norism’–balancing the one by the other so as to reject them 
both (‘I want neither this nor that’) (Barthes, 2017, p. 317). 
The essence of this device is as follows: first, reality is reduced 
to limited options; then both options are weighed up and 
both are dismissed; finally, based on the above, reality is got 
rid of. To put it differently, by focusing on formal opposites, 
which balance each other only inasmuch as they are purely 
formal, a decision about the actual actions is made on a for-
mal mythical basis.
An example of Neither-Norism in astrology: ill luck is al-
ways followed by equally good luck. In fact, therefore, one no 
longer has to choose, to act as a subject, and one can only drift 
with the current of events, where ‘yes’ and ‘no’ are formally 
balanced, and wait where it takes you, because nothing will 
change, and the subject has no control.
Furthermore, Barthes describes the ‘quantification of qual-
ity’, and takes the bourgeois theatre as an example (Barthes, 
2017, p. 317): on the one hand, reflections on the true essence 
of the theatre may not be dismissed, on the other hand, bour-
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geois dramatic art rests on a pure quantification of effects, that 
is, the emphasis is on quantity.
Finally, the ‘statement of nature’ is a rhetorical figure, based 
on common sense and produced in order to perpetuate the 
status quo, ‘for the Nature, in which they are locked up under 
the pretext of being eternalized, is nothing but a Usage. And it 
is this Usage, however lofty, that they must take in hand and 
transform’ (Barthes, 2017, p. 320). Its transformation inevita-
bly will come into conflict with power.
Barthes was concerned with studying the phenomenon of 
power and language. Power, language, and myth are insepa-
rable. Myths are products of a certain power, the power of a 
clan or community, as in ancient archaic societies, of certain 
classes and strata, such as left- and right-wing myths, bour-
geois myths, as considered by Barthes at the present stage 
of historical development. However, being such a product, 
myth always remains unique due to language, a special orga-
nization of its semiological systems: language as object and 
metalanguage.
Power and myth are not only political, but also ideologi-
cal phenomena. There is an opinion that it is always one thing. 
And yet, what if powers were plural, like myths? Voices which 
authorize themselves to utter the discourse of all power, to 
convey the myth of superiority, are ubiquitous.
According to Barthes, the object in which power is inscribed, 
for all human eternity, is language activity (‘langage’), or to be 
more precise, its necessary expression – the language we speak 
and write (‘langue’).
‘Language’ is legislation, ‘langue’ is its code (Barthes, 1996, 
p. 365). In ‘langue’, we are no longer free: we use cases, this or 
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that gender of a noun, conjugations. Grammatically, we must 
speak so and in no other way.
Once uttered, speech (‘langue’) enters the service of power. 
In speech, two categories appear: the authority of assertion, the 
gregariousness of repetition. In langue, servility and power are 
inevitably intermingled. If we call freedom not only the capac-
ity to escape power but also and especially the capacity to sub-
jugate no one, then freedom can exist only outside language.
The trouble is that human language has no exit – it is a con-
fined space. We can get out of it only at the price of the impossi-
ble: by mystical singularity, as described by Kierkegaard when 
he defines Abraham’s sacrifice as an unparalleled action, or by 
the Nietzschean ‘yes to life’, which is a kind of exultant shock 
administered to the servility of langue.
In this case, Barthes believes literature, namely language 
games in literature to be the solution. Literature and literary 
discourse can be mythologized (see Barthes’ work ‘Myth To-
day’ [Barthes, 2017, pp. 295–297]). At the same time, myth 
itself can be analysed from a literary perspective.
The forces of freedom that are in literature do not depend 
on the writer’s civil position nor on his political commitment. 
Literature’s force is its force as representation. From ancient 
times up to the efforts of our avant-garde, literature has been 
concerned to represent something.
To persist means to affirm. Literature’s ability to resist and 
survive the typified discourses, the philosophies, sciences, psy-
chologies, myths, which surround it, is unparalleled.
The structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure revo-
lutionized the methodology of the studies of the humanities 
and society. According to Saussure, language is a system of re-
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lations that precede any statement, sound, or word. The name 
of the new science was semiology, and it was assumed that its 
method of structural analysis would become universal for ana-
lysing cultural symbols, relations, and structures.
Claude Lévi-Strauss succeeded in using this method in his 
anthropological research. Social organization and social struc-
ture are, in many respects, identical to the structure of language, 
but on a different dialectical level. Social organization is passed 
from generation to generation unconsciously, unintentionally, 
just as the structure of language precedes the content of a phrase.
It is impossible to understand society if one only studies 
its actions, without understanding its deep a priori structures. 
The diachronic approach, which literally means “through time” 
and therefore historical (δια means through, and χρονος means 
time) prevails, but the structures should be explained not only 
historically, through their origin, but also as they are, through 
their current position and way of action and interaction. Based 
on this approach, models and methods are created that may 
be useful in related social sciences. The structuralist method is 
also considered appropriate for analysing such social phenom-
ena as myth and mythical thought.
Myth is a very important social institution. In antiquity, it 
gave people solid ground to stand on, providing a complete 
and total explanation of the world and the phenomena around 
them. In this case, we are dealing with concrete, life-oriented 
thinking. However, this way of thinking still plays an important 
role today, and, consequently, mythic thought and myth itself, 
having changed in comparison with ancient myth, retained 
their distinctive structural forms and so their stable position in 
the social structures of modern societies.
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Total understanding of the world and resolution of all con-
tradictions are basic human needs. Myth satisfies this need, but 
this is the principal difference between mythic thought and sci-
entific thought, which has prevailed since the beginning of the 
modern era. Scientific thought works in a completely different 
way: it gradually postulates hypotheses, step by step, always 
leaving the unknown behind, never resolving contradictions 
completely. It solves local problems, but the learning process 
is far from being over. Myth explains the world from the day 
of its creation, resolves its contradictions in the drama of the 
world, provides a complete picture of the world. In the struc-
ture of myth, binary oppositions play a key role (and this is an 
important conclusion of Lévi-Strauss). In other words, myth 
functions due to the binary way of thinking. Myth is always 
based on opposition. Contrasts are vivid and rigid, making rec-
onciliation ever more wonderful. Myth is a form of language. 
But for Levi-Strauss, it is a language functioning at the highest 
level, explaining past, present, and future.
One of the most important researchers of myth, its semio-
logical structure and principles of functioning in modern soci-
ety, was the French philosopher Roland Barthes, who defined 
myth as a type of speech, a communicative system, a means of 
signification.
Barthes was a proponent of the structuralist approach 
originally developed by Saussure and considered mythology 
to be part of a more general science – semiology. According 
to Barthes, the key component of myth is its structure, the se-
quence of first-order and second-order semiological systems, 
where an image from the world of objects, the world of primary 
reality, becomes the signifier in the second-order semiological 
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system of myth, acquiring a completely new sound and mean-
ing. Perceiving the unity of the first-order and second-order 
semiological systems (the unity of messages from the world of 
objects and the concept of myth), we become its actual readers, 
as myth directly affects our consciousness.
Myth cannot conceal anything; if one reads it relying purely 
on everyday language, myth will turn into a trivial political or 
ideological statement. Myth always appeals to nature, its primary 
semiological message should be perceived as completely natural 
and authentic, in which case it leads to the creation of myth.
However, this authenticity of myth, as well as its ability to 
resolve social contradictions, may result in the exploitation of 
a form of mythological utterance, including in the current po-
litical situation, at this stage of social development. Political 
myths can multiply at both ends of the political spectrum. The 
key element of power here is language. We are not free in its 
power, we are obliged to use cases, declensions, comply with 
the structural rules. Paradoxical as it may seem, a possible way 
to free ourselves from these oppressive structures of totalitari-
an power can be language itself, but in a different literary mode. 
Literary discourse is an unparalleled way to move away from 
the standard patterns of discourse of any kind: scientific, philo-
sophical, psychological, political, etc.
Hence, the more we study myth, its structure, its repeti-
tive concepts representing its content, the more it reveals to 
us both positive and negative aspects of the mythological way 
of thinking. On the one hand, myth satisfies our epistemologi-
cal and psychological needs in cognition, provides us with a 
complete picture of the world from the day of its creation to 
its end, and resolves the emerging social contradictions using 
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its power of miracle. On the other hand, we may fall victim to 
political myth if we fail to consider the possibility of exploiting 
the structure of myth for the sake of creating modern mytho-
logical concepts and using them for political purposes.
Resistance to exploitation of this kind can be twofold: on 
the one hand, one can crack the code of myth, analyse its use 
of binary oppositions and its semiological system, recognize 
the primary and secondary semiological messages, and the 
concept of myth itself. On the other hand, literary discourse is 
another example of resistance. It is such discourse – and espe-
cially literature itself – that can oppose political ideologies and 
political mythmaking within a statement.
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Chapter 5. Knowledge in culture: 
myth, metaphor and cognition
The understanding of being, the very cause of existence, 
lies in the possibility of thinking; hence, the rise of knowledge 
is equal to the rise of spirit, of intellectual life. In this regard, 
‘Book F’ and ‘Book A’ of Levinas, as well as Aristotle’s ‘Meta-
physics’ contain explanations of the first encounter with the 
Absolute, that is, a reference to the Absolute, which is self-de-
fined as being-in-itself. Cognition is the concept of intellectual 
activity or actions through thinking. It is a mental process that 
occurs through experiencing the process of understanding and 
turning the understood into something for oneself.
According to Aristotle, we can only deal with our own con-
sciousness. This kind of independence is a treasure, even if it 
is limited by biological needs and death. Levinas believes that, 
in this regard, the human sphere coincides with the heavenly 
life. This structure has a semantic composition, in which rep-
resentation and objectification are the necessary models. All 
human experience is transformed into teaching, turns into sci-
ence, and is expressed in teaching (Levinas E., 1983, p. 107).
While earlier an attempt was made to identify and under-
stand life using knowledge, modernism made another attempt 
to identify being as cognition. There was a transition from 
thinking to existence, because the free act of knowledge, which 
has no external goal, finds itself reflexively. Its purpose is the 
free act of cognition, which is a mystery in itself. The wisdom 
of the first philosophy consists in self-cognition.
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Hans-Georg Gadamer and Emmanuel Levinas criticized 
the mind, guided by technology and calculation (computa-
tional, instrumental reason), based on the concept of moderni-
ty, inherited from the Age of the Enlightenment. This cultural 
concept was dominant in bourgeois and industrial societies. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the aforementioned phi-
losophers considered different ways of overcoming the crisis of 
dehumanization that broke out in the modern era.
Developing the idea that culture supports man, Gadamer 
writes ‘Culture and World’. However, such a positive definition 
of culture has always raised questions. With regard to culture, 
there has always been a note of pessimism, and the debate on 
the concept of culture continues to this day. As Gadamer aptly 
noted, ‘We all understand that there is culture, both instinc-
tively and intuitively, but defining this concept still remains a 
rather complex task’ (Gadamer H. G., 1980, р. 218). Both Ga-
damer and Levinas criticized the understanding of culture as a 
process of conceptual inheritance of traditions of the Enlight-
enment, namely a culture of knowledge based on instrumental, 
computational reason.
Levinas described the relationship between man and 
knowledge in terms of externalization (externally manifested 
acts). In the culture of instrumental reason, the Other is no 
longer a human being, but a ‘depersonified’ object, while tran-
scendence transforms into immanence. The Other appears in 
the form of an object, in the form of an undeniable reality of 
our knowledge. In this case, it is worth noting that we are talk-
ing about rational instrumental knowledge, which originated 
in the Age of the Enlightenment or even earlier – in the teach-
ings of Stoicism. It should be emphasized that the views of 
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both philosophers – Gadamer and Levinas – coincide, when 
it comes to criticizing the concepts of the Enlightenment and 
those of modernity: ‘That one could be lifted up above the 
rawness of the state of nature and progress along this path to 
become a perfect “policymaker”, toward complete humanity – 
this was the arrogant confidence of modernity at its beginnings’ 
(Gadamer H. G., 1980, р. 148).
In Gadamer’s view, the Enlightenment’s faith in human rea-
son was arrogant. He believed that the subsequent development 
of bourgeois society and industrial society not only failed to 
remove this arrogance and its negative consequences, includ-
ing dehumanization, disregard of the Other, and uncontrolled 
industrialization, but also exacerbated the existing problems. In 
this respect, Gadamer focused on one of the key questions of 
philosophy: ‘What moral advancements does mankind owe to 
the unfolding of the sciences and the arts? (from the spirit of the 
Enlightenment)’ (Gadamer H. G., 1980, р. 152). If we consider 
progress from the point of view of understanding, it may be de-
fined as the degree to which one person can understand another 
person. This is a way from complete misunderstanding to under-
standing the Other in a situation, when the Other is not only in-
different to the fact of being understood, but also is initially in a 
state of self-misunderstanding, failing to grasp the concept of the 
Self. From this point of view, many philosophers have criticized 
bourgeois society, whose ideology is based on the principle of 
equality. According to Levinas, the state of asymmetry in the 
relationship between the Self and the Other – where the Self 
should react if addressed by the Other – has a long history.
Gadamer noted that the main directions of the development 
of twentieth century society also challenged the bourgeois 
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idea, which consisted in upholding the ideal of equality. Ac-
cording to Gadamer, he himself belonged to the generation 
which ‘went to the woods’. At the same time, industrial society 
was based, among other things, on the legacy of the bourgeois 
system. Gadamer has no illusions – science dominates in mo-
dernity and postmodernity. In ‘Man and His Hand in Modern 
Civilization. PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS’ (Gadamer H. G., 
1978, pp. 190–198), where the form of the modern era is re-
flected in full detail, Gadamer posed the following questions: 
How can a person, a creator, exist with the given data? How 
can one preserve the ability to create, whose loss can be equat-
ed with the ultimate loss of oneself and the loss of mankind 
as a whole in a dehumanized industrialized world, where man 
is nothing but a tool? Levinas asked similar questions in his 
works on barbarism and a ‘universal meaningful culture’ as a 
culture of knowledge. It should be noted that emphasis on this 
kind of knowledge is put on the technical side of the question, 
reliability, mathematization, leading to a new culture of dehu-
manized knowledge. In general, the process of dehumaniza-
tion leads to barbarism, which is most clearly manifested in the 
externalization of the Other.
Levinas contrasted barbarism with an ethical culture, where 
responsibility for the Other is the centrepiece of transcendence. 
Gadamer, in turn, studied the origins of the dehumanization 
of modernity, trying to work out ways to resist the process of 
dehumanization, experienced by the industrial society of the 
modern period, by returning the world’s attention to culture, 
beginning and ending with the most important word of recon-
ciliation: ‘The reconciliation brings an increase into the world. 
Only through reconciliation can the otherness – the insuper-
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able (unaufhebbare) otherness that divides man from man – be 
overcome’ (Gadamer H. G., 1980, р. 215).
Any persistent differences between people can be overcome 
through reconciliation. Insuperable otherness can be elimi-
nated only by way of reconciliation in a verbal culture. The key 
word is reconciliation. At the same time, Gadamer, in his fight 
against the dehumanization of society, suggests going deeper 
into human ‘non-specialization’, where our flesh (‘our hand’) 
is the creating organ of man-creator: ‘The hand is an intellec-
tive organ, a limb that serves for many things and makes many 
things serve it. That is why this part of the body is so closely 
linked with language. The hand not only makes and handles 
things, it also points to things’ (Gadamer H. G., 1978, р. 195). 
Here, Gadamer establishes a connection between the ‘intellec-
tual hand’ and the voice, thereby creating an allegory of the no-
tion of culture, that is, the ‘verbal culture’. ‘Together the hand 
and the speaking voice represent the highest perfection of hu-
man non-specialization’ (Gadamer H. G., 1978, p. 196).
The solution proposed by Levinas is mainly ethical (ethics 
is the basis of culture), and human nature is characterized by 
an asymmetric relation to the identity of the Other. In this re-
gard, the Other has an advantage – I can neither hear nor dis-
miss the Other’s call to me. Man has always been looking for 
an answer to the following question: What does it mean to be 
human? What is the function of homo humanus, distinguishing 
him from all other living creatures, making him stand out from 
the rest of the animal kingdom, giving meaning to his existence 
in the cultural community as opposed to the ‘instrumentalized’ 
slavish existence, lowering him to the level of a thing, reduc-
ing him to nothing but a cog in a machine that strives solely to 
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boost wealth? Additionally, an artificial human specialization 
takes place, and we can only overcome it by force of will and 
action. Gadamer famously said on the subject: ‘Man needs to 
form himself into something’ (Gadamer H. G., 1978, р. 197).
According to Gadamer, people can engage in self-reflection, 
express doubts, and eventually choose who to become, which 
also requires certain criteria serving as a basis for a rational 
choice. Gadamer opposes the rational to the demonic impulse 
and instincts. However, our cognitive process helps us predict 
the possible outcomes. Thus, we can control our instincts, that 
is, think before we act. Gadamer claims that the main challenge 
consists of finding the right balance between our instincts and 
moral aspirations: ‘Clearly, the problem of man is this: how 
can we find a balance that fulfils the law of our nature when 
we are just as much sensuous creatures as moral ones?’ (Ga-
damer H. G., 1978, р. 197).
Gadamer, therefore, does not deny the subconscious in 
man, although he insists that our common nature can be ex-
plained by much more than a self-preservation instinct, which 
is underscored by the fact that culture, history, progress, and 
regress are all natural. Our human capabilities – the original 
‘non-specialization’–give us a chance to be creators of culture. 
However, this ‘non-specialization’ poses a threat by creating an 
artificial trend of differentiation. Man ceases to be a creator and 
becomes a machine, a tool in the hands of others: ‘As a result of 
our whole cultural process, the individual finds himself more 
and more in the service of functions, circumscribed by func-
tioning robots and machines – a new kind of universal slavery 
has come over mankind’ (Gadamer H. G., 1978, р. 197). As a 
result, man is falling into a new form of slavery.
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A question arises: How to achieve balance in the paradigm 
suggested by Gadamer? Levinas looks at the same problem 
from a different perspective. In Levinas’s opinion, there is an 
ethical solution strongly marked in the personification of the 
Other. It goes beyond the education of the senses, but we will 
come back to this issue later. Gadamer argued that there is no 
conflict, and there should be no conflict, between the senses 
and the intellect. The creating hand is an intellectual organ, and 
our senses are spiritualized and cultivated to the extent that 
they are ‘inspired’ by the human ‘hand’, which has absolute 
freedom. It can touch, embrace, specify, and create. The senses 
have their own intellect. According to Gadamer, this intellect 
protects us from wild instincts and deep prejudices. ‘Cultural 
senses’ are the result of the development of the human capacity 
for choice and judgement. In Gadamer’s opinion, the ‘common’ 
reappears here in a different form, unlike the one described by 
Levinas, and is understood as the ‘intellect’: ‘We need to see 
how the hand can coexist with calculation. What about a bal-
ance, then? Both sides must obviously be cultivated. Losing a 
hand means a loss in cultivated senses, but we saw that it is the 
person himself that needs to be cultivated – his understanding 
as well as his senses’ (Gadamer H. G., 1978, р. 197).
At the same time, Levinas is deliberately trying to get away 
from the ‘common’. His views are largely based on the person-
alized identity of the Other. Nevertheless, Gadamer does not 
limit himself to the naïve ‘instrumentalized’ paradigm of the 
intellect – Verstand (Understanding). In his opinion, intellect 
means ‘intelligence’ or Vernunft (Reason), to be exact. By cul-
tivation, he does not mean calculation, arithmetic, the art of 
contractual relations, or technical art. So, what does he mean? 
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There is an amazing mental analogy with the definition of ‘spe-
cifica homo humanus’. Gadamer describes it as follows: ‘Some-
one has cultivated senses only if he can see with the sensibility 
of the whole of his nature, to be observant, notice other things 
and enter into them’ (Gadamer H. G., 1978, р. 198).
It means that the need for the Other is implied in these oth-
er things, but they still remain ‘things’, which, in some cases, 
may be characteristics of the living. Gadamer means the even-
tual return to basics. According to Levinas, however, it is not 
the other things, nor the person looking at himself/herself or at 
something else that matter. In essence, Levinas speaks of tran-
scendence, the Other’s personality. His views lack the qualita-
tive characteristics of things, it means he is not speaking about 
things, but about personality. And further, he speaks of a per-
son, my neighbour, the Other. Gadamer says that the process 
of cultivation (German: Bildung – education, formation) in-
cludes learning how to look at the world through the eyes of 
the Other. ‘Bildung’, or cultivation, is not only demanding, but 
also gives us an opportunity, which indicates the importance 
of perception of the Other for the philosopher.
However, this perception is somewhat assimilated by man – 
his senses are cultivated; this is his opportunity to see the world 
through the eyes of the Other. It is not the Other who looks. 
It is my ability to take the place of the Other and look at the 
world through his eyes. But it does not deny the existence of 
the Other and the ‘otherness’. Gadamer places the subject at 
the centre. His paradigm is still the paradigm of modernity, but 
his interpretation with the admission of the Other is more lib-
eral. However, the Other is assimilated by me, and eventually 
I come back to myself. This theory of assimilation of the Other 
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is criticized, in particular, by Levinas: ‘Knowledge would thus 
be the relation of man to exteriority, the relation of the same 
to the Other, in which the Other finally finds himself stripped 
of his alterity, in which it becomes interior to my knowledge, 
in which transcendence makes itself immanence’ (Levinas E., 
1983, р. 180).
This culture is subsequently transformed into a culture of 
immanence: ‘Metaphors to take seriously: A culture in which 
nothing can remain the Other is, from the beginning, turned 
toward practice’ (Levinas E., 1983, р. 180). Such is the destiny 
of this paradigm, which is becoming a common practice, that 
is, the primacy of the subject, subject-centrism. According to 
Levinas, this approach inevitably leads to the ‘instrumentaliza-
tion’ of man, where the culture of immanence becomes a sche-
matic representation of the embodied practices, appropriation, 
and satisfaction. However, the use of the ‘creating hand’, ac-
cording to Levinas, is the expression of thought in the flesh. In 
this respect, his views are similar to those expressed by Gadam-
er about the hand of the man-creator. Cultural development 
cannot be a repetition of the already existing: ‘Culture in the 
etymological sense of the term – a dwelling in a world which 
is not a simple spatial inherence, but a creation of perceptible 
expressive forms in being by a non-thematizing wisdom of the 
flesh, which is art or poetry” (Levinas E., 1983, р. 183).
One is expressed through the Other, and, according to 
Levinas, this expression is the source for all forms of art. Inter-
nalization, which consists in obtaining knowledge of the Other, 
is no longer present; there is no domination of one over the 
other; the culture is presented to us from Levinas’s point of 
view, in accordance with his famous definition. His culture the-
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ory demonstrates that free human nature is formed by follow-
ing one’s vocation, through perception and expressive forms 
of existence, such as art and poetry. Levinas notes that meta-
physical ontology has a limited number of forms of meaning 
for thinking. However, the question arises: Are there more rel-
evant forms? Levinas introduces the concept of intentionality, 
as presented in the phenomenology of Husserl, calling it one of 
the key points of Western philosophy.
Manifestations of the Other are much like the initial mani-
festation of rationality. The closeness to one another is inher-
ent to human beings. The Other may be my neighbour who is 
in front of me, and his proximity makes him a reminder of my 
responsibility and raises one question after another with regard 
to my responsibility for his life. Responsibility for a fellow hu-
man being in the eternal, pre-reflexive past, which has nothing 
to do with the present, is much older than consciousness. This 
may be a measure, or a method, or a system of eternal freedom, 
which is even older than decisions or actions. My responsibil-
ity for the Other is inevitable.
The return of man to the depths of pre-reflective, interested 
consciousness, makes him fight against injustice without any 
fear of death. Therefore, a conscientious person would rather 
suffer than commit injustice. To be human is to make your-
self understand the meaning of being. According to Heidegger, 
man does not enter the world, but the question. Questioning 
is the existence of an interested consciousness, a free inquiry 
followed by answers. The cognitive process is as old as human-
ity itself; therefore, a hermeneutic approach to a symbolic struc-
tural unit is extremely important. Ideology requires critical 
hermeneutics; hermeneutics should reveal a hidden, distorted, 
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obscure meaning lying motionless under the general, superfi-
cial truths of life. Philosophical criticism of the late nineteenth 
century to the early twentieth associated with the formation of 
hermeneutics is divided into three branches: “epistemologism” 
of philosophy with a smaller branch of positivism, analytic 
philosophy, represented by phenomenology and existential-
ism, and hermeneutics. What could replace the Absolute spirit, 
the abstract idea? Many proponents of the analytic and herme-
neutic approaches drew attention to the language, to this ideal 
substance, which is neither immanent, nor a pure abstraction, 
since it is connected with human nature. Gadamer’s herme-
neutics focuses on the word, namely on its enlightening qual-
ity. According to Gadamer, we are a unified history of mankind, 
a ‘conversation’: ‘Because we are a conversation, we are the 
one story of mankind. In constantly discovering more early 
cultures and pre-cultures, we come to know more and more of 
this story’ (Gadamer H. G., 1980, р. 155).
Gadamer believes that we are a ‘conversation’. Communi-
cation is what distinguishes us from the animal kingdom. So, 
what does the ‘word’ mean? Obviously, you cannot find it in 
a dictionary; it is not a frozen signification or denotation of 
things; this word is ‘logos’ or ‘conversation’. All that is mean-
ingful can be articulated. How does this ‘logos’ form a culture? 
Most importantly, one should note that logos in Gadamer’s 
interpretation is not our intellect, not an abstraction, and cer-
tainly not a mathematical mindset. Logos is a conversation. 
These are the words addressed by one person to the Other. The 
Other, therefore, is present in conversation, but in contrast to 
Levinas’s theory, there is no asymmetric relationship with the 
Other. According to Levinas, the Other, his/her identity, calls 
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out to me. In conversation, the situation is different. In Levi-
nas’s view, a conversation initially has ethical overtones. Levi-
nas claims that it is all about the identity of the Other and his/
her ethical calling, ‘Thou shalt not kill’.
In Gadamer’s opinion, a word appears not as a command 
and not as an order, but in response to the question: ‘Ulti-
mately, don’t the words first come to exist in the answer? Isn’t 
it, then, that they first become the words that were said to 
someone and to which someone has had to answer?’ (Gadam-
er H. G., 1980, р. 164). Gadamer believes that a word is spoken 
to someone, and the Other must reply. He highlights the very 
act of questioning and not the ethical calling. Although in Ga-
damer’s theory the understanding of conversation and that of 
Logos has a certain ethical overtone (it is worth noting that it 
is not an abstract issue of being or language), any conversation 
or Logos exists a priori to distinguish between good and evil, 
helpful and harmful by going beyond the existing immanence 
of things. This ethical process of distinguishing through Logos 
and language is specifico homo humanus, that is, a specific quality 
distinguishing man from all other beings. However, Logos, ac-
cording to Gadamer, is symmetrical, and its highest manifesta-
tion is in the unity achieved through it. Logos describes things 
that are absent here and now in a transcendent speech, as well 
as through communication: ‘It manages to make manifest what 
is helpful and what is harmful. That means pointing out things 
that we want to recommend or warn against, even when they 
do not immediately recommend themselves, perhaps because 
they are not very pleasant’ (Gadamer H. G., 1980, р. 182).
Hence, culture – according to Gadamer – originates from 
everything that grows and increases through transcendence. 
Chapter 5. Knowledge in culture: myth, metaphor and cognition 133
Similarly, Gadamer perceives Logos as ‘communication’, which 
is not immanent, and not through an immanent contract. One 
of the most important tasks of this transcendent non-contractual 
‘communication’ is to prevent aggression. This ‘communication’ is 
symbolic and is expressed through language and other sym-
bolic means of the symbolic universe. In this universe, the 
word – according to Gadamer – gives us two opportunities: 
1) recognizing oneself in the Other, and; 2) recognizing one-
self together with others, which is achieved through coopera-
tion. (Gadamer H. G., 1980, р. 185).
Hence, it brings us to the world of freedom, namely free-
dom of human speech and joint participation, where people 
determine their own destiny and where the mystery of cultural 
human traditions rests on the word – on ‘Logos’–within three 
spheres: words-questions, consisting in constant questioning of 
the nature and purpose of being by the human spirit, which re-
quires a new answer every single time, and words of legends and 
poetry with a certain degree of self-sufficiency. The philosopher 
believes that the word-logos with its ethical overtone is the 
most important one (for instance, the word of forgiveness and 
the word of reconciliation). Is this pathos of forgiveness and rec-
onciliation in any way similar to Levinas’s ‘Thou shalt not kill’, 
uttered as a call of the personalized Other, spoken by the Oth-
er? In our opinion, it is. After all, neither forgiveness nor recon-
ciliation are for the sake of some abstract idea or phenomenon; 
we always forgive or make peace with the other person, who 
is present in that moment, whose suffering we witness, that is, 
the Other, a specific person.
At the same time, Levinas criticizes or at least questions 
the possibility of achieving the ‘clarity’ of one’s mind, which is 
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understood as the elimination of differences between the Same 
and the Other. The Other is said to be reduced to (or  trans-
formed into) the Same. Such a transformation, according to 
Levinas, is characteristic of the culture of rational knowledge, 
and similarly – of the artistic expression of culture, where the 
unity of the whole is confirmed by the unity of body and soul. 
All this is an expression of the neo-Platonic ideal of ‘oneness’, 
to which the world is oriented in its variety, while a state has a 
meaning of a form of unity.
Levinas suggests an alternative: the ‘Other’ is inescapable, 
and the ‘otherness’, which is present a priori, cannot be synthe-
sized. We meet the Other. He/She can neither be created, nor di-
alectically removed. The only possible relationship between me 
and the Other is an unintended ‘otherness’ of strangers, which is 
independent of all previous definitions and fundamental ethical 
attitudes. It is a cultural project preceding political principles – 
the Other appeals to me and I am responsible for the Other, but 
the Other does not care about me and I cannot avoid confronta-
tion with the Other (his/her identity or views), as he/she repre-
sents a completely different cultural image, the ‘culture of tran-
scendence’. ‘Otherness’, at its highest manifestation, shows the 
face of the Other, ‘the epiphany of the face’. For instance, in the 
case of the death of the Other, I am responsible for it. It concerns 
me, and I cannot leave the Other dying alone. What is respon-
sibility? What does responsibility mean in this context? How 
is it manifested? What is the difference with Gadamer’s theory 
comprising a notion of reconciliation? Responsibility here is 
not postfactum, as is the case with reconciliation. Responsibility 
is not a formal legal term; on the contrary, it is associated with 
love. Hence, such responsibility can be related to existential guilt, 
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which is essentially irrecoverable. In this case, the neutralization 
of transcendence is excluded.
How is it possible to live ethically without getting drawn 
into barbarism, bloody conflicts, avoiding scenarios that might 
have fatal consequences for the human soul and heart? It is 
clear that scientific and technological progress has not been 
followed by the progress in morals, nor has it defused the con-
flicts, which may pose even greater threats than those experi-
enced by humanity in the twentieth century. In criticizing the 
industrial dehumanized era, both Levinas and Gadamer share 
similar views, but their solutions are different. Gadamer tends 
to the modernist paradigm with the assimilation of ‘otherness’ 
by man through logos, conversation, and reconciliation. Ga-
damer believes that the word of reconciliation should be the 
first and the last word – the alpha and omega that can prevent 
humanity’s slide into barbarism.
At the same time, the concept of culture, offered by Levinas, 
is related to the inevitable concept of transcendence, which is 
manifested in the face of the Other. The inevitable and eter-
nal are expressed in the commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’, 
in the form of a calling to me. I am responsible for preventing 
the premature death of others. Are these concepts opposed to 
one another? Do we have to make a choice in favour of one of 
them? In our opinion, this is not the case. Both concepts re-
main relevant while expressing the ‘otherness’, preconditioning 
the Other. Discourses can reveal the limits of our responsibil-
ity in certain historical conditions, helping one find an answer 
to the question: ‘In what way am I responsible?’ At the same 
time, ethics (and I fully support Levinas on this) precedes any 
concept of knowledge.
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The Other is unavoidable – the one you meet, but do not 
create. The Other does not appear as a consequence. Thus, eth-
ics is primordial and becomes First Philosophy. Language is 
the main mode of activity of our Being-in-the-world, a form of 
the world’s structure: the mystery of man lies in the mystery of 
language. For Heidegger, it is the call of Being; for Levinas, the 
call of the Other. The metaphysical difference consists in the 
following: according to Heidegger, man without a language is 
inconceivable. Not only do we speak a language, but also live 
in it: ‘Man would not be man, if his ability to speak was taken 
away from him – man speaks incessantly, comprehensively, on 
all subjects, diversely, which is mostly expressed in the unspo-
ken ‘this is that’ <…> we live first of all in a language’ (Hei-
degger M., 1993, p. 259). One can even speak while remaining 
silent, which means that there is no opposition between ratio-
nal and irrational.
Moreover, for Heidegger, a relationship formation through 
speech is not reduced to human activity. Not only do we speak 
a language, but we also speak because of it (Heidegger  M., 
1993, p. 266). Speaking in itself is pointless unless it presup-
poses listening carefully to the language. But what do we hear 
when we listen to it? And how does it manage to say something 
to us? Does language itself speak? (This means language on its 
own). This question is the point of dispute between Levinas 
and Heidegger.
Heidegger (Heidegger  M., 1993, p. 266) insists that it is 
language that speaks. And we can listen to its monologue. The 
process of listening to language enables people to understand, 
to be, and disappear. And the world thereby reveals itself. Levi-
nas agrees that historical epochs and historically constituted 
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languages may indicate that being reveals itself, that is, under-
standing a language may reveal the truth. But Levinas empha-
sizes that Being becomes an object of discussion and under-
standing, as well as truth and non-truth through signification. 
It is very important to note that without meaning created 
through communication, Being would be unable to establish 
itself, that is, reveal itself to us. In this respect, it is necessary to 
overcome alienation on the way to understanding and inter-
pretation of meaning through hermeneutics.
Gadamer distinguishes two forms of alienation that we en-
counter in our real existence. They consist in the following: expe-
rience of alienated aesthetic consciousness and alienated histori-
cal consciousness. ‘What we reject has nothing to say to us – or 
we reject it because it has nothing to say to us’ (Gadamer H. G., 
1980, р. 20). Historical consciousness is another mode of the 
alienation experience. The task of historical consciousness is to 
understand past events arising from the spirit of the past. The 
purpose is to control our prejudices that come from the present. 
We must control these prejudices in order to gain a proper un-
derstanding of past events. But it is quite possible that such con-
trol will not fully accomplish the task, failing to ensure a correct 
understanding of the past and to pass down its legacy. History 
reflects only a part of our real experience, our direct contact with 
historical tradition. Hermeneutic consciousness is not enough 
to match these two forms of alienation.
According to Gadamer, the task of hermeneutics is to 
achieve understanding, overcoming prejudices. Historical 
consciousness and hermeneutic consciousness act as meth-
ods of preventing misunderstanding. Another purpose is to 
overcome all disorders of the soul contained in these types 
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of consciousness (Gadamer H. G., 1980, р. 22). These are not 
only our judgments, but also forms of consciousness, including 
our prejudices, which may form part of the human soul – this 
is a rather provocative statement about prejudices, but Ga-
damer uses it in a positive context. Prejudice is not necessar-
ily groundless and erroneous, inevitably destroying the truth. 
Bias, prejudice, in relation to our openness to the world is just 
a state, due to which we can get something, experience some-
thing we have encountered– however, it can only give us a lim-
ited or one-sided view of reality. Consequently, the question 
arises as to how to integrate this hermeneutic dependence of 
our being into the modern scientific discourse, which is based 
on the principle of equal treatment without prejudice, when 
we have to try and overcome our prejudices and, instead, put 
into practice the principle mentioned.
The scientific ideal is motivated by a pure and simple crav-
ing for knowledge. This craving for knowledge and science in 
general has become the basis of the modern and postmodern 
civilization. This raises the question: Is knowledge obtained in 
semi-darkness destructive? This problem is, in fact, universal. 
Methodology and knowledge of methodology are very impor-
tant for science, but one should take into account the existence 
of ‘sterile methodology’. Using some techniques, we can solve 
completely trivial problems, and these methods and solutions 
will never lead to the creation of something new. In this respect, 
imagination is the most important function of the scientist.
Imagination and fantasy also have a hermeneutic function 
and serve to overcome challenges. Imagination enables us to 
ask real, productive questions, and the power of hermeneu-
tic knowledge is the ability to understand that such questions 
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can be asked. Endless dialogue in search of truth is possible 
only thanks to finiteness – the peculiar characteristic of our 
being found in different languages and cultures. Language is 
repeatedly materialized in vocabulary and grammar – as ever, 
through the inner infinity of dialogue between interlocutors. 
That is why the hermeneutic circle is infinite. This fundamental 
aspect of hermeneutics – a natural speaker who wants to ex-
press himself – nevertheless does not produce well-organized 
signals at once, but searches for words to convey messages to 
another person. This is a common human task, as well as the 
task of hermeneutics, which has an opportunity to say a new 
word and save it in writing.
While analytic philosophy seeks to understand intellect only 
through the analytical perception of the work of language, both 
Heidegger and Sartre in their later works shifted attention from 
the logic of language to its essence, as well as to the silent, not-
yet-expressed, which is about to be included in the uncovered-
ness of being. Philosophical analysis is aimed at understanding 
the various ways of Being-in-the-world, created by language 
and covering all areas of our presence in the world. Moreover, 
Heidegger did not consider propositional truths to be essen-
tial; on the contrary, they did not reflect the original essence 
of being. According to Heidegger, it is much more important 
to listen to language itself, to what it expresses, to its perfor-
mative acts: ‘Instead of speaking of consciousness, he speaks 
of Erschlossenheit (openness) and of lumen naturale (light). 
He subordinates theoretical knowledge to a more original un-
derstanding from which it derives. This original understand-
ing is indiscernible from existence as openness. To the extent 
that this openness entails a certain degree of comprehension, 
140 Dimitry N. Mentuz THE IDEA OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS EVOLUTION IN MODERN DISCOURSE
Heidegger identifies the human being with speech. This is not 
a representative kind of speech, but one that embraces the di-
verse modalities of consciousness. It is practical because it re-
fers to being oriented; it is reflexive because it echoes in the 
subject and its capacities’ (Wrathall  M., 2006, р. 68). Hence, 
we observe a clear change in the subject of analysis: a transition 
to understanding of being as evidence, which can be learned 
not so much by analysing the structures of consciousness or 
Dasein, but because understanding itself becomes fundamental 
and is revealed exclusively through language, which contains a 
pre-understanding of being.
Sartre draws attention to the performative act of language 
and art, not reducing the propositional function of language 
to being: ‘Similarly, the signification of a melody if one can 
still speak of signification is nothing outside of the melody it-
self, unlike ideas, which can be adequately rendered in several 
ways. Call it joyous or sombre. It will always be over and above 
anything you can say about it’ (Sartre J.-P., 1949, p. 10). Thus, 
we can grasp the living truth through the greatest work of art, 
where a word can become part of evidence.
According to Donald Verene, an image is interpreted in the 
process of recollection – Erinnerung (German – memory, remi-
niscence). In his writings, most notably in ‘Hegel’s Recollection: 
A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit’, Verene 
concludes that a propositional statement, which consists in the 
transition from subject to predicate (in speculative knowledge), 
is preceded by a ‘recollection’, ‘Erinnerung’, which, in essence, 
makes such a predicative propositional statement possible.
‘What does it mean to claim that the key to Hegel’s Phe-
nomenology is Erinnerung? Simply put, it claims that specu-
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lative knowing, spekulatives Wissen, presupposes recollection. 
The spekulative Satz – the speculative proposition that Hegel 
discusses in the Preface, in which the substance of the judg-
ment passes from subject to predicate – requires powers of 
mind that are not in themselves logical, nor can they assume 
a logical form. These powers are not antilogical or illogical or 
irrational. They are the constant companions of speculative 
knowing, but, by their very nature, cannot take the form of the 
speculative proposition. Recollection proceeds through meta-
phors, ingenuities, and images; it gives us access to the whole 
gallery of images through which consciousness brings forth its 
starting points and restarting points in the course of its being’ 
(Verene D. P., 1985, р. 3). Erinnerung comes through meta-
phors, intuitions, and images.
In Verene’s interpretation, the process of Erinnerung is also 
largely based on metaphors, intuition, and images (Verene D. P., 
1985, р. 54). Such a position is credible, because due to remi-
niscence, we gain access to the entire gallery of images, used by 
consciousness to generate all the turning points in the process 
of life. To recall means to form not a proposition, but images. 
An image is not a proposition or an indirect offer that we ac-
cept. In Verene’s interpretation, in addition to representation 
of an image, memories also refer to the process of its internal-
ization. Thus, Hegel uses a hyphen in the term Er-Innerung 
(German – recollection) to refer to these concepts. Recalling is 
Innerung, that is, the process of ‘internal formation’ of an image. 
This internal formation is the basis for its form. The next point 
is the statement that the power of reminiscence and its ability 
to internalize an image pave the way to Absolute Knowledge – 
Wissen (in Hegel’s terminology), which is its main way. Meta-
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phors are used to create real images, through which Absolute 
Knowledge can be achieved. Hence, we come to understand 
that Erinnerungs can both generate images and be aware of 
them, and systematize such images into the meaningful history 
of the Spirit.
The first language of infinity is a metaphorical image: infin-
ity can be recreated later as a concept. When it comes to lan-
guage, we believe that this is its form of action; it is dialecti-
cal, since it provides for the immediate internal functioning of 
the predicative process, the simultaneous use of metaphor and 
the hermeneutic circle, and, consequently, an opportunity to 
gain access to the image. Such a movement, which is essentially 
the dialectic of the invisible, is opposed to the visible, or, in 
Verene’s interpretation, to our movement through the visible. 
Our consciousness constantly deals with the problems of its 
own limitations and the creation of the invisible. Discourse is 
a volitional embodiment of the moment, which is necessary to 
get out of character to give a theoretical meaning to the invis-
ible. Discourse initially takes place at the moment when an im-
age is transformed into a name. The power of naming (denota-
tion) is the first hint of Absolute knowledge, and such a power 
arises at the very beginning of ‘phenomenology’, in real-time 
mode, in an attempt to create such denotations.
In a deductive proposition, the subject and the predicate re-
main separate. The form is separated from the content. A men-
tal proposition and a mental form characteristic of dialectical 
thinking contradict this statement, since, in this context, the 
subject expands to become the predicate, and the meaning of 
the latter must be sought on the way back to the subject, that 
is, to itself. Man, therefore, represents a proscenium, where all 
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things in existence can appear and fulfil their potential through 
words and images.
Ricœur contrasts the speech activity of an utterance with a net 
of signs thrown over the lifeworld – this is the first link between 
semantics (meaning of a phrase/speech) and semiotics (struc-
turalism, a net of signs). The subject should be considered in the 
area of language, not separately. In the discourse, a contradiction 
between semiotics and semantics should be revealed (Ricoeur, 
P., 1974, p. 18). Once again, we observe a shift in the meaning of 
metaphor, allegory. Our ability to transform the signs of the Uni-
verse, where ‘I am’ is primary to ‘I think’, comes to the fore. We are 
in the world, then we begin to comprehend and interpret it, and 
only after that, to talk about the world around us. In addition, the 
process of speaking itself refers to being and has an influence on it.
The basic questions, according to Ricoeur, arise at the junc-
tion of the semantic theory of metaphors and the theory of 
imagination. The semantic theory of metaphors is aimed at 
studying the ability of metaphors to transfer non-transferable 
information; therefore, their study claims to get a true and deep 
insight into reality (Riсоеur  P., 1978, p. 143). The question, 
however, is whether an action, which has a metaphorical mean-
ing, is compatible with the dichotomy of propositional mean-
ing and image. Or is it able to cancel and dialectically remove 
the dichotomy between the meaning expressed in a phrase and 
imagination, where meaning is the objective content of the ex-
pression and representation is a mental process, which makes 
use of images and sensations? With this formulation in mind, 
those who seek the correct assessment of the semantic role of 
imagination should not underestimate the importance of mov-
ing in the right direction (Riсоеur P., 1978, p. 143).
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The purpose of the semantic transfer is to fill the lexical gap, 
while adhering to the principle of economy, controlling the de-
notation of new objects. In this sense, it is better to think of 
metaphors as predications ‘with deviations’ than as extensions 
of denomination by means of deviations from the meaning 
(Riсоеur P., 1978, p. 145). How does such a fluctuation appear? 
A metaphorical statement functions as a means to mitigate the 
syntagmatic deviation from the norm, which is achieved through 
the establishment of a new semantic significance. Hence, semantic 
innovation can be expressed as the first step in the creation of 
new knowledge within the social context.
The first step is to understand how resemblance functions 
to create a new meaning. The next step is to find a connection 
with the figurative ‘aspect of imagination’ within resemblance. 
For metaphors, not only semantic conflict matters, but also a 
new predicative meaning, regenerated from the remaining lit-
eral meaning. In other words, the renewed meaning is based 
only on the general ordinary meaning of our words. Metaphor 
is not a mystery, but rather an answer to it. When such changes 
take place, the features of semantic innovation are typical; they 
perform their functions of resemblance, imagination, and syn-
tagmatic mitigation.
One of Riсоеur’s main questions is whether the focus of at-
tention on the concepts of imagination and semantic innova-
tion can shift and go beyond the original discourse, that is, be-
yond the theory of metaphor and the philosophical discourse 
as a whole. In this case, according to Riсоеur, we will be deal-
ing with the transition from theory to practice. Does the term 
‘imagination’ refer to a homogeneous, holistic phenomenon, 
or is it a collection of distant impressions? Such was Riсоеur’s 
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question in relation to imagination. Riсоеur introduced four 
practical interpretations of the term ‘imagination’ (Riсоеur P., 
1994, pp. 109–110).
Firstly, this term defines any arbitrary evocation of things 
that are currently absent but existent elsewhere. The second in-
terpretation is similar to the first one. The same term refers to 
portraits, paintings, drawings, sketches, etc. – everything that 
has its own physical existence, whose function is to replace the 
things they represent. The third interpretation of this term – ar-
tistic images describing absent and non-existent things. Such 
artistic images are divided into dreams and fantasies, described 
in literary works (dramas and novels). And finally, the term 
‘imagination’ is used in the field of illusions, that is, in relation 
to the representation by an independent observer or as a con-
sistent reflection of absent or non-existent things, which makes 
the subject believe in their reality during conversation.
On the one hand, imagination refers to a preliminary idea 
of an object – all theories of reproductive imagination confirm 
the fact. On the other hand, imagination refers to something 
that is far from reality, namely, to various key types of creative 
imagination. What is the new approach to the phenomenon 
of imagination, proposed by the theory of metaphor? Riсоеur 
sees the problem differently: instead of asking questions about 
perception and its transition to imagination, Riсоеur, in his 
theory of metaphor, suggests linking imagination to a particu-
lar type of language. More precisely, he focuses on an aspect 
of innovative semantic features of language, when used meta-
phorically (Riсоеur P., 1994, р. 109).
Among the types of language use, a poet engaged in the po-
etic process resorts to a particularly important one, depending 
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on the circumstances and procedures. At the same time, it is 
important to understand the process of reverberation. How-
ever, to understand this process, one should keep in mind that 
reverberation is generated by what was heard, not seen. In an 
attempt to find synthesis, Riсоеur turns to structuralism. The 
tasks of psychoanalysis and structuralism are similar: We ob-
serve a movement from the directly given to the hidden, as 
well as from the study of conscious linguistic phenomena to 
the study of their subconscious structures. However, accord-
ing to Riсоеur, the weak spot of structuralism is that it chose 
the existing culture as a subject of its analysis. At the same time, 
structuralism ignores the ongoing cultural process. Once again, 
we are confronted with the need to understand metaphor and 
double meaning, however, structuralism, which uses both 
material and a style of philosophizing, which are historically 
bound, is closer to the classical era than modernity.
The language vocabulary accessible to the participants of 
the discourse should give them the opportunity to choose the 
necessary meanings and produce new ones. Alternatively, here 
is an example of Verene’s interpretation of philosophy: ‘Philos-
ophia is a different activity of mind than philologia, the latter 
being the love of history, literature, and language. If this were 
not so, issues of philosophical thought would be resolved by 
the productions of intellectual historians’ (Verene D. P., 1985, 
р. 51). It seems that we are again confronted with the need for 
imagination and a new meaning. In this respect, a distinctive 
feature of human being is speech, or even existence through 
speech (Riсоеur P., 1978, p. 143). Based on this, we encoun-
ter semantics in Chomsky’s ‘generative grammar’ and Hei-
degger’s ‘ontology of language’. Language crosses two bound-
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aries in its development: a boundary of meaning (something 
is said) and on the other side of this meaning – a boundary of 
correlation (boundary of reference).
Language intends to speak, to influence the surrounding re-
ality, while demonstrating the influence of reality on the mental 
process. The most radical critics of Hegel’s philosophy, relying 
on their anti-metaphysical spirit, reduced the concept of spirit 
to the concept of consciousness. From this point of view, the 
world of signs becomes part of the inner world. There are two 
main ways for such regression (return to immanent conscious-
ness)–the revival of Hegel’s metaphysics or the recognition of 
the existence of two worlds, namely the world of natural sci-
ence and the world of culture. But there is a third way – inten-
tionality of consciousness. The intention of language to speak, 
as well as its metaphorical and poetic use can be viewed as a 
consequence of such intentionality.
Language, therefore, ceases to be an absolute phenomenon 
and becomes our mediator. It goes beyond the moment when 
time stops or, in other words, beyond the notion of the end of his-
tory. Mediation is a function of language, which is just as im-
portant as its structure. A phrase (not a word or a phoneme) 
is its basic component. Man is present in a phrase, his being is 
the being of a phrase. All that is human emerges before an af-
firmative answer is given to the question of man’s existence. It 
emerges simultaneously with the first act of interrogation. Ego 
is identical to inquiry; its existence is a question about being. 
Questions are asked to find out more on the subject. In this 
case, everything comes into existence together with Dasein, and 
the Cartesian metaphysical component – thinking opposed to 
being – disappears. This is characteristic of all epistemological 
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fundamentalist approaches, separation into subject and object, 
as well as their subsequent hypostatization.
An analysis of Ricœur’s works demonstrates that episte-
mological issues are bound to experience a shift towards se-
mantics. This process is both inevitable and hermeneutically 
productive. However, if it seems necessary to decode con-
sciousness for self-reflection, since its content may be false, 
then one should understand the patterns of double meaning. 
Speaking of interpretation, its version may be different from 
the one proposed. In fact, self-reflection is a kind of correc-
tive criticism. This kind of work creates a meaning. The final 
function of an image is not only to convey meaning to various 
sensory fields, but also to contain meaning in a neutral atmo-
sphere with elements of fiction. This is a kind of free play of 
possibilities in conditions of not being drawn into the world 
of perception or action. The new analogy and agreement are 
special for a meaningful metaphorical statement. They follow 
from a kind of semantic convergence that occurs suddenly 
between denotations, despite the gap between them. Things 
that used to be distant now seem close. The final resemblance 
is essentially a convergence that hides in itself the general 
similarity of two different ideas.
The explanation at the level of a mytheme is also very im-
portant: myths have always been attributed to past events be-
fore the creation of the world or immediately after it; all such 
events are timeless and, therefore, can effectively eliminate 
contradictions during structural transitions. Myths explain 
the past, present, and future. The dual structure of myths, both 
historical and anti-historical, explains how they correlate with 
speech and, as such, are analysed using the language, in which 
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they are reproduced. Myths are major structures of a language, 
functioning at the highest level.
In this respect, meaning can separate itself from the linguis-
tic basis, where it is built, where imagination is the ability to 
create new types of generalizations. In terms of conceptual rep-
resentation, such generalizations are not based on differences, 
but exist in spite of them. Imagination is the stage of creating 
symbols, where interconnections have not yet reached the 
necessary level of conceptual order and balance. In our opin-
ion, this lack of order and balance is also the moment when 
Heraclitus’s fire flares up and dialectic emerges followed by the 
meaning of phrase and language itself in the form of a lively 
metaphorical speech. The issue of metaphorical statements is 
essentially the problem of the language of poetry and its truth 
claims. At first glance, the language of poetry has nothing to 
do with anything other than itself. Nevertheless, it is this lan-
guage that we use to provide realistic descriptions of the world 
around us.
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Conclusion and recommendations
The concept of ‘knowledge’ was reinterpreted amid the large-
scale historical catastrophes of the twentieth century, affecting 
a broad range of ethical and epistemological issues. In today’s 
cultural contexts, there are numerous approaches to knowledge 
production: systemic, metanarrative, formal, procedural, discur-
sive, hermeneutic, intuitive, and metaphorical. The same is true 
about various interpretations of the attitude of the Self (human 
being) towards guilt, justice, and the Other. Freedom, human 
corporeality, and knowledge of oneself and the Other are closely 
intertwined in a contemporary philosophical discourse – namely, 
in a deontological one. Important issues are considered in codes 
of ethics, including the limits of knowledge and principles of the 
relevant solutions regarding human corporeality, for example in 
medical codes of ethics where in some cases not medical knowl-
edge, but the decision of the patient, about his or her body, plays 
the most significant role.
Contextualism may give a definite but incomplete answer 
to the question of the foundations of knowledge and ethics, 
taking into account the current crisis of epistemological and 
ethical foundations, the fact that the era of metanarratives has 
come to an end, the failure of the methodology of analytical 
philosophy to solve the problem of scepticism and find reli-
able foundations of knowledge. In addition to the hermeneutic 
tradition of continental philosophy, the developments of phe-
nomenological ontology can be an effective tool in clarifying 
the above issues.
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The Gettier issue can be described as a deep philosophical 
problem. All the attacks of sceptics are aimed at knowledge 
justification. This sceptical problem may be solved, on the one 
hand, by studying the initial premises of the subjects’ interest, 
and, on the other hand, by a hermeneutic interpretation of the 
context.
When it comes to ethical issues, contextualism is strictly 
limited from a methodological point of view. Universals, in 
turn, are important for the very reason of being universals, that 
is, they are ideal tools. We would like to emphasize the role 
and importance of the proper use of contextualism: in spite of 
everything, contextualism can be essential for solving deonto-
logical problems. It may counterbalance dogmatic deduction 
and act as a dialectical opposite to abstract universal values, 
provided that such universal values are not rejected by contex-
tualism as completely unnecessary. In the event of forgetting 
the universal, there is a risk of context hypostasis, which may 
lead to complete moral relativism.
For philosophers such as Hans Georg Gadamer, Emmanuel 
Levinas, and Paul Ricoeur, the cultural concept of the Age of 
the Enlightenment was largely based on technology and com-
putational reason, while they paid a great deal of attention to 
ethics and the cultural heritage. The cultural concept of the En-
lightenment as seen by the above-mentioned philosophers was 
dominant in bourgeois and industrial societies. Nevertheless, 
the aforementioned philosophers considered different ways of 
overcoming the crisis of dehumanization, which broke out in 
the modern era. With regard to culture, there has always been 
a note of pessimism, and the debate on the concept of culture 
continues to this day. As Gadamer noted, ‘We all understand 
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that there is culture, both instinctively and intuitively, but de-
fining this concept still remains a rather complex task.’ Both 
Gadamer and Levinas analysed the understanding of culture 
as a process of conceptual inheritance of traditions of the En-
lightenment, namely, a culture of rational, computational, and 
deductive knowledge.
The hermeneutic approach to a symbolic structural unit is 
extremely important. Hermeneutics should reveal a hidden, 
distorted, obscure meaning lying motionless under general, su-
perficial truths of life. Representatives of analytical philosophy 
and hermeneutics, using the corresponding approaches, fo-
cused on language as an ideal substance that is both immanent 
and transcendent. It is a living speech in and of itself, where 
consciousness is revealed. A metaphor always gives us a hint, 
stimulating our consciousness to look for clues and trying to 
understand what it sees. Therefore, everything that exists now 
manifests itself and can fulfil its potential through words and 
images. The human being, therefore, represents a proscenium 
of being, where the meaning and specific content of real-life 
situations and the metaphorical proliferation of meaning, 
which are irreducible to it, create the need for reinterpretations, 
constituting knowledge-generating processes, for example interpre-
tation of constitutional texts, human rights, myths, historical events 
etc. in the field of humanitarian discourse.
With regard to recommendations, I would suggest that, in order 
to acquire knowledge, it is less important to have a store of knowl-
edge at a particular time, than to maintain the search for knowl-
edge using all the methods of knowing which the human spirit has 
discovered: scientific, discursive, deductive, intuitive, like the way 
of thinking of geniuses, who can guess the real state of things, when 
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some hypothesis can be true only on the base of prediction and intu-
ition, hermeneutical, when judges interpret successfully a constitu-
tion, and this interpretation has a positive impact on further social 
development, metaphorical, when in ancient tribes people use myth 
and metaphors in order to transfer social knowledge to children or 
further generations, and others. In my opinion, this is the best way 
to avoid dogmatism and refute scepticism.
I would therefore recommend refuting scepticism, but not with-
out arguments and not with the help of dogmas of particular epochs, 
we should rather refute scepticism by taking into account not only 
the scientific concept of knowledge, but cultural and hermeneutical 
concepts as well, by concentrating not on a factum of knowledge, 
but rather on the life world of humans and on the process (life way) 
of obtaining knowledge and developing Spirit throughout all ep-
ochs of Its emanation. It means we can say that we know something 
only when we are well aware of all historical epochs of philosophy 
as supreme thinking of the Truth, Ethics and Knowledge.
Further research could consider the following:
a) Investigating the causes of the present crisis of values 
referred to above as the current crisis of epistemological and 
ethical foundations;
b) suggesting possible solutions, with respect to the crisis of 
values, as well as the current ecological, economic and political 
situations;
c) and also trying to resolve the problem of, on the one 
hand, trying to respect every culture, while also attempting to 
arrive at a world-wide acceptance, which I consider the most 
important, of universal human rights.
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